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PREFACE

Several years ago, as I read the minutes of a conference per
taining to some problems between the United States and Great Britain,
I wondered about the many problems involved in any wartime international
collaboration and how the leaders contrived a course of successful
action.

The question remained in my mind, as a kind of general topic

for later study, until I was faced with the choice for thesis work.
Having been active in World War II and having been based in
England during the finale of that Anglo-American enterprise, I chose
to study the background and progress of the collaboration which caused,
or rather, directed the forward action of which I was a part.

The re

sulting research led to the firm realization that national interests
and respective leader interpretation of those interests guide the de
cisions of international collaboration.

In order to reduce the subject

to manageable proportions, the view was narrowed to the really major
figures, their formal meetings, and decisions for a primary action the Second Front.
Just as progress in a great international undertaking requires
support from the parties involved, so my work was supported by the
gracious ladies of the Army Pentagon Library, who manage the reference
department and who render all possible assistance in locating a vital
reference, suggesting available source material, and listening to their
"customers'" ideas.
ii

Dr. Leo B. Lott, Chairman, Department of Political Science,
University of Montana, and thesis director, furnished valuable support
in the area of Ideas, expression of those Ideas, and overall encourage
ment during the final period of compilation.
Finally, my wife kept the spirit of completion alive when all
the exigencies of daily living contrived to cancel the writing effort.
She had a double and re-doubled task, for once having Father at the
typewriter, she then had children to entertain elsewhere, because
"Daddy is studying."

iii
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The record of relations between nations contains many examples
of crises as well as periods of stability, and the eventual easing of
tensions or furthering of cooperation is proportional to the satis
faction of national interests.

This results from the fact that national

interests are what states seek to protect or gain in relations with
other states.

It has been suggested that "an ideal foreign policy con

tains a systematic formulation of national interests in which . . . the
interests have been judged against one another in terms of priorities
and the interests as a whole have been budgeted against the power of the
state to achieve those interests."^

If they act rationally, nations

with common interests will cooperate so long as their action furthers
respective national objectives.

However, even in the best of cooperative

international enterprises, where optimum commonality of purpose is vital
to achievement of goals, there is still variety in approach and diver
gence in opinion.

Even those nations which have much in common cultur

ally, linguistically, economically, as well as in broad national inter
ests, experience difficulty in achieving agreement in matters of policy,
procedure, and goals.

A case in point is that of Anglo-American cooper

ation during World War II.
^Frederick H. Hartman, The Relations of Nations, (New York:
Macmillan Company, 1957), p. S.

Essentially three elements or Influencing threads of philosophy
extend throughout the period of Anglo-American cooperation and contribute
most heavily to decisions made.

The first of these Influencing threads

Is typified by the philosophy and apparent motivation of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt:

his overriding concern for achieving world

peace by those methods embodied In President Woodrow Wilson's original
Fourteen Points.

Such was Roosevelt's primary objective In the Anglo-

American cooperation.

His was a long range goal.

He was very careful

to avoid direct conflict with his domestic political adversaries,
because Isolationist political elements had destroyed Wilson's hope for
control of war by International organization, and the President Intended
to avoid the Wilson type of failure.
England's Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill's philosophy and
goals constitute the second dominant thread of Influencing factors.

His

primary goal was explicitly stated In the first speech he made following
his elevation to power.

"Our goal," Churchill said, "Is victory."

Although the Prime Minister was admittedly a key figure along with
Roosevelt In formulating the original statement regarding the Inter
national organization which we call the United Nations, he was primarily
motivated by the desire to attract to his cause the somewhat large and
Influential segment of Internationalist thought prevalent In England.
This he did by encouraging the establishment of an International organi
zation.

During the early Anglo-American cooperation, the urgency of his

Immediate problems and the danger his country faced just for survival
claimed his attention much more than did consideration of post-war
actions.

However, to the degree Churchill gave thought to the means

of maintaining world peace, he favored the traditional balance of power,
with Britain as the balancing nation.
The third set of influences affecting the decisions described
herein was voiced by the military staffs of both nations and took the
form of argument over proper military strategy, politics notwithstanding
From the beginning of joint military planning, the British espoused a
strategy derived from their historical experience as a nation and which
was based on the concept of a strong navy to offset the deficiencies of
a small army.

By using their navy, they were able to mount various

land offenses, attain their objective, and retire to their naval base
of operations.

This strategy allowed them to strike then at another

place with fairly consistent success.

The United States, on the other

hand, was a large land power and looked upon the European war as a
land war which would require large armies.

The American strategy

envisioned the build up of a powerful striking force with which they
would mount a swift and overwhelming offensive.

The nation's tremen

dous productive capacity would insure an adequate flow of supplies,
particularly since the supply route planned by the Americans would be
by way of England and would be protected by the navies of both
countries.

Moreover, as Allied air power developed, with the potential

of blunting, or stopping entirely, the German air arm, the attack
could be launched sooner than envisioned by the British.

Finally,

the American battlefield psychology and experience was such that
their techniques of land warfare called for rapid attacks with over
whelming force.

It is not the author's intention to pass judgment on which
decision should have been made or whether an alternative course of
action would have been better.

Numbers of peopl^-wfto are experts in

hindsight deliberation have already done this.

It is more useful to

explore the way major decisions were made which led to the massive
campaign called the Second Front.
Several accounts attest to the fact that production was vital
to the prosecution of the war.^

Each nation was plagued by shortages.

British capacity was strained to the limit well before the days of
Lend-Lease.

American productive capacity was not adequately organized

and channeled at the time of Lend-Lease legislation.

Therefore, the

meshing of industrial and military might of England and the United
States promised to be difficult.

However, the essential problems lay

in the realm of political and military decision making, basic strategy,
and the achievement of national goals.
There seems to be general agreement among writers about the
period that major differences did exist in this area of necessary
O

cooperation.

Not only were national interest of Great Britain and

the United States not identical in form or intensity, but powerful

^Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1949), II, pp. 494-501; Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt
and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 410.
O

For a discussion of the differences in political interests and
outlook, see Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the
Second World War (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1962)
p. xxxiv. For similar comment by an American, see Maurice Matloff and
E. M. Snell, United States Army in World War II. War Department; Stra
tegic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1942 (Washington: Department
of the Army, 1953), pp. 29-30.

personalities were involved.

The machinery for national decision

making in each case was of different design, stimulus, and operation.
Variations in major policy, both political and military, were ever *
present in varying degree.

There were numerous occasions when each

party to the enterprise doubted the other's really effective contri
bution to planning, execution, and peace procedures.
This study deals with the political policy as well as with
military plans and associated actions.

Such policy and plans provide

the rationale for decision not only to strike the enemy, but more
importantly, where and in what sequence to strike him for most damage to
his war making capability.
The Anglo-American political cooperation had a definite existence
as far back as 1939, when Churchill re-entered the British Cabinet in
the Admiralty, much to the satisfaction of President Roosevelt.^

Like

Churchill, Roosevelt had been prompt to realize the menace of Hitlerism,
although he was far in advance of the strict neutrality sentiment prev
alent at the time in American public opinion and in Congress.^

Cordial

relations between the United States and Great Britain were earnestly
encouraged by both men.

With the fall of France, Roosevelt appeared to

recognize that the die was cast and that England would require all the

^Trumbull Higgins, Winston Churchill and the Second Front
1940-1943 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), p. 30.
Alden Hatch, Franklin D. Roosevelt. An Informal Biography
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1947), p. 245.

support the United States could provide if the British were to prevail.^
His convictions were constantly supported by encouraging and urgent
messages from Churchill.

The latter roared at the enemy and inspired

British citizens to renewed optimism.

Churchill knew, however, that

Britain by herself could not be victorious and that he must acquire as a
partner the former colony across the Atlantic if his stance in the face
of superior force was not to be undermined.

Both men had domestic

problems at home which restricted their ability to make the international
decisions they felt most appropriate at the time.
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Both had goals of a

national caliber which had to be pushed aside at times in order to attain
the cooperation essential, at least for the British, for survival.

Both

were strong leaders of democratic nations committed to the cause of
individual freedom, but each had differing organizational forms and ideas
for achieving the primary short range goal--victory, and long range
goal— lasting peace.
Although political contact and agreement between the two leaders
was relative simple to initiate and maintain, inter-governmental coop
eration was quite another matter.

Many members of the American Congress

were far from convinced that their constituents desired close cooperation
1

This is evident from the early encouragement of British pur
chases of war supplies in spite of U.S. industry inability to furnish
with any degree of timeliness the needs of its own growing military
force. Then, as Britain announced the imminent exhaustion of her
financial resources (November 1940), Roosevelt managed to push through
Congress the Lend-Lease measure (signed into law March 11, 1941).
2

For example, the Destroyer for Bases Exchange where England
traded base rights on certain British islands to the United States for
fifty over-age destroyers. Respective national governments had to be
convinced that necessary quid pro quo was present.

with any remaining democratic government of Europe.

An anxious press

as well expressed doubt that the war in Europe was America's concern.

1

In addition to these strong policy doubts, American production through
the summer of 1941, though potentially enormous, was insufficient to
meet Lend-Lease demands or the United States military requirements.
Many members of the United States military establishment were pessimistic
about the United States ability to reach a stage of military readiness
in time to aid the British.^

General Marshall and Admiral Stark were

among those to whose lot fell the task of proving that there was not
only a need, but also a way of

achieving that powerbase.

cooperation with their British

counterparts was not smooth, but at least

the military goals were the same.

Types of experience among the two

national military leaderships were different.
dissimilar.

Detailed

Ideas of strategy were

Indeed, not until 1944 did they appear to coincide, and

even then, overall strategy itself was not fully agreed to by both
parties.

The feelings of American military people involved in the

negotiations were not improved

by the constant pressures of the

politically-oriented Roosevelt

and Harry Hopkins to provide for the

"hungry" British forces from the United States military table of supply,
a meagre table in the earlier days, and especially so as the Pacific
Ocean war progressed.

As the United States Army Chief of Staff,

^See the digests of opinion in the New York Post, (September 4,
1939); and the New York Times, (September 8, 10, 1939).
^Henry L. Stimson, and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in
Peace and War (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), p. 376.
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General Marshall initiated consultations with the British military
apparatus as far back as 1940 in the search for common understanding of
England's needs.

As requirements were established, Marshall bent every

effort to meet them from such sources of supply as he found available.
Hence, he was chagrined to see his hard-won supplies, obtained for
previously agreed military actions, employed by the British in small,
peripheral and, in his judgment, wasteful diversions.
In the interest of order, four major events, or combinations of
events, will form the basis for this study.

They represent key consid

erations during the growing Anglo-American cooperation which led to a
Second Front.

The paper will consider the three elements of influence

stated at the beginning and pertinent aspects of each event, i.e.,
personalities, circumstances, and some arguments; and finally, the
impact of decisions made during one event on the succeeding events of
the study.
The first episode culminates in the first high-level AngloAmerican conference.

This summit meeting took place at Argentia,

Newfoundland, in August 1941, and was the first wartime personal contact
between the President and Prime Minister.

During the week of that

meeting, there evolved the declaration of principles later known as
the Atlantic Charter, which contained Roosevelt's philosophy.
The second event was a conference held in Washington in
December 1941.

Called at Churchill's request, it is noteworthy for

its achievements.
ship:

The Atlantic meeting had paved the way for partner

now the principals resumed where they left off.

Churchill's

purpose In requesting the meeting when he did was to forestall any
American inclination to shift their central interest from the Atlantic
to the Pacific following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.

Now tliat

the United States was in the war, Churchill wished to reaffirm previously
agreed Allied policy.

A number of important decisions were reached, such

as conmon strategy, acceptance of a blueprint of operations, priority of
the war against Germany, and a declaration to the world of an association
of United Nations.

However, the most vital decision and keystone to

future cooperation was the decision that henceforth, Britain and America
were to run the war as one entity with military staffs combined at
highest level to give single direction.
The third and perhaps most influential episode in this chronology
took place in Washington in June 1942.

It followed in the wake of Soviet

Foreign Commissar V. M. Molotov's visit to Washington during which
President Roosevelt had acceded to Molotov's request for a statement
saying that "full understanding was reached with regard to the urgent
tasks of creating a Second Front in Europe in 1942."

There were

implications in this statement that the British were unwilling to under**

1
write.

In British eyes, the Americans were insisting on a dangerous

and untimely campaign which might have disastrous results.

To clarify

their divergent views, the two countries undertook a series of conver
sations which culminated in a second visit by Churchill to Washington
beginning June 17, 1942.

^Sherwood, p. 577.

The British War Cabinet had earlier stated

10

firmly that they could not accept an invasion of France in 1942 and
that if there were to be any semblance of such a second front as
Roosevelt promised Molotov, it would have to be other than on the
European continent.

Churchill's purpose during the visit was to convince

the President that a North African invasion was the answer.

The eventual

decision in this matter led to the well-documented sequence of decisions
for follow on operations in the Mediterranean in accordance with British
desires.

American military leaders were chagrined, for they were con

vinced that build up for a 1943 cross-Channel invasion was the best
strategy.
The fourth episode or set of events pertains to the difficulties
and arguments which arose between Great Britain and the United States
in deciding the time and manner of fully engaging Germany in a true
Second Front.

The Quadrant and Cairo-Teheran conferences were the means

of settling the differences and making decisions for this action of major
importance to the Allied cause.
involved.

Difference in military strategy were

Both nations recognized the necessity for a cross-Channel

invasion of France.

However, the British envisioned an Italian campaign

to remove Italy from the war and at the same time cause a German diversion
of forces to Italy from other fronts.

If successful, such a course of

action would weaken German opposition to the massive Allied crossChannel effort to follow.

The Americans, on the other hand, proposed

the cross-Channel operation for an initial assault upon the Nazi-controlled
area and were impatient with their British partner for the "unnecessary
delay," which would be created by peripheral activities.

The resulting

11

compromise has the markings of the most controversial decision of the
overall cooperation, and writers of political and military strategy are
still divided as to which side was right,^

For examples of those on the American side, see Samuel Eliot
Morison, Strategy and Compromise (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1958), pp. 28-29; and Albert C. Wedemeyer, Wedemever Reports (New York:
Henry Holt and Company, 1958), pp. 228-234. For examples of those on
the British side, see Hanson W. Baldwin, Great Mistakes of the War
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1949), pp. 9-13 passim; and Chester
Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952),
pp. 714-715.

CHAPTER II

PRELUDE TO COOPERATION

Hans Morgenthau has expressed a theory of political power which
has to do with a nation's interests.

He says that "the concept of

national interests presupposes . . . continuous conflict and threat of
war, to be minimized through a continuous adjustment of conflicting
interests by diplomatic actions."^

The importance of national interests

and the interpretation of United States and British interests by
respective national chiefs were noted in the introduction.
action may assume a variety of forms.

Diplomatic

Furthermore, it may be conducted

on a quite personal and informal basis, especially by highly placed
government officials.

Such personal diplomacy marked the relations

between President Roosevelt and Pritne Minister Churchill during the
period with which we are concerned, and most citizens of the two
countries appear to have approved this close relationship as right and
proper.
That these two leaders encouraged closer bi-lateral association
during the late 1930's was not accidental; nor was the fellowship

Hans Morgenthau, "Another Great Debate: The National Interest
of the United States," American Political Science Review, LXVI, No. 4
(December 1952), 9610968.

12

13

without some pattern.

However, in order to illuminate the personal

factors, as well as national objectives, which fostered the somewhat
providential relationship, a sequence of background facts about both
the President and the Prime Minister will be presented.

In the process,

it is appropriate that additional people who played vital roles in the
Anglo-American cooperation of World War II be considered.
is concerned with such facts and personalities.

This chapter

It is sub-divided in

the interest of clarity.

Franklin D. Roosevelt: Pre-War Cooperative
Action and Long Range Goals
Franklin D. Roosevelt assumed the United States presidential
cloak of office in 1933 at a time when the Administration's problems
were predominantly domestic.

The Years of the Great Depression had

seen the national economy virtually wrecked.

At that time the average

United States citizen was experiencing tenuous security.

Governmental

action on behalf of these people was sadly lacking.
The new President's close advisers were determined that solution
of these knotty domestic issues would be the principal governmental
objective.

Roosevelt was in accord with their ideas for the national

scene, for a basic tenet of his philosophy was "that the government
should subordinate private interests to the collective good and substitute
cooperation for selfish individualism.

He had always hated the tremendous

inequality in the distribution of wealth and ardently desired to correct
it."^

However, Roosevelt had been in the Wilson government and was also

^Hatch, p. 169.
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in sincere sympathy with the tenets of humanitarian philosophy as Wilson
had felt it should be applied to the world.

The new President was also

well aware of the international system of which the United States was a
part.
During the 1933 Disarmament Conference, Roosevelt proposed that,
in exchange for disarmament agreement, the United States would enter into
a consultive pact.

This would promise conference with signatories when

one of them claimed aggression had occurred, but it would leave the
United States free to decide for itself whether aggression was a fact
justifying the application of economic sanctions.

President Hoover had,

during his latter days in office, requested of Congress legislation to
empower the President to embargo the shipment of arms to aggressor nations,
and in mid-April 1933 the House of Representatives passed the resolution.
Roosevelt's consultive pact plus the Congressional resolution for a
discriminatory arms embargo would build a special annex of the League
of Nations for the United States in which it could cooperate for
collective security without conmitment or loss of sovereignty.
The Senate Committee of Foreign Relations, apparently fearing
loss of sovereignty and resisting involvement in European power politics,
amended the measure so as to remove the discriminatory clause and require
instead that the embargo would apply to all parties to a dispute.

Since

such a law would render impossible United States cooperation in economic
sanctions against aggression and, therefore, make a consultive pact

15

useless, rather than risk its passage, the administration dropped the
resolution and it was not voted on.^
With this example of strong isolationist influence before hfm,
it did not take the President long to realize the need to soft pedal
his enthusiasm for world cooperation.

Although he agreed with Woodrow

Wilson's great plan, he was determined to avoid a public misunderstanding
or run the risk of a rejection of any similar plan.

Therefore, he under-

took a long campaign to re-educate the American people.

2

The "educational" process which ensued was fraught with problems,
for a large and vocal isolationist element extended throughout the nation.
Nevertheless, when Hitler announced the rearmament of Germany in 1935,
Roosevelt protested and said "we cannot build a wall around ourselves
and stick our heads in the sand."

Then, in January 1936, he declared

that "peace is threatened by those who seek selfish power."

3'

Still

later, in 1937, when Japan, Germany, and Italy combined forces, he spoke
1
"The heart of the argument was that isolationists during the
period between the two World Wars asserted the impossibility of the
United States taking part in collective action against an aggressor
without forming 'entangling alliances' . . . which would destroy the
sovereignty of the United States and permit other nations to determine
its policy and even plunge it into war against its will." Basil Rauch,
Roosevelt from Munich to Pearl Harbor (New York; Creative Age Press,
1950), p. 2.
^Hatch, p. 232. The friendly biographer tends to imply a
Roosevelt conviction that the United States would become obligated to
action in Europe.
I agree with Professor Langer that during this period,
the President had no such conviction.
Rather, he was anxious that the
United States be prepared for its obligations as a leader in world af
fairs, not merely an observer. William L. Langer, and S. Everett Gleason,
The Challenge to Isolation; The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American
Foreign Policy. Vol. I (New York; Harper and Row, Puhliahensy-4.952),
p. 202.
^Hatch, pp. 235-236.
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out in warning and defiance as he marked the shift to direct alignment
i

and overt planning for defense in the struggle between fascist and
democratic states:
The peace loving nations must make a concerted effort in oppo
sition to those violations of treaties and those ignorings of
humane instincts which today are creating a state of interna
tional anarchy and instability from which there is no escape
through mere isolation or neutrality . . . the will for peace
on the part of peace loving nations must express itself to the
end, that nations which may be tempted to violate their agree
ments and the rights of others will desist from such a course.
Repercussions from diverse sources across the land resulted.
Time Magazine reported the opposition as being:
From the Wall Street Journal which front-paged an editorial
'Stop Foreign Meddling; America Wants Peace'; from World
Peaceways and five other passive-peace organisations; from
Senator Gerald P. Nye, sponsor of neutrality legislation;
from columnist Hugh Johnson who wrote 'Well, here we are
again, taking sides in a war.
The following week. Time added "Franklin Roosevelt's major job in
Washington is to deal with the reverberations, political and intema3
tional, that followed his announcement."

Always a politically

sagacious man, Roosevelt gave way before the great clamor of public
disapproval.

However, his convictions that resistance to dictatorship

was a necessity did not change.

Hence, he waited for public acceptance

of the logic of his global politics.

^President Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Quarantining War," Vital
Speeches of the Day. IV (October 15, 1937), 2-4.
^T ime, October 18, 1937, pp. 17-19.
^ i m e . October 25, 1937, p. 17.
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Some eighteen months later, in July 1939, the President tried
again, as he urged the repeal of the Arms Embargo section of the Neu
trality A c t .

Even the strong support of this effort by Secretary of

State Hull was to no avail however, and Congress denied the request.
Congressional isolationists, such as Gerald P. Nye and William Borah,
remained adamant in their stand against such a move,^ confident that
there was no danger of war.

Roosevelt's determination to resist Hitler's

program of European dismemberment was demonstrated by his proclamation
of a Limited National Emergency in September 1939.

In November, his

policies achieved partial success when he succeeded in obtaining
Congressional approval for changes in the Neutrality Act to permit the
sale of war munitions to democracies on a "cash and carry" basis.^
As a follow up to this success, Roosevelt sent Sumner Welles,
Under Secretary of State, on a fact finding tour of European capitals.
The tour took place just after the first of the year in 1940.
brought back an alarming report.

Welles

There was to be a strong German

offensive in the spring of that year; one the Allies were in no con
dition to meet.

Although the President was certain that, without sub

stantial United States aid the Allied cause would be lost, he also
realized that the nation was not as yet convinced of the lesson he had
to teach.

The deteriorating European situation contributed to Roosevelt's

decision to attempt the unprecedented third term race for office as
President of the United States.
^Of primary importance to England and France was the repeal of
the embargo on sale of arms. By the time of passage, the bill had been
so thoroughly debated that Mr. Arthur Krock observed that the Senate had
"bored itself and the country at large." (The New York Times. October 29,
1939).
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The expected German spring offensive exploded into being.

The

Nazis occupied Denmark in April and stormed into Norway soon thereafter.
♦
A month later, their mechanized might stunned Europe and by May 14,
"pierced the thin shell of France's fortified line.

The Roosevelt

message to Americans, until then largely ignored, got through.
country was in danger!

The

At last, as Roosevelt spoke to the joint session

of Congress on May 16, 1940, he was able to convince the nation of what
he and the military staff had known for years.

In addition to the sober

accounting he gave of the steps needed to strengthen our military forces,
he saw as vitally necessary an enormous increase in production.

He set

a goal more ambitious than anyone before had imagined.

He was moving

the nation on a course for support of warring nations.

Such support

would eventually involve millions of Americans under arms.
The question might be asked:

What sort of man was this President

who brought his nation from an attitude of isolation and strict neutrality
to a conviction that the ideals of freedom were just as important in
Europe as elsewhere in the world?

One writer submits that the chief

reasons Roosevelt was admired and trusted— loved if you will— by a pre
ponderance of the common, ordinary citizens of the United States were
his optimism, his sympathy, and his ability to take them into his
confidence.

They were a part of his responsibility; he did not consider

himself to be their responsibility.

During those early years of his

administration, the President "made the unemployed, the dispossessed.

^Hatch, p. 259.
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the underprivileged feel that he cared," and the programs he sponsored
did not betray those for whom and to whom he appealed.
believed the American society could be improved.

"Roosevelt

He felt the same way

about the world scene, and when war came, he set out to provide a means
for nations to live in prosperity and peace.

His pattern was the Wilson

philosophy up-dated to the needs of ,the current world.
Roosevelt demonstrated other attributes as well, which are not
so idealistic.

He did enjoy power and the exercise of it.

arbitrary, stubborn, and dilatory.

He could be

He wore the presidency like a cloak.

It was his office; it did not own him.

Therefore, he manipulated the

affairs of state, established ^oals, and was not necessarily orthodox
or traditional in his methods of achieving his objectives.

In foreign

affairs, he sometimes strained the limits of constitutional authority,
but being an astute political technician,

2

he shaped the broad lines of

his desired policies in conjunction with the legislative body and
coordinated with public opinion— as close a taskmaster as his actions
would acknowledge.
The President permitted quarrels in the official family and often
by-passed his cabinet officers, but there was often method in this loose

^Dexter Perkins, The New Age of Franklin Roosevelt 1932-45.
(Chicago; University of Chicago Press, 1957), pp. 8-10.

2

Samuel Morison has suggested that Roosevelt "had a political
calculating machine in his head, an intricate instrument in which Gal
lup polls, the strength of armed forces, and the probability of England's
survival; the personalities of ... congressmen; the Irish, German,
Italian, and Jewish votes; ... were combined with fine points of political
maneuvering." Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American
People (New York; Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 995.
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procedure.

By surveying the opinions of a large number of imaginative

and competent minds at other levels of authority, Roosevelt established
in his own mind a conviction as to what should be, and aligned it with
what his experience and judgment as a politician told him it could be.
The result was a policy, essentially his, but susceptible to adjustment
as trusted members of his staff or others might suggest.

It is to a

consideration of one of these trusted contemporaries that we now turn.

Winston Churchill:
His Background for Cooperation and Goals
Although the Roosevelt story is far from complete, it is appro
priate to stop at this point, for it is during the period of late 1939
and early 1940 that the personal diplomacy so important to our study
really began.

We must now consider pertinent facets of the Churchillian

background.
Rarely had the British people been so united in going to war as
in 1939.

Winston Churchill gave expression to the feelings of these

people in the last speech he made as a private member of the House of
Commons :
We are fighting to save the world from the pestilence of Nazi
tyranny and in defense of all that is most sacred to man. This is no war for imperial aggrandizement or material gain.
It is a war to establish on impregnable rocks, the rights of
the individual. It is a war to establish and revive the
stature of man.
With such demonstrated awareness of the people's feelings,
Churchill was recalled to the government in an atmosphere of general

Lewis Broad, The War That Churchill Waged (London;
1960), p. 17. Hereafter referred to as Broad.

Hutchinson,
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acclaim.

His dynamic energy and the fame of his anti-appeasement

speeches made him the man of the hour in Britain as he returned to his
old place in the Admiralty in September 1939.

Heartened by a United

States Presidential message of congratulations, Churchill replied at
once.

Thus began the long correspondence which paved the way to close

understanding and personal diplomacy between the central figures of
these two nations.
Churchill became Prime Minister in May 1940.

The phrases of his

speech presenting his Ministry to the House of Commons established his
policy, his aim, and his dedication:
I have nothing to offer but blood, toil, tears, and sweat . . .
Our policy?
. . . to wage war against a monstrous tyranny,
never surpassed in the dark, lamentable catalogue-of^humaH"
crime. That is our policy. Our aim?
. . <^it is victory,
victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory
however long and hard the road may be - for without victory,
there is no survival.^
Continuous bad news plagued the Prime Minister and the New
Government:

the German breakthrough, no reserves, the French defeat.

But in the press of problems, Churchill informed Roosevelt that "What
ever might happen, the British in their
end.

But

island would fight on to the

if the Americans were able to render assistance, 'if it is

to play any part it must be available soon'."^

The pressing need was

for arms.

Washington received a formal British appeal for help and

responded

in such a way that the United StatesArmy was deprived of

^Winston S. Churchill, The Second World W a r , Vol. II (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1949), pp. 25-26.

2

Broad, p. 36.
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all but the minimum essentials.

Rifles, machine-guns, and field guns

with ammunition w6re shipped to Britain.

The American decision to take

vigorous action was based on Roosevelt's evaluation of Churchill's *
steadfast character.

The American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull,

attested to this fact as follows :

"The President and I were convinced

that under Churchill's indomitable leadership Britain intended to fight
on.

We believed that Mr. Churchill meant what he said,

Had we had any

, 1
doubt we would not have taken the steps we did."
The American willingness to believe in Churchill might be
attributable to his position of power in his nation.

Certainly, as the

"first" of the British Ministers, the Prime Minister (Churchill or some
other) acquires power from the fact that he selects the members of his
Government.

Further, he alone, of all the Ministers, may make great

decisions without the approval of the full Cabinet.

A comparison of

the Prime Minister's position with that of the American President is
made as follows;
The Prime Minister, because of the concentration of respon
sibility in the Cabinet and the discipline of British parties,
has, as a general rule, far greater powers than the President,
whose freedom of action is severely limited by the separation
of powers, but the President can usually exercise his powers
far more independently as an individual than can the Prime
Minister. The British executive is a plural executive, in
spite of the predominance of the Prime Minister.%

^Cordell Hull, Memoirs of Cordell Hull (New York:
Co., 1948), Vol. I, pp. 744-745.

Macmillan

^Samuel H. Beer, and Adam B. Ulam (ed.). Patterns of Government ;
The Major Political Svstems of Europe (New York: Random House, 1962),
pp. 116-117.
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Regardless of Churchill's influence in government by virtue of
the Constitutional position he occupied, however, Roosevelt was also
well acquainted with Churchill's position as a persuader in his country
among the British people.

Just as presidential power in the United States

depends in large measure upon the individual's ability to persuade, so
in the final analysis, did Churchill's authority stem from a political
base dependent upon the will of the people as represented in the House
of Conmons.^

That Prime Minister Churchill could persuade and more than

not convince the mass of England's population in resisting the German
threat clinched the President's decision for aid.

Thus Roosevelt, by his

action, gave Churchill his own personal vote of confidence.
At the time Churchill formed his first Ministry, he was head of
a government but not of a political party.

Although it was customary

for a Conservative Prime Minister to lead his Party, Churchill would not
permit his predecessor, Neville Chamberlain, to surrender as leader of
the Tories.

A compelling reason is taken from his letter to Chamberlain;

"As Prime Minister* of a national government, formed on the widest basis
and comprising three parties, I feel that it would be better for me not
to undertake the leadership of one political party."

Having made the

Churchill alluded to this in his first speech to the American
Congress on December 26, 1941, when he said: "I have steered confidently
toward the Gettysburg ideal of 'government of the people, by the people,
and for the people'.
I owe my advancement entirely to the House of
Commons, whose servant I am . . . O n any day, if they thought the people
wanted it, the House of Commons could by a simple vote remove me from my
office." Charles Bade, The War Speeches of The Right Honorable Winston S .
Churchill (London: Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1952), p. 145.
^Broad, p. 53.
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Party administration secure by retaining its nominal leader, Churchill
could devote himself to the primary task of marshalling his forces to
defeat Germany.

Considering himself to be especially well qualified«in

military matters, he assumed the post of Minister of Defense.

Although

it was unusual for a Prime Minister to assume responsibility for a
subordinate position as well, Churchill has explained his rationale;
Power in a national crisis, when a man believes he knows
what orders should be given, is a blessing.
In any sphere
of action there can be no comparison between the positions
of number one and number two, three, or four . . .
It is
always a misfortune when number two or three has to initi
ate a dominant plan or policy. He has to consider not only
the merits of the policy, but the mind of his chief . . .
There are always several points of view which may be right,
and many which are plausible.
I was ruined for a time being
in 1915 over the Dardanelles, and a supreme enterprise was
cast away, through my trying to carry out a major and cardi
nal operation of war from a subordinate position. Men are
ill-advised to try such ventures. This lesson had sunk into
my nature . . .
At the top there are great simplifications.
An accepted leader has only to be sure what it is best to do,
or at least to have made up his mind about it.l
Churchill's powers and responsibilities as Defense Minister were,
like the British Constitution, undefined.

Hence, they became very much

what he wanted them to be; as extensive as the exigencies of the war
dictated.

Having his own conception of how a war should be run, he

was determined that decisions should be reached swiftly, and resulting
orders should be issued promptly and obeyed.

During the previous war,

Lloyd George had a small War Cabinet as a management tool.

Churchill also

had a War Cabinet, but he used it only as the executive authority.
direction of vital affairs, such as planning and control of military
operations, was lodged with him through and together with the Chiefs

^Churchill, II, pp. 15-16.

The
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of Staff; that is, the professional heads of the three military services •*
Navy, Army, and Air Force.

This Chiefs of Staff Committee, as it was

called, was the operational authority for conducting the war.
Defense Minister, Churchill was its guiding force.

As

The arrangement

resulted in the Prime Minister's having full control over the British
handling of the war.

Although he and the Chiefs of Staff Committee were

subject to decisions of the War Cabinet and the House of Commons, he was
prompt and conscientious in placing pertinent matters before these bodies.
As a result, there was seldom any interference from them, and no Prime
Minister before him had exercised such direct authority in the military
sphere.^
Neither did Churchill have cause to worry about his parliamentary
position, at least for the first six months of his tenure as Prime
Minister, for the sense of national peril silenced criticism.

He had

promised the nation only that his Government would be resolute against
tyranny and that every effort would be bent towards ensuring national
survival.

Therefore, the disasters of 1940 were borne in Parliament

with stolid resignation.

Continued reverses of 1941 brought forth

breaks in the silence, but the Prime Minister's critics found little
support in the House of Commons, which registered confidence in the
Government by a vote of 447 to three.

2

1Lewis Broad, Winston Churchill; The Years of Achievement
(New York: Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1963), p. 67. Hereafter referred to
as Broad, Years. Also see pp. 195-197 for Churchill's account of duties.
^Broad, p. 92.
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Churchill could view with satisfaction his domestic political
situation, and he could be reassured in the knowledge that his ideas
and vision would receive full consideration in British war councils.
But the defeat of Germany required more than purely British sources
could provide.

The channel of communication with the American President

was the Prime Minister's most valuable hope.

As long as he had access

to the American leader, Churchill would be able to assist in the design
of Hitler's eventual destruction.

Therefore, the Prime Minister was

ever alert to ways for influencing his Atlantic neighbor toward active
participation in the war to save mankind.^

Churchill's primary goal

remained always one of victory.

Other Key People: Their Place in the
Cooperative Role
That Roosevelt and Churchill were men of vision, politically
astute, and extremely competent in achieving agreement with their points
of view is evident from the several accounts of their accomplishments.
Furthermore, they clearly shared a vital national interest - the defeat
of Nazi Germany.

However, their vision, their ability to achieve, and

the realization of national interests came to fruition predominantly
through the contributions of thought and action of loyal military
leaders.

This is not to detract from the exceptional support rendered

See Appendix I for example of Churchill's effectiveness in this
respect. It is his letter to the President dated December 8, 1940,
"vigorously stating Britain's position, needs, arid the war prospects
for 1941 . . .
It proved a powerful advocate for the policy of LendLease."
(Hull, Memoirs. II, pp. 920-922).
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the nation during this period by those more specifically oriented to
politics, such as Harry Hopkins, but in time of war political and
military actions are so closely akin as to be intertwined.
The American military personalities, who stood out as key figures
in the early Anglo-American cooperation, were General George Marshall
and Admiral Harold Stark, Chiefs of Staff respectively for the Arny and
Navy.

Although Marshall remained throughout the war. Admiral Ernest King

replaced Stark soon after Pearl Harbor.

Secretary of War Henry Stimson

and Secretary of Navy Frank Knox were effective Cabinet personnel, and
as such were vital to proper coordination of functions between the
political element and the purely military establishment.
As had France and Britain, the United States in 1939 had looked
on helplessly as Germany swiftly defeated the Polish forces.

In spite

of Roosevelt's efforts to change the situation, the twin ills of
complacency and unpreparedness which had plagued France and Britain
were United States afflictions too.

Marshall and Stark had little

time for shoring up defenses, in spite to the American ocean defenses
and modest military forces.

In addition, they had to fight against

great odds, for isolationist forces were still strong.

Even Roosevelt

recognized the necessity for moving the nation carefully or not at all
The task which Marshall faced at the end of 1939 seems unbelievable in
retrospect.

His biographer sums up as follows:

Seventeenth in rank among the world's a m e d forces, the United
States Army retained from World War I only the luster of its
fighting reputation. Weapons, effective in the Meuse - Argonne
were obsolescent; many officers lacked proper training or had
stagnated; the allotment for training in the late thirties.
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amounting to approximately two per cent of the Army's
appropriations, was insufficient to keep the Regulars in
shape or give the National Guard a real concept of field
duties; and the lack of equipment and personnel for existing
units held them below authorized peacetime strength. Worse
still. Congress in its legislation reflected the national
conviction that enforcement of the neutrality laws was
sufficient to prevent war from touching the Western Hemi
sphere".^
In 1939, during the early period of American neutrality, the
military men had been engaged in strengthening defenses in the Carib
bean and the Atlantic.

A different orientation emerged when Japan

moved toward expansion in the Pacific.

The fleet was ordered to re

main at Pearl Harbor rather than return to the west coast bases. The
United States now looked to the British and French fleets to hold the

2

Atlantic.

The defeat of France brought with it a problem not the least
of which was guarding two oceans in the event Britain failed to hold
out.

Marshall, Stark, and their advisers were especially concerned

at the latter prospect.

Therefore, in August 1940, at the suggestion

of the President, a quick tour of inspection was made of British in
stallations by American military representatives.

An optimistic

evaluation of Britain's long term chances of survival resulted.

More

importantly, the tour fostered the conviction in military circles of

^Forrest C . Pogue, George C. Marshall Ordeal and Hope (New York:
The Viking Press, 1966), pp. 6-7.

2

Americans had consistently, either consciously or unconsciously,
looked to England for patrol of major trade routes of the world. As far
back as 1937, Lippman discussed this phenomenon of United States de
pendence upon Great Britain.
(Walter Lippman, "Rough Hew Them How We
Will," Foreign Affairs, XV, July 1937, pp. 587-594).
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both nations that a periodic exchange of information between Britain
and the United States was desirable and should be accomplished on a
regular basis.

Therefore, in November 1940, Admiral Stark formally

proposed that :
The United States Army and Navy
talks on technical matters with
to reach agreement and lay down
Allied effort should the United
enter the war.^

at once undertake secret staff
the British and Canadians . . .
plans for promoting unity of
States find it necessary to

During this same period. Admiral Stark's counterpart in the British
Navy, Admiral Found, expressed the view that there should be conversations
in Washington with War and Navy Department Staffs.^
was noncommittal concerning the suggestion.

At first, Marshall

Lacking a fighting force

that could contribute heavily to any offensive policy within the next
eighteen months, he wished to proceed cautiously.

Still, he agreed with

Stark that the United States military forces needed to know something of
British capability just as the British should know what to expect from
the United States forces.

If such information were not exchanged in

3
advance, "we would start with no basis at all if war developed later on."
As a result of the consensus in the United States and British military
staffs, American-British Conversations (ABC) took place in Washington
from January 29 to March 29, 1941.

Mark S. Watson, United States Army in World War II, The War
Department. Chief of Staff; Prewar Plans and Preparations (Washington:
Department of the Army, 1950), p. 119.
^Watson, p. 120.
3pogue, p. 126.
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The opening statement by the Americans at the first ABC meeting
revealed that for them the conversations were:
To determine the best methods by which the armed forces of the
United States and the British Commonwealth can defeat Germany and
the Powers allied with her, should the United States be compelled
to resort to war.l
To avoid any possible suggestion of official commitment by the United
States, the President carefully took no part in the proceedings, and
Marshall and Stark, after appearing briefly at the opening session,
were absent thereafter.

2

The report of the British and American representatives at the
ABC sessions was later approved by the British Government, and although
the President declined to give it formal United States approval, both
nations treated it as a fairly specific statement of understanding by
the military service leaders.

In summarizing the points of agreement,

we find that the United States was interested primarily in hemisphere
defense and the maintenance of Britain's position in Europe.

Running

through American conclusions were threads of British strategy, such as
operations to remove Italy from the war, a major air offensive and minor
amphibious raids against German controlled areas, and the encouragement
of resistance groups in occupied Europe.

Only for the undetermined

future could they speak of a build up for a final offensive against
G e r m a n y .3

Although this document was not a formal pledge, its

^Excerpt from statement by Stark and Marshall at opening of the
conference. Copy in War Plans Division (WPD) 4402-94 and WPD 4402-89
as cited by Watson, 372.
2
Watson, p. 374.
3por more complete account, see Watson, pp. 376-380.
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provisions went far toward specifying the type of war the United States
would wage if it entered the conflict with Germany.

Robert Sherwood

concluded correctly that the conversations and exchange of opinions
"provided the highest degree of strategic preparedness that the United
States or probably any other nonaggressor nation has ever had before
entry into war

Thus the American military leaders laid a foundation

for future war planning and cooperation with Great Britain.
At the same time early United States military coordination was
being effected with Great Britain, another key American figure, Harry
Hopkins, was active in a similar vein on the political front.
was perhaps Roosevelt's closest confidant and adviser.

Hopkins

Until 1941 he had

been engaged in the service of other Departments or agencies of the
Government.

However, beginning in 1941, Hopkins chief involvement with

the President related mainly to the conduct of military affairs and
included his work in administering the Lend-Lease Act.

Further, and of

utmost importance, were his several important missions to confer with
Churchill and Stalin as the President's personal representative.^
In January 1941, while the secret ABC military discussions were
in preparation, Roosevelt sent Hopkins to his first meeting with the
Prime Minister.

Just as those visits by United States military repre

sentatives, during the previous August, were to acquire factual

^Sherwood, p. 273.
^Hopkins made five trips to visit Churchill and two to Stalin,
the last to Stalin being for President Truman in May 1945.
(See Index
'^Hopkins, Missions," Sherwood, p. 969).
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information, so was Harry Hopkins "to gain first hand knowledge of
Britain's needs and of finding a way to fill them."^

The mission to

Churchill had its beginning in a lengthy letter from the Prime Minister
to Roosevelt dated December 8, 1940.

This document vigorously stated

Britain's position and needs and war prospects for 1941.^

The President

was deeply troubled by the implications it raised for England's survival.
He knew that concerted action was required in some areas but felt much
of the problem "could be settled if Churchill and I could just sit down
together for awhile."

Hopkins suggested that, since the President

couldn't be away from the country at that time, he, Hopkins, might visit
Churchill in the President's place.

"If I had been to England and seen

it with my own eyes, then I might be of some help."^
It was during this visit with Churchill that Hopkins became well
acquainted not only with the Prime Minister, but also with the moral
fiber supporting England in her ability to make war and with the British
war making requirements which the United States could support.

Perhaps

the most important result of the visit, however, was the conviction he
could take back to Roosevelt;
Churchill is the Government in every sense of the word . . .
Churchill wants to see you - the sooner the better . . .
I am convinced this meeting between you and Churchill is

^Sherwood, p. 236.
^Churchill, II, p. 458. Also see Appendix I. The Prime Minister
has referred to the letter as being one of his most important.
^Sherwood, p. 230.
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essential . . . .
This island needs our help now, Mr. President,
with everything we can give them."!

Summary of Prelude
This chapter has served to provide a setting for Anglo-American
collaboration, which in December 1941, was suddenly made completely
overt and direct.

Contacts between British and ihnerican political and

military chiefs of both nations had by that time been established.
Although not official, sound basic military coordination had been
effected and at least informal agreement had been reached about how
the United States would wage war against Germany if she became compelled
to do so.
We have seen that both Roosevelt and Churchill were leaders of
their nations in the literal sense of the word.

Both had breadth of

vision necessary to plot courses of action calculated best to serve
respective national interests.

Realizing that they could travel the

inevitable war route more effectively as allies, they guided their
national destinies to a common meeting ground.
Through personal contact, Churchill kept the President so in
formed of the British plans and needs that the President was able to
fashion the domestic political atmosphere in the United States in a
way most suited to support Great Britain's war makine^essentials.
Although not discussed in the main body of the^chapter, two examples
of the President's political shrewdness in this regard are the exchange
of United States destroyers for lease rights to British controlled bases;

^Sherwood, p. 243.
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and the Lend-Lease Act, which enabled the United States to provide
Britain the machines of war on a loan basis.

Both programs of action

were at such odds with the American policy of neutrality that some
discussion of citizen reaction to them is appropriate here.
The Destroyer for Bases agreement of September 1940 provided
Britain fifty over age destroyers in exchange for base rights to
selected British owned Atlantic islands, use of which would improve the
United States defense posture.

The general public considered the deal

an admirable bargain, even though it seemed to border on an AngloAmerican alliance.^

The terms of the agreement were so favorable to

the United States that initially there was little disposition in Congress

O
to criticize it.

Isolationist alarms were certainly sounded.

For

example, the St. Louis Post Dispatch ran a full-page advertisement in
the New York Times and other papers on September 4, 1941, saying
"Mr. Roosevelt today committed an act of War."^

However, the position

of the isolationists was sorely weakened by their long advocacy of
action to acquire bases in these same islands.^

That they showed less

^"This trade gives notice that the democracies have the courage
and foresight to help each other effectively." (Christian Science Moni
t o r , September 4, 1940); The deal gave the United States "a stockade of
steel to the East." (New York Herald Tribune, September 4, 1940); for
public opinion generally see survey of opinion of The New York Times,
September 1, 1940.
2

See summary in The New York Times, September 4, 1940, and
The Congressional Digest, January 1941, 17 ff.
3
For complete account of "The Destroyer Deal" see William L.
Langer, and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation (New York;
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1952), pp. 742-776.
^The Chicago Tribune, July 26, 1940, repeated a long-standing
proposal to acquire British possessions in settlement of war debts.
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than usual inclination to make an issue of the transaction is illustrated
in the words of an unnamed Senator:
Listen, you can't attack a deal like that. If you jump on the
destroyer transfer, you're jumping on the acquisition of defense
bases in the Western Hemisphere. And the voters wouldn't stand
for that.
Roosevelt outsmarted all of us when he tied up the
two deals.1
The idea of Lend-Lease was conceived purely and simply as a means
to aid Britain.,

The Churchill letter of December 8, 1940, to Roosevelt

(see Appendix I) brought into clear focus for the President the
distressing material conditions which faced England.

The Prime Minister

submitted

essentially two propositions. First, that control of the

oceans by

the United States and Britain "is indispensable to

the security

. . . and the surest means of preventing war from reaching the shores of
the United States."
longer be

Secondly, "the moment approaches when we shall no

able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies.

Roosevelt's practical answer to

Churchill was the submission of

a bill to Congress which would provide a program:
To sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, or otherwise dispose
of defense articles to the government of any country whose defense
the President deems vital to the defense of the United States. . .
This merchandise to be settled for as the President deems satis
factory, and the benefit to the United States may be payment or
repayment in kind or property, or any other direct or indirect
benefit which the President deems satisfactory.3

^New York Post, September 9, 1940.
^Churchill, II, p. 476.
Excerpt from the Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941, as discussed
by Basil Rauch, p. 295.
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The isolationists immediately condemned the bill as a "blank
check."

Senator Burton K. Wheeler declared:

"Never before has the

Congress of the United States been asked by any President to violate
international law . . .

It means war, open and complete warfare."^

However, after a two month debate in Congress, when the final
vote was taken, the measure passed by 317 to 171 in the House and by
60 to 31 in the Senate.

If, as it seems reasonable to assume. Congress

reflected the opinion of the country, the American people were ready to
assist Britain.
Taking such action as these two examples illustrate enabled
Roosevelt not only to provide more effective aid to the nation who
had become America's first line of defense, but al^sg^-throngh~the re
sulting massive Governmental procurement programs, he could begin
marshalling his own nation's vast productive resources before the
advent of an almost inevitable war.

^Congressional Record (77th Congress: 1st Session),' Vol. 87,
pt 10 (Appendix), p.A 178-179, as cited in Rauch, 304.

CHAPTER III

THE ATLANTIC CONFERENCE:

CLOSER ASSOCIATION

AND THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

This chapter outlines a view of the primary Anglo-American
issues of the Atlantic, conference, some of the processes in arriving
at conference decisions, and selective impacts these decisions had
upon the progressive cooperation of the two English-speaking nations
in defeating the Nazis.

That conference was the first of periodic

personal contacts between the President and Prime Minister.

It was a

dynamic step in an ever growing collaboration between the two heads of
government.
With the establishment of a broad framework of contacts and
procedures for both Lend-Lease supply and limited military support of
the British, President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill agreed
in mid-1941 on the necessity for personal conversations regarding
international policy.

Inasmuch as the two national leaders had agreed

in principle to such collaboration as was encompassed by the Lend-Lease
Act, Roosevelt and Churchill were likely to be very much in accord on
other courses of common action as well, such as aid to Russia, or
resistance to Japanese aggression.

However, personal association seemed

to offer the most promise for clear understanding of, and differing
approaches to mutual problems.
37
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Harry Hopkins was responsible in some degree for bringing this
face to face association to fruition.

It will be remembered that he

%
had discussed with Churchill in January 1941 the need for such a
personal exchange of views between the two men.
that time was March or April.

The date mentioned at

However, the President found it impossible

to leave the country before April, and by that time the Prime Minister
could not leave England because of war crises in Greece and Crete.
Hence, it was not until July, while Hopkins was on his second mission
to England, that early August was set as the time and Argentia Harbor
in Newfoundland as the place for the Atlantic Conference.
Churchill reflected in his account:
A conference between us would proclaim the ever closer associ
ation of Britain and the United'States, would cause our enemies
concern, make Japan ponder, and cheer our friends. There was
also much business to be settled about American intervention
in the Atlantic, aid to Russia, and our own supplies, and above
all, the increasing menace of Japan.^
Roosevelt approached the conference with firm opinions concerning
what the Anglo-American relationship should be.

He was also aware of

the Prime Minister's desires for early American military action.

In

cluded in the President's convictions were that American production
effort alone would not enable Britain to win the war.

"He, Churchill,

knows that to mount an offensive, he needs American t r o o p s . A n o t h e r
problem of weighty concern to Roosevelt was the matter of freedom of

^Churchill, III, p. 427.
^Elliot Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York:
Pearce, 1946), p. 24.

Duell, Sloan, and
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international trade, particularly as it was affected by Empire prefer
ence trade agreements, which had long existed.

During the same conver

sation, from which we quoted above, Roosevelt told his son, Elliot:
We've got to make clear to the British from the very outset that
we don't intend to be . . . used to help the British Empire put
of a tight spot, and then be forgotten forever.
. . » America
won't help England in this war, simply so she will be able to
continue to ride roughshod over colonial peoples.!
There is evidence of action to insure the presence of suitable
political and military talent on each side as plans for meeting took
final form.

When Roosevelt learned that the British Chiefs of Staff

Committee would be present, he advised the Prime Minister that he would
bring Admiral Stark, General Marshall, and General Arnold.%

Since such

representation would provide the primary "opposite numbers" on respective
military staffs, Roosevelt's selections were appropriate.

Later, when

Churchill advised he would bring Permanent Under Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Roosevelt added to the American
party. Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and Averill Harriman.
The latter had just returned to Washington from London where he had been
sent to expedite Lend-Lease supplies to the British.

Perhaps there was

nothing premeditated in Roosevelt's decision to bring Harriman along,
other than to have readily available the best-informed opinion; however',
since the President seemed confident that the Prime Minister would urge

^Roosevelt, p. 24.
^General Henry Arnold was in command of the United States Army
air arm of that day which later became the Army Air Force. Thus, Arnold
represented the United States on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as
on the Combined Chiefs of Staff when that body came into being.
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an immediate American declaration of war against the Nazis,^ Roosevelt
may have deliberately planned a campaign of resistance to the Prime
Minister's eloquence.

Certainly, both Hopkins and Harriman were

currently informed, Hopkins having arrived (with Churchill's party)
from a remarkable two-day conversation with Stalin,% and Harriman having
recently toured British field units in Africa and the Middle East.
The business at hand was begun almost immediately on arrival of
the two parties at Placentia Bay.

In the afternoon of the first day,

Welles and Cadogan engaged in establishing mutual understanding of major
topics to be considered.

The President's and Prime Minister's first

meeting, before the official opening of the conference, was more for
acquaintance and relaxation than anything else.

Roosevelt entertained

Churchill and his party at dinner that evening.

Although the dinner was

far from a formal conference atmosphere, it was during this time that
the two leaders, and Hopkins, Welles, and Cadogan began serious dis
cussions.

Conversation was wide-ranging.

However, sufficient time

was spent on two main topics to insyre a common basis for work by
pertinent staff members.

The first pertained to the growing menace of

Japanese aggression in the Pacific, which the British held to be of
primary concern.

The second topic was the proposed joint declaration

which was to become the Atlantic Charter.

Detailed discussion of these

subjects is taken up later in this chapter.

^Roosevelt, p. 24.

2

During the whirlwind visit to Moscow, Hopkins "had gained more
information about Russia's strength and prospects than had ever been
vouchsafed to any outsider." (Sherwood, p. 343).
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Accounts indicate that Churchill held the center of attention
during that first evening gathering; primarily, because Hopkins wanted
the President to hear "one of Churchill's after-dinner analyses of the
war s i t u a t i o n . I n his eloquent manner, Churchill presented the British
position, and how close to defeat his nation had actually moved.

Although

confident in the hardihood of his fellow citizens, he made no effort to
conceal his anxiety regarding American decisions.
come in at our side!

"The Americans must

You must come in, if you are to survive I W h e n

Roosevelt suggested the Russians as a factor in deterring German victory,
Churchill expressed conviction that Russian resistance, though commendably
sturdy and surprising, would cease in a relatively short time.

The

Prime Minister seems to have had two objectives at this single sitting.
The first was to convince the President of the urgency in declaring war
against Germany.

The second was to counteract any American tendency to

increase aid via Lend-Lease to Russia.

Roosevelt listened but at the

time made no comment in reply to Churchill's plea.
Officially, the talks between Roosevelt and Churchill' began oh
August 11, 1941.

Sir Alexander Cadogan, Harry Hopkins, and Sumner Welles

were present at the first meeting.

Early in this period the Prime Minister

raised the topic of Japanese military expansion in the Far East.

His

initial recommendation was that the United States, Britaiju_and the
Netherlands simultaneously issue a warning to Japan that further military

^Sherwood, p. 353.

2

Roosevelt, p. 30.
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expansion on her part would lead to counter measures by the three
governments named, even though such counter measures might result in
war between them and Japan.

There was a corollary-'to this warning in

cluded in Churchill's suggestion.

It was to the effect that should

Great Britain assist the Netherlands, as a result of Japanese aggression
against the Netherlands East Indies, the President would request
Congressional authority to assist the British and Dutch in defense
against the Japanese aggression.
Both Churchill and Cadogan had already discussed the problem with
Welles and had provided him and the President copies of suggested drafts
of parallel communications along the above lines for presenting to the
Japanese government.

Churchill did not think there was any other re

maining possibility of deterring Japanese expansion farther to the south,
in which event war between Great Britain and Japan would result.

Welles

has recorded Churchill's emphatic belief that "if wardid break out
between Great Britain and Japan, Japan immediately would be in a position
...

to cut the life-lines between the British Dominions and the British

Isles unless the United States herself entered the war . . .

The blow

to the British Government might be almost decisive.
Both the President and Welles also felt that war with Japan should
be avoided as long as was reasonably possible.

But they were reluctant

to use such a "mailed fist" approach as urged by Churchill; they thought
it might be better to provide some element of "face-saving" for the

^Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941
(Washington; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1958), Vol I, pp. 355-356.
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Japanese.

Therefore, rather than submit the somewhat blunt statement as

proposed by the Prime Minister, they proposed to tell Japan that only
withdrawal from her expansion program would justify the lifting of
United States trade sanctions against her.

However, the United States

would, in a friendly spirit, seek to explore the possibilities for
reaching a friendly understanding between the two governments.
agreed to this procedure.

Churchill

He also concurred in the President's

suggestion that the United States and Britain be prepared to advise
Japan that neither the United States nor Britain had aggressive
intentions with regard to Thailand.

By following the above course of

action, Roosevelt felt that Japanese aggression which might lead to
war "could be held off for at least thirty days."^

Churchill was more

optimistic, feeling that, with an expression of firm resolve to the
Japanese, there was a resonable chance for avoiding war in the Pacific
altogether.
Preparation of the United States-proposed Joint Declaration was
to require more time than did the discussions concerning Japan.

The

President was eager to issue a document that would declare the broad
principles which prompted Anglo-American cooperation in the world.

There

would be strong political overtones in any such declaration, and these
two masters of the political art applied extreme care in producing a
statement which would have the desired results in respective domestic,
as well as international, political circles.

One example of compromise

arose over Roosevelt's desire to make clear that no future commitments

^Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, p. 360.
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had been made during the meetings.

His objective was to render it

impossible for isolationist elements in the United States to allege
conclusion,

of secret agreements.

Churchill understood this aspect of

the President's problem, but he demurred in favor of a positive statement
that discussions had been solely of "questions relative to the furnishing
of aid to the countries resisting aggression under the terms of the
Lend-Lease Act."^

The President agreed with Churchill's recommended

change, because he could then refer questions of secret agreements to
his initial public statement.
Following this agreement on the initial statement, the two leaders
turned their attention to the draft of the proposed Joint Declaration.
Two points of the document were controversial in varying degree.
first concerned freedom of trade.

The

This had been a topic of conversation

between Roosevelt and Churchill during an intimate gathering the second
evening of the conference.

At that time, the President had emphasized

his conviction that much of the backwardness in the undeveloped areas of
the world was due to British Empire trade agreements, which gave England
a favored position in dealing with the British Dominions and Colonies.
Roosevelt had long been certain that "if we are to arrive at a stable
peace, it must involve the development of backward countries . . . (and
that) the structure of peace demands, and will get, equality of peoples.
Equality of peoples involves the utmost freedom of competitive trade.
At the time of that informal discussion, Churchill had taken issue with

^Foreign Relations, Vol. 1, p. 361.
^Roosevelt, pp. 36-37.
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the President's stand, because he felt there could be no tampering with
Empire agreements.

Later, when the question was raised at the formal

session, both sides of the issue were discussed in detail.

The draft of

the point in question, as presented by Sumner Welles, Under Secretary of
the United States Department of State, read as follows:
Fourth, they (the United States and Great Britain) will endeavor
to further the enjoyment by all peoples of access, without discrim
ination and on equal terms, to the markets and to the raw materials
of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.^
The President and Welles voiced recognition of the adverse effect
the phrase, "without discrimination and on equal terms", might have on
British Empire preferential trade agreements.

However, the phrase, "they

will endeavor to further", initiated the point; hence, there was not
implied an immediate binding obligation on the part of His Majesty's
Government.

The Prime Minister indicated personal agreement with the

proposal, for he had always opposed the underlying Ottawa agreements.
He went on to point out the evils of the United States tariff walls as
well.

Furthermore, both he and Cadogan agreed with Welles that phrase

ology was not the question.

Rather, the need was for "a policy of

constructive sanity in world economics as a fundamental factor in the
creation of a new and better world, and that except through an agreement
upon such a policy by our two governments, there would be no hindrance
to a continuation later to the present German practices of utilizing . . .
trade and financial policies in order to achieve political ends

^Foreign Relations, I, p. 361.
^Foreign Relations, I, p. 362.
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However, regardless of his personal convictions, Churchill was
without authority to agree upon the point as stated for inclusion in
the proposed declaration.

This was due to the necessity for British

Government, as well as Dominion, agreement, which, if possible to obtain
at all, would require so much time as to delay issuance of the declaration
until after news of the meeting had been released to the world.

The

Prime Minister then suggested a revision in wording, approximately as
follows;

"Fourth, they will endeavor, with due respect for their

existing obligations, to further, etc."^

He felt he might obtain

approval from his government if such a change were made.

Although Welles

felt the value of the point was thus seriously reduced, if not destroyed,
the President agreed to the redraft of the fourth point as recommended
by Churchill.
The second point requiring resolution of differences pertained
to what became point Eight in the final draft of the Joint Declaration.
Although both the original American and British draft versions had in
cluded a provision for some form of international organization, the
draft Roosevelt preferred omitted such reference because of the
suspicions and opposition he feared such a statement would create in
the United States.

Churchill initially agreed to the revised text.

Later, however, since he felt that some opinion in England would be
disappointed at the absence of any stated intention to establish an
international organization for keeping peace after the war, he proposed
further modification of the text.

This involved insertion of the

^Foreign Relations, I, p. 361.
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phrase "pending the establishment of a wider and more pemanent system
of general security."

Roosevelt finally agreed; hence, the concluding

point of the declaration read as follows:
Eighth, they believe that all the nations of the world, for
realistic, as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the
abandonment of the use of force.
Since no future peace can be
maintained If land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed
by nations which threaten, or may threaten aggression outside
their frontiers, they believe, pending, the establishment of a
wider and permanent system of general security,! that the disarmament of such nations Is essential. They will likewise aid
and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten
for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armaments.
Thus, the seed of the United Nations organization was first
planted, not by Roosevelt but by Churchill.

Point Eight In the charter,

as well as the others to varying degrees, made the document historic.
Although the United States and Great Britain never regarded the
declaration as a formal State Paper or Treaty, through Its Issuance,
they firmly assumed new moral responsibilities within the world.
Roosevelt was eager to do just this.

However, he had not felt the

United States political climate was ready for a forthright statement
of his desire.
The Chiefs of Staff discussions at the Atlantic Conference
produced little of Importance.

No agenda had been prepared, and there

had been no specially prepared exchange of views.

The British had hoped

for discussion of major problems In strategy, but the Americans, with
Admiral Stark as primary spokesman, had no authority to exceed tentative
agreements already made.

Their main Interest was In connnectlon with

1

Italics mine.
^ Foreign Relations, I, pp. 368-369.
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Lend-Lease priorities and production schedules as affected by develop
ments on the Russian Front.

In this regard. General Marshall reminded

the British Chiefs of the mounting pressure upon the United States for
munitions, now that Lend-Lease supplies for Russia caused a large un
programmed and additional drain on existing production resources.^
Since Admiral Stark at the outset requested the conference be
restricted to discussions only,^ he suggested that the American staff
would require time to analyze the British review of the war situation.
Therefore, there is little evidence of such hearty military cooperation
as was enjoyed between the Chiefs of State.
However, upon return of the Chiefs of Staff to Washington, General
Marshall asked the War Plans Division (WPD) to examine the British report,
and to comment upon it.

Several members of the WPD responded, and all

who did were unanimous in their opposition to the British views.
British had stated:

The

"The intervention of the United States would

revolutionize the whole situation."3

Their rationale for such a belief

included such factors as the easing of the sea-shipping losses; the
ability of American forces to prevent enemy penetration in Morocco and
West Africa; and the assumption that the United States could assume
commitments in the Atlantic Islands.

The WPD consensus can be expressed

in Colonel (later General) Wedemeyer's contention that "we must not

^Watson, p. 405.
^Watson, p. 404.
^Watson, p. 402.

49

become an active belligerent until we have created the means by which
we can accomplish our national o b j e c t i v e s . T h e staff considered that
with her undeveloped army strength of those days, the United States
would be of more assistance in supplying munitions.
Another British proposal had relegated the land offensive to
some vague future time, following concentrated naval and air action.
The latter action ostensibly would beat down German resistance to such
a degree that large land forces would be unnecessary.
also unacceptable to the Americans.

This idea was

They interpreted in the British

Chiefs' review only minor attention to preparation for land operations,
and instead of agreeing with the British view, emphasized that "naval
and air power may prevent wars from being lost; and by weakening enemy
strength, may contribute greatly to victory . . . but it should be
recognized as an almost invariable rule that wars cannot be finally won
without the use of land armies.
The differences in military strategy as exemplified by the above
discussion continued on a recurring basis throughout the Anglo-American
collaboration until achievement of firm commitments for cross-Channel
attack of Germany were eventually agreed in late 1943.

Of course, there

was continuing and earnest effort in both countries to compromise in the
common interest.

However, the military arguments, during and after the

Atlantic Conference, served at least one constructive purpose.

They

warned the British of the strong views held in Washington, and provided

^Watson, p. 406.

2

Watson, p. 408.
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unmistakable evidence that the United States was likely to be the
controlling partner in any coming alliance.
In retrospect, the primary accomplishments of the Atlantic
Conference were political in nature.

Most important to the success of

future cooperation was that the two Chiefs of State were able to
establish a deep personal relationship and firm understanding, which
would be vital in the days ahead.

This understanding was to enable an

easy attitude in collaboration and international decision-making.
Although both men may have had different objectives in mind for the
declaration which became the Atlantic Charter, they mutually decided
upon its content, agreed upon its implications, and appear to have tried
to comply with its spirit.

The degree of influence the document had on

respective peoples of the world in changing the course of war-time
events is impossible to assess with accuracy.

However, the moral

philosophy expressed bound the nations in a cause from which they never
faltered until the defeat of their common enemy was assured.
toward a Second Front had begun.

The move

CHAPTER IV

THE ARCADIA CONFERENCE;

ALLIED GRAND STRATEGY

AND THE UNITED NATIONS

The Anglo-American parallel warnings to Japan, which Churchill
recommended during the Atlantic Conference, were never made.

The Prime

Minister undoubtedly hoped for a strong stand by the United States
against Japanese aggression.^

However, the President returned to the

United States to find a middle course of warning to Japan more appro
priate.

This was due to recurring Japanese requests for a meeting be

tween Roosevelt and Japanese Prime Minister Konoye, to discuss Far
Eastern problems.

Such meetings also failed to materialize, because

the Japanese were unwilling to participate in pre-conference discussion
of the fundamental principles with which such a meeting would deal.
Japan's insistence on holding the meeting and leaving the "details" for
later consideration created suspicion in the United States Department of
State.2

Nevertheless, the record reflects consistent diplomatic effort

by the United States to avoid war with Japan.
considered, as was the soft.

The hard line was

Since a middle course was attempted,

^In his account of the final conference to the British War
Cabinet on 12 August 1941, he referenced the warning to Japan and con
cluded with "One would always fear State Department trying to tone i t .
down; but President has promised definitely to use the hard language."
(Churchill, II, p. 446).
% u l l , II, pp. 1023-1024.
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only to have it fail, arguments for either untried extreme can be
advanced.

However, the reality is clear, the United States and British

political and military plans for the Pacific, in existence at the close
of the Atlantic Conference, were wrecked in early December 1941
This chapter has to do with succeeding steps taken in AngloAmerican cooperation during the first Washington Conference.

Convened

at Churchill's request, it took place during the last week of December
1941, following the attack on Pearl Harbor.

During conference delib

erations, or as a result of them, Churchill's hope was realized, and
decisions on grand strategy were made.

Of primary concern to Roosevelt,

was the firm declaration for unity among the nations allied agaTnst the
Axis.
Roosevelt's primary aim was also realized by the issuance of the
declaration of the United Nations.

Also, agreement was reached re

garding the application of unity in command for respective theaters
having joint forces.

Finally, it was at this conference that the

Combined Chiefs of Staff became an important entity as the future
executive body for the direction of the joint Anglo-American war effort,
and decision was made to form the extremely vital Munitions Allocations
Board.

How such conference decisions were reached will be discussed

and where pertinent the effect of such decisions on later cooperation
will be explored.
Accounts of how Roosevelt and Churchill viewed the Japanese
attack against the United States vary in detail.

However, there is

enough similarity in basic material to conclude that both men experienced
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some feeling of relief that it had occurred.
cast.

At least, now the die was

The firm commitment of the United States to war following the

attack on Pearl Harbor solved a number of political problems for both
men.
In the United States, the voices of isolationism were muted.
The nation's massive production capacity could now be geared to full
capacity, for production was no longer merely "a matter of aid to
foreigners."^

Furthermore, the full development of the nation's military

potential became a matter of national pride rather than a necessary evil.
Churchill could now point to the friend or partner as an ally.
The two nations were no longer prevented from welding their capabilities
into an effective force.

In British eyes, the joint effort could best

be guided by her hard experience of recent years.

Churchill felt that

this close merging of capabilities was even more urgent.

During previous

Anglo-American consultations, agreement had been reached that accounts
must first be settled with Hitler in Europe.

However, the violence of

the Japanese attacks in the Pacific, and the disaster at Pearl Harbor
raised doubts in the Prime Minister's mind that Americans would hold to
the original priorities.

Therefore, the foremost item on Churchill's

agenda was to seek United States reaffirmation of a policy of defeat
Germany first.

Convinced of the necessity to pursue such a policy,

Churchill and his advisory staff worked in their usual singleness of
I

^Robert Sherwood expresses Harry Hopkins' feelings in Roosevelt
and Hopkins (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 410, "We could not
have even an adequate production program until the automobile and other
industries could be converted from a peacetime basis to meet the require
ments of total war - until the American people as a whole, realized that
production was not merely a matter of aid to foreigners, however deserving
they might be, but a matter, of life or death for their own sons."
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purpose to prepare arguments to support this policy.

At least one

account reflects that Churchill's Initial presentation of the subject
to Roosevelt was the evening of the day he arrived In the United States.
Before the Prime Minister could bring forth his arguments, how
ever, the President advised him of agreement:
ments) as well as you do.

"We know them (the argu

The fact Is that we could beat Japan and

still lose the war, but It Is Inconceivable that we could defeat Germany
and not thereafter crush Japan.
This major decision of policy seems to have been easily made.
It seems that Roosevelt by himself could decide the Issue for his nation,
now that a state of war existed.

Of course this was not the case even

though there was no thorough-going American political and military
consultation organization In existence at that time.

Although there

had been some semblance of consultation between the War, Navy, and
State Departments through the Standing Liaison Committee, even this
committee ceased to function with any purpose after November'1940,
because the President began at that time to deal directly with his
chiefs of staff.

He even by-passed respective Departmental Secretaries.

A few officials like Harry Hopkins were normally the only persons
other than the military chiefs who had access to such combined political
and military discussions as the President conducted.

In August 1941,

the President did convene a War Council consisting of State, War, and
Navy Secretaries plus the Chiefs of Staff, but this Council "hardly

^Hatch, p. 299.
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served . . . for mixing military and political views.

Rather it

provided the President with a platform from which to announce decisions
already reached with the help of the Chiefs of Staff.
The decision expressed by Roosevelt to Churchill was based on
extensive Anglo-American military staff conferences and such political
considerations as the President wished to include.

Therefore, the

American military opinion that operations against Germany should have
priority was in firm consonance with Roosevelt's ready agreement with
Churchill.

It is to be noted that there were instances where the

President acted without the advice of his staff, for he liked to trans
act even international business on a personal basis, which sometimes led
to embarrassing commitments or misunderstandings.

He also had a tendency

to become interested in side issues of military strategy and often might
encourage courses of military action which, in the opinion of his
military advisers, were dangerously divergent from a sound strategic
plan.

This "tangential strategy" often resulted in consternation among

military staff members.

Such deviation from agreed views was especially

likely where sponsorship of the British cause was personally conducted
by the Prime Minister, as during the Arcadia meetings, which the first
Washington conference was called.

The Chiefs and Departmental Secre

taries often felt fortunate in being able to call upon Harry Hopkins
to arrange some opportunity for persuading the President to follow
through with decisions he and the Chiefs of Staff had made.

^Harry H. Ransom (ed.). An American Foreign Policy naader
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1965), p. 137.
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Even Hopkins was disturbed during the Arcadia meetings by the
President's inclination to accept casually some of the Prime Minister's
proposals.

An incident of this sort occurred shortly after the English

visitors arrived.

During an evening meeting with Churchill and some of

his advisers, Roosevelt agreed to discuss the possibility of allotting
to the British certain reinforcements originally intended for the
Philippines with the understanding that such action would take place
only if it proved impossible to get the reinforcements to General Douglas
MacArthur, who was in command of United States forces in the Pacific.
The move appeared to be practical, but it was interpreted by the United
States military staff, as a British effort to write off the Philippines
in favor of Singapore.

The immediate problem stemmed from the fact that

the American staff members were not appraised of the idea until the head
of the British secretariat called for a meeting of the Combined Chiefs
of Staff to consider the proposal.

Marshall, Arnold, and Eisenhower^

immediately protested to Secretary of War Stimson that the President had
apparently made serious military commitments without staff advice.

This,

in turn, resulted in an angry call by Stimson to Hopkins warning that
"if Roosevelt persisted in this type of decision making he would need
a new head of the War Department."^

When Hopkins found a propitious

moment to mention Stimson's concern to the two leaders, they denied that

^At the time, Eisenhower was assigned to the Army War Plans
Division. He became Commander of the North African forces in 1942, and
was appointed Commander of Overlord in 1943 following the Cairo-Teheran
meetings.
2pogue, p. 265.
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any such arrangement had been made.

But when Stimson later read to

Roosevelt extracts from a British secretary's record of the informal
discussions in question, the President realized the impropriety of his
action and quickly assured his military advisers that he had no intention
of depriving MacArthur of men or supplies.^
Having achieved consensus regarding the fundamental priority of
defeating Germany first, Churchill could readily acquiesce to a proposal
near to the President's heart.

As a foundation to the future, Roosevelt

had proposed that all twenty-six nations at war with the Axis accept the
principle's of the Atlantic Charter in a public declaration.

Remembering

the unhappy result of Wilson's failure to obtain international commitment
while the war raged, the President wanted to obtain agreement during the
period of stress and peril which existed in December 1941.

Thus, the

formation of the grand coalition of the Allies was among the first
order of business.
Secretary of State Hull was instrumental in formulating the
declaration.

His Department worked out the details of the United

States' draft just as they had the draft of the earlier Atlantic Charter.
The first draft of the document, which was to become the Declaration of
the United Nations, contained three specific points to be agreed upon
by signatory nations.

The first pledged the application of full

governmental resources against the Axis until the latter was defeated.
The second promised full cooperation to effect coordination of effort

^Stimson Diary, 25 December 1941, as cited by Pogue, p. 266.
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and resources against common enemies.

The third assured that there

would be no separate armistice with the common enemy except by common
agreement of the signatory nations.
At Hull's behest, a second document was prepared which suggested
the creation of a Supreme War Council.

Upon presenting this latter

document to the President, Hull said:
It seems essential to provide machinery which will effectively
coordinate the use of resources and the military effort, making
suitable allocation between theaters of war, keeping continuous
check on the execution of war plans, and if possible, achieving
unified command in theaters where this is feasible.1
Churchill has indicated that he and the President "repeating
our methods in framing the Atlantic Charter, prepared drafts of the
declaration and blended them t o g e t h e r . A l t h o u g h the blending of their
ideas concerning the final document certainly transpired, the Prime
Minister's statement over-simplifies the process.
pertinent suggestions of far-reaching significance.

Hopkins had some
He felt that every

effort should be made to include religious freedom in the document.
He also made note that Russia would be reluctant to sign unless the
wording employed acknowledged that she was not at war with Japan.
Hopkins displayed remarkable sensitivity to the possible reaction of
respective allies, such as Russia and China, when he suggested that
their names be placed within the document near those of the United
States and Great Britain.^

it is revealing of the close bond between

^Hull,, II, p. 1118.
^Churchill, III, p. 664.
^Sherwood, p. 448.

59

Hopkins and the President that the latter forwarded these Hopkins
suggestions, as though they were- his own, to Hull for incorporation
within another draft of the paper.^
Secretary Hull and appropriate members of his staff incorporated
the suggestions and discussed the amended document with British Ambassador
Halifax prior to a conference between the President, the Prime Minister,
and themselves that same evening (December 27, 1941).

Halifax agreed

with Hull that the provision in the document for a Supreme War Council
was appropriate.

Since Roosevelt and Churchill were not in agreement

that such a council should be formed at the time, that provision was set
aside.

The remaining provisions were then handed to the Russian

Ambassador, Litvinov, for comment by his Government.
Churchill had wished to substitute for the phrase "the govern
ments signatory hereto" the word "authorities".

His purpose was to

permit the inclusion of the Free French, and although neither Hull nor
the President wished to. take the Free French into the fold in place of
the Vichy government, the President had overruled Hull's arguments and
agreed to the word "Authorities".

Litvinov refused the change, because

"the approval of the Declaration was an approval by the Government in
contradistinction to the Foreign Office, and no ambassador of Russia
has the power to agree to any textual change."2

Although Litvinov then

cabled his Government for approval, which was granted, the agreement must

^Hull's account in his Memoirs, II, 1120, reflects these Hopkins
recommendations as though they were the President's words. Hull gives no
credit for them to Hopkins. Hence, I think he was unaware of Hopkins'
part in this instance.
2Sherwood, p. 449.
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have arrived too late, for the word "Authorities" did not appear in the
published Declaration.

The changes in the text requested by Russia

were negligible and apparently were due to her reluctance even to imply
any sort of commitment against Japan.
All Russian revisions were accepted, including even her wish to
substitute for the words "the defeat of members of adhérants of the
Tripartite Pact" the phrase "the struggle for victory over Hitlerism."
The Soviet ambassador justified the latter by telling Hull "the word
'Hitlerism' with his country includes Nazism, Fascism, and Japanism."^
That Russia's suggestions were so readily accepted is significant.

For

even at this early stage in relations, Roosevelt was beginning to woo
Stalin's support in arranging for peace keeping capability.
By the time major revisions had been made, the Declaration of
the United Nations contained two points rather than the three Cordell
Hull had originally submitted to the President.

They read as follows;

(1) Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources,
military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite
Pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war.
(2) Each Government pledges itself to cooperate with the Govern
ments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or
peace with the enemies.%
On the first day of the new year, 1942, representatives of the
United States, Great Britain, and China signed the document.

The sig

natures for the remaining twenty-two nations aligned against the Axis
were affixed during the following day, and the United Nations Organization

^Hull, II, p. 1122.
2h u 11, II, p. 1124.
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was born.

Although the signatory nations were in fundamental agreement,

the objectives of Great Britain and the United States, at least, were at
variance.

Roosevelt was;

Serving notice that his nation would not agree to the establish
ment of spheres of influence, alliances, and all the other
trappings of traditional diplomacy after the conclusion of the
war. The President wanted to pave the way for United States
leadership of a new organization of countries which would re
place power politics.!
Churchill, on the other hand, was intent on protecting British
interests in the Mediterranean, the Balkans, and Asia.
still for victory.

His search was

He seemed to feel, at least initially, that the

British could now draw on the United States manpower and weapons as if
these had been swept into a common pool for campaigns tailored to suit
the interests and convenience of Great Britain.

As indicated in his

account of the deliberations, "the issuance of a declaration could npt
by itself win battles, but it set forth who we were and what we were
fighting for."2

Hence, he certainly had no objection to the declaration

of purpose, even though his purpose might differ from that of Roosevelt.
Although decisions on grand strategy and proclamations of Allied
unity were important results of the Arcadia meetings, the military
staffs bropght into being an equally important command arrangement for
waging-war by the two allies.

This was in two parts:

First, was an

agreement by the two nations that the forces in each theater would be
commanded by a supreme staff in accordance with the principle of unified

^Donald Brandon, American Foreign Policy; Beyond Utopianism and
Realism (New York; Appleton-Century-Croft, 1966), p. 73.
Zchurchill, III, p. 683.
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command.

Secondly, the Joint Chiefs of Staff of each nation would serve

as a Combined
the war.

Chiefs of Staff to direct the entire military course of

Such an arrangement would permit complete exchange of infor

mation between both national staffs and insure coordination at all major
planning and operational activities.

Churchill has suggested that future

historians may consider this setting up of unified control as the most
valuable result of the December 1941 meetings.^

Certainly, it was the

most important from the military point of view.
General Marshall was the most firm advocate of unity in command.
To his lot fell the burden of convincing not only the British, but also
the United States Navy as well.

His first opportunity to splak for the

appointment of a single commander in a theater of operations was
December 25, 1941, and was with reference to the Pacific theater.

He

contended that "only a commander responsible for the whole theater could
decide the question of allocation of defense forces . . .
manage by cooperation . . .

We cannot

If we can make a plan for unified command,

now, it will solve nine-tenths of our t r o u b l e s . H e

soon realized that

by failing to prepare conference representatives for such close inter
national cooperation, he might have jeopardized its acceptance.
Stark was noncommittal.

Admiral

The British were unwilling to discuss the matter

without sounding out the Prime Minister.

Therefore, the next day, Marshall

outlined his plan of command to Secretary of War Stimson and obtained
enthusiastic concurrence.

Following this, the two men obtained presi

dential approval and presented the detailed outline to a special meeting
^Churchill, III, p. 686.
2pogue, p. 276.
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with Navy Department representatives.
Marshall's arguments won agreement.

Although there was some reluctance,
With his position now clearly out

lined and supported by the President and the Navy, Marshall resumed his
plea to the British Chiefs of Staff.
This time the meeting ended on a happy note with the combined
staffs agreeing to the preparation of a directive for consideration by
the President and Prime Minister.

The latter had strong doubts that one

man could effectively command such widely scattered forces as might be
in the Pacific and offered a counter-proposal that each service choose
its own commander and report to a Supreme War Council in Washington.^
Lord Beaverbrook, Churchill's production minister, favored the unity
proposal and quietly suggested to Hopkins that he, Hopkins, discuss the
details with Churchill.

The result was a private discussion arranged by

Hopkins between Marshall and Churchill, whereupon Churchill sunimoned his
Chiefs of Staff for study of the proposal.

On December 28, he impressed

the British War Cabinet with the urgency of this decision in the eyes of
the President and told them that "General Marshall visited me at my
request and pleaded the case with great conviction."2

Later in the day,

Churchill strongly endorsed the proposal.
The idea of a Supreme Commander in the field was followed by the
conception of unity of staff for direction of the entire war^effort.

The

British had indicated early in the discussions their willingness to

^Hull suggested this procedure when he presented the draft of
the Declaration of the United Nations to Roosevelt and Churchill. This
may be the source of Churchill's idea.
Zchurchill, III, p. 674.
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having a single council sitting in Washington.

Their original idea had

been to have special appointees represent the London-based Chiefs of
Staff.

Since Marshall was opposed to additional levels of authority

between service chiefs and political heads, he recommended delay in
establishing "some sort of council."

This time, it was the United States

Navy in the person of Chief of Operations, Admiral King, who insisted on
firm action now.

King's reasoning was that unity of command in the

Pacific demanded agreement by both the Americans and the British on the
control organization.

The result was that the conference accepted a

British proposal for stationing in Washington a Joint Staff Mission to
represent the British Chiefs of Staff in regular meetings with their
American counterparts.

Thus, the military representatives established

the committee called the Combined Chiefs of Staff, which directed AngloAmerican strategy until the war's end.

This entity became a major means,

of resolving strong strategic differences which later arose between the
British and American military planners.

Its formation had additional

impact on the war effort in that it forced the establishment of a formal
American Joint Chiefs of Staff as the President's direct advisory group.
Secretary Stimson was especially glad to see that turn of events, for in
his view "this formal organization of the staffs had . . .

a most salutary

effect on the President's weakness for snap decisions.
With the creation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, the Allies
provided central management for war planning and operation, but a similar
management function for supply and logistics was also needed if efficient

^Stimson and Bundy, p. 414.
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production was to be properly coordinated with operational needs.

The

machinery selected took the form of the Munitions Assignment Board, which
came under the purview of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but which had
offices in both Washington and London.

For months before the Arcadia

conference the British had been seriously alarmed over American failure
to decide on an orderly method of allocating munitions to the military
services of the United States and the Associated Powers.

They were just

as concerned over the delay in developing an industrial program that would
insure the production needed for victory.

As Churchill's Minister of

Production, Lord Beaverbrook favored a committee under Hopkins to handle
all problems of production - "a Supreme Command in supplies as well as in
strategy."^

As early as August 1941, Marshall and Stark, also much

concerned, had tried without success to place the allocation of military
material under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

After the attack on pearl

Harbor, the President attempted to solve the problem by appointing
Hopkins, Marshall, and Stark as members of a Strategic Munitions Board
to establish an appropriate program for allocating munitions to the United
States and to countries receiving defense aid.

But they had held no formal

meetings before the Arcadia Conference and seem never to have met there
after.2
Allocation of supplies is as vital to carrying out grand strategy
as is the deployment of men and machines.

Therefore,

_th Allies were

^Sherwood, p. 470.
^Richard M- Leighton, and Robert W. Coakley, The United States
Army in World War II, The War Department; Global Logistics and Strategy
1940-1943 (Washington; Department of the Army, 1955), pp. 247-248.
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anxious to achieve some manageable procedure.

Negotiations took place

at both political and military levels of authority during the conference.
Discussions were heated and for a time it appeared that agreement might
not be reached.
The British had arrived in Washington with fairly definite ideas
about Anglo-American cooperation in the field of production and supply,
and they had an elaborate organizational plan for putting their ideas into
practice.

However, the sharp disagreement experienced prior to the final

decision in favor of a Combined Chiefs of Sraff Committee caused the
visitors to proceed slowly when the inatter of production allocation came
up for discussion.

Furthermore, the British staff recognized the heavy

administrative burden their original plan might place on any acceptable
combined body.

Therefore, General Macready of the British staff proposed

an alternate plan.

He and his opposite number on the United States staff.

General Moore, had already agreed on the primary elements of the suggestion.
The plan proposed by these two men called for pooling British and American
production, which would then be divided in bulk between two Allocation
Committees, one located in London and one in Washington, each serving a
group of countries.
That sharp differences ensued is understandable, for such a system
as proposed would essentially divide the world into two spheres of in
fluence, with the United States and Great Britain each supporting the
needs of the Allies for whom respectively they had accepted responsibility.
The word "proteges" was used to describe the sponsored Allies.

The

United States proteges would include Latin American countries and China,
and the British proteges would include France and other countries of
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continental Europe, Turkey, the Arab states, and the British Dominions
and colonies.

Decisions affecting the distribution of supplies as

between one Ally and another, or one neutral and another, might assume
considerable diplomatic significance.

Under a divided source of supply,

individual smaller nations would tend to become firmly oriented
(politically as well as practical) toward the nation which was the source
of supply.

This offered the potential of forming a British sphere of

influence through the flow of United States produced supplies.

Therefore,

"few propositions could have been devised that would more quickly arouse
American suspicions that the British were planning to use United States
supplies to serve purely national i n t e r e s t s . M a r s h a l l insisted that
control would be exercised only by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and from
Washington.

He felt that "nothing but confusion would follow from trying

to create duplicate b o d i e s . F i e l d Marshall Sir John Dill, Chief of the
British Joint Staff Mission in Washington, agreed with Marshall, but
pointed out that a decision had to be made on some system for control
of supply and allocation of war material.

He suggested, therefore, that

the Americans join the British Staff in signing a draft resolution to the
effect that finished war material should be allocated in accordance with
strategic needs and that control of both London and Washington Allocation
Committees would rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Marshall agreed,

and the other American staff members reluctantly joined him in signing

Ipogue, p. 286.
2j. M. A. Gwyer, History of the Second World War, Grand Strategy.
Vol. Ill (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1964), p. 397.
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the resolution.

This resolution ended the military side of the nego

tiations and the results were submitted to the President and the Prime
Minister.
Simultaneously with the discussions conducted by the Chiefs of
Staff, Hopkins and Beaverbrook were also considering the problems of
production and its allocation.

Early in the conference sessions, Hopkins

had recommended a two man Board for the task of allocating war materials.^
He envisioned one American and one British representative.
Churchill

Such a board

would be at the highest level of

authority.

was inclined to

agree with this approach when he

discussed it with his staff.

His

immediate purpose was assurance that the Americans would share fairly
with the British.

2

as well as strategy.

Beaverbrook favored a supreme command over supplies
The ideas merged toward the end of political

deliberations in a proposal which Roosevelt handed Marshall only a few
minutes before British and American representatives filed into the
President's White House Office for the last meeting of the conference.
The proposal would set up boards

under Hopkins andBeaverbrook independent

of the Combined Chiefs of Staff,

one in London and one in Washington.

With

only Hopkins and Roosevelt present, Marshall reiterated his views that the
military must control military supplies and that if this view were not
accepted, "he could not continue to assume responsibilities of Chief of
Staff."3

Hopkins agreed with Marshall to the extent that "if the

Ipogue, p. 286.
^Gwyer, p. 397.
^Sherwood, p. 472.
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organization were not established as Marshall said it should be, he
could not assume responsibility in it either.
In the conference with Churchill and his staff which followed,
the President presented the General's case, and both Marshall and Hopkins
repeated their arguments.

When Churchill and Beaverbrook debated the

question, pointing to the possibility of disagreements, Hopkins suggested
that in case of disputes, appeal could be made to the President and Prime
Minister.

With some reluctance, Churchill agreed to try the arrangement

for a month, and Roosevelt quickly closed the bargain with "We shall call
it a preliminary agreement and try it out that way."2
perfect, this was the bestsolution

Although far from

circumstances would allow,

and the

arrangement continued in force with very littlealteration until the
of the war.
appropriate:

end

Sherwood's summation concerning the Munitions Boards is
"The disputes which resulted produced minor irritations,

but no serious discord.

Hopkins usually moved in on these and his

decision was accepted as final.
The Arcadia conference was a success for all participants.
Churchill could look with satisfaction on the accomplishments achieved.
His primary objective in asking for the meeting, reaffirmation of a
Germany first strategy, had been met.

Further, he had little reason to

doubt that, with the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in existence,
England would be able to draw her fair share from American production

^Sherwood, p. 472.
^Sherwood, p. 472.
^Sherwood, p. 473.
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and use it essentially in such a manner as the Minister of Defense might
wish.

Therefore, progress toward Churchill's broad goal of victory had

been advanced.
The President was
the Arcadia results. Not

also in a position to view with satisfaction
only did the United States now officially share

a common cause with twenty-five other nations of the world, but one of
these, Russia, might well be a key to complete success in effecting postr
war peace efforts.

It was also evident, in the light of British agreement

to Washington control of war production, that Roosevelt had the final word
and Washington was the headquarters for the joint war effort.

As a result,

he was almost assured of Great Britain's support in his post-war hopes.
Surely, these three nations could police the world until such time as a
truly competent international body could be established to maintain world
peace.
Finally, the military leaders on both sides could join their
political leaders in a feeling of satisfaction following the conference.
They were essentially in agreement on immediate strategy.
the American proposal for

Furthermore,

unity in command had found agreement, and a means

for central strategic management of the war had been designed.

Leaders

from both nations very likely could forecast differences in opinion before
many months elapsed.

But as the conference ended, a sense of solid

purpose in a common endeavor was evident, and a valuable step toward
even closer cooperation had been taken.

CHAPTER V

THE SECOND WASHINGTON CONFERENCE:
STRATEGIC DIVERSION - NORTH AFRICA

Within a month after the British visitors had returned home from
the Arcadia conference, military developments in Europe and the Far East
put all the hard-won agreements under severe strain.

The Japanese war

machine was moving with such speed and confidence that both nations
developed concern for the lines of communication to Australia and New
Zealand, not to mention the Philippines and Singapore.

The reinforced

Germans in North Africa were- delivering staggering blows to the British
forces there.

The American military establishment was now overwhelmed

with money, men, and authority to build an army, navy, aqd air force, but
time was at a premium and production was still insufficient to meet the
many needs.

In Britain, Churchill was criticized for a variety of things,

including his lengthy stay at the Arcadia meetings.

About the only source

of good news was the Russian Front where the Red Army was making counter
attacks .
This chapter will be devoted, to a consideration of the American
effort to offset the above conditions, and to expedite the application of
its force as soon as^ and in the most direct'way possible against Germany.
Problems arose primarily because the strategy advocated by the Americans
in this effort was in almost direct opposition to that argued by Churchill
and staff.

Therefore, the cooperation pledged at the Arcadia conference
71
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received early testing.

The rationale for decisions made is also of

special interest to us at this time.

Although these decisions were

predominantly military and pertained to strategy, the deciding factors
were political, and the strain caused by these decisions extended through
out the Anglo-American staffs for the remainder of the war.
Hitler's attack on Russia in mid-1941 had taken some of the
pressure' off Britain, insofar as danger of invasion was concerned.
However, Russia exerted a steadily increasing pressure on both Britain
and the United States to furnish supplies in kind and quantity not
readily available.

Both Roosevelt and Churchill concurred in support of

the Russian demands to the extent possible.

Although there are indications

that Churchill retained some reservations concerning lasting British unity
with Stalin, heimade it clear that Britain would support Russia against
the Nazi attack.
Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom will have our
aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe . . .
That is our policy and our declaration.
It follows, therefore,
that we shall give whatever help we can to Russia and the
Russian people.^
Roosevelt could not at the time publicly make such a blanket offer,
because his nation might not agree.

However, he used his authority and

influence in every way possible to comply with Russian demands on United
States production, and eventually was able to bring Russia under the
terms of the Lend-Lease Act.%

In the early months of 1942, when Russia

^Churchill, III, p. 372.
2a detailed discussion of decisions for aid to Russia is contained
in the Twentieth Century Fund Series:
(Harold Stein Ed., American Civil
Military Decisions (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 1963), pp. 99140.
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was the sole successful challenger to German force, the President gave
top priority to assistance to Russia even at the expense of equipping
his own armed forces and of aid to Britain.

Thus, it is certain that

both these national leaders were in accord concerning the need and desire
to support the USSR.

In spite of this earnest effort, however, the

combination of German U-boat attacks on shipping, and demands for defense
against Japan combined to reduce the amount of materials actually de
livered to Russia.

Hence, as Russian forces were fighting with backs

toward the Soviet capital, Stalin was insultingly vocal in his demands
for a Second Front.
The Red dictator's attitude was often cause for disgust and
chagrin on the part of Roosevelt and Churchill.

For although he had

given lip service adherence to the Atlantic Charter, and had authorized
the signing of the Declaration of the United Nations, his conversation
with Anthony Eden during the letter's mission to Moscow in December,
1941, lacked the elements of true cooperation.

At that time he dis

closed his ambitions concerning the post-war settlement.
he would demand:

He told :den

". . .' dismemberment of Germany; extension of the

Russian boundary 150 miles into Poland; a Soviet hegemony in the Baltic
and B a l k a n s . R o o s e v e l t and. Churchill disagreed in the way these Russian
political demands should be handled.

Churchill wanted documented Russian

agreement on such things as disputed national boundaries and extent of
"Soviet hegemony" while Russia was on the defensive, dependent upon
Western aid, and anxious for the Second Front.

^Brandon, p. 74.
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that Stalin would agree to a more reasonable course of action while he
was dependent upon the British and Americans for supplies.

Roosevelt,

on the other hand, insisted that territorial type questions be delayed
until peace deliberations.

The President genuinely wished for nations to

comply with the terms of the Atlantic Charter, whereas, Churchill had no
compunctions about making "deals" if they would lead to victory.

In

spite of disagreement about post-war methodology, however, both were
anxious and eager to provide a Second Front or its equivalent.

But the

place and procedure for launching it were in question as the two nations
wrestled with their several problems.
The American war planners and Departmental Secretaries also desired
early action in the direction of a Second Front.
fiably military in nature.

Stimsqn felt " . . .

Their reasons were justi
that the absence of such

a (detailed operational) plan was a serious weakness; without it there
could be no firm commitment that could prevent a series of diversionary
shipments of troops and supplies to other areas more immediately threatened."^
At the White House, Stimson advocated " . . .

sending an overwhelming force

to the British Isles and threatening an attack through France."2

Soon

after this expression, his view was confirmed by Chief of War Plans
Division, Brigadier General Eisenhower, who said:
We've got to go to Europe and fight - and we've got to quit wasting
resources all over the world - and still worse - wasting time. If
we're to keep Russia in, save the Middle East, India and Burma;
we've got to begin slugging with air at West Europe; to be followed
by a land attack as soon as possible.3

^Stimson and Bundy, pp. 415-416.
^Stimson Diary, March 5, 1942, as cited by Stimson and Bundy, p. 416.
3pogue, p. 304.
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Such was the position taken by all the President's advisers.
Their advice was soon supported by Marshall who presented a plan to the
President on April 1, 1942.

The latter approved it for immediate presen

tation to the British in London by Marshall and Hopkins.

Known in American

circles as the Marshall memorandum, this plan became the basis for the
much discussed cross-Channel operation, thereafter^advocated by the
Americans.

Proposed as the. first major offensive by the United States

and Great Britain, the operation was to begin in April, 1943, and would
involve the landing of sizeable forces in France.

The Americans chose

France as the locale for initiating the first United States field action
against Hitler because of the space thus provided for full development of
Anglo-American combined land and air resources.

Further, action there

would provide a solid Second Front in support of the beleaguered Russians.
The British were " . . .

relieved by the evident strong American intention

to intervene in Europe, and to give the main priority to the defeat of
Hitler.

This had always been the foundation of our strategic thought."^
As an "emergency" action only, the American proposal also included

an alternative, greatly reduced, plan that if initiated at all would take
place in late summer or autumn of 1942.

Although the Americans offered

the smaller scale plan, only for use in the event Russia could not hold
out, there were additional reasons for its having been designed.

One was

to provide battle experience for Americans in preparation for the big
event in 1943.

Another was to insure that, if there was to be combined

action anywhere in 1942, it would be in a theater of the main strike and

^Churchill, III, p. 316.

76

diversion of forces thus would be avoided.

The British Chiefs of Staff

agreed with the outlines for cross-Channel action in 1943, but they
warned that 1942 was another matter, which would have to be governed by
developments in R u s s i a . B o t h Churchill and Alanbrooke withheld ex
pression of their true feelings.%

The result was that Marshall and

Hopkins returned to the United States thinking the British were in com
plete agreement.

The evident misunderstanding was most unfortunate for

the reason given by Lord Ismay:

"...

when we had to tell them . . .

that we were absolutely opposed to it, they felt we had broken faith with
them."3

But an even more troublesome result was Roosevelt's implied

pledge to Stalin that a Second Front would be created in Europe in 1942.^
One reason for this pledge stemmed from Roosevelt's principal
wartime objective:

to obtain active Soviet participation in the United

Nations organization after the war was won.^

The President had the utmost

confidence in his capacity to charm Stalin out of his design for Russian
expansion and World Communism.

Therefore, he more than ever wanted to

provide Stalin with timely and positive American support.

In this way,

Ipogue, p. 318.
^Alanbrooke was not impressed with the strategy involved and felt
Marshall's main purpose in advocating the 1942 plan was to fit political
opinion (at home) and the desire to help Russia.
(Arthur Bryant, Turn
of the Tide (New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1959), pp. 288-299.
^Lord Ismay, The Memoirs of General Lord Ismay (New York:
Viking Press, 1960), pp. 249-250.
4pogue, p. 327.
^Brandon, p. 73.

The

77

some sense of appreciation by Stalin might foster a personal relationship,
which would permit the charm to work.

George Kennan has expressed dis

appointment at Roosevelt's attitude by saying:
. . . FDR's evident conviction that Stalin, while perhaps a
somewhat difficult customer, was only, after all, a person like
any other person; that . . . we hadn't been able to get along
with him . . . (because) we had never really had anyone with the
proper personality and the proper qualities of sympathy and
imagination to deal with him, . . . that if only he could be
exposed to the persuasive charm of someone like FDR himself,
ideological preconceptions would melt and Russia's cooperation
with the West could be easily arranged. For these assumptions,
there were no grounds whatever; and they were of a puerility
that was unworthy of a statesman of FDR's stature.^
Kennan's conviction notwithstanding, Roosevelt certainly implied
a commitment to Stalin at a time when Churchill's emissary. Admiral
Mountbatten, was enroute to the United States for the^express— purpose of
insisting that any 1942 cross-Channel attack would be a mistake.

A prior

message to Roosevelt from Churchill announced Mountbatten's visit and
forecast difficulties in the 1942 cross-Channel plans.

In closing his

message to Roosevelt, Churchill said, "We must never let Gymnast (a plan
for invading North Africa) pass from our minds."2

The Prime Minister then

secured his position with the British War, Cabinet by obtaining their firm
refusal to commit Englandto the controversial 1942 cross-Channel action.
In this way, when Molotov stopped in London enroute to Russia, after his
visit with the President, Churchill was able to inform the Russian
Foreign Minister that the British were definitely not committed to the

^George Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1961), p. 355.
^Churchill, IV, p. 340.
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kind of Second Front implied by Roosevelt.

Such deliberate action by

one Ally to forestall the intentions of another would have overtaxed to
the breaking point the patience of smaller men.
Having refused to support what he considered to be an unwise
American proposal for 1942 cross-Channel action, Churchill was anxious
to explain his position to the President.

Although Mountbatten had al

ready explained all the ramifications of such an attack and why the
British were reluctant to proceed with it, the Prime Minister was never
one to leave vital actions unresolved.

Just as Marshal'l'"a'hd~Stimson were

eager to establish a plan for early action, so did Churchill and his staff
want combined action in 1942.

However, they wished to take such action

where it would stand the greatest chance of success and at the same time
possibly support an action already in progress.^

This rationale brought

the Prime Minister on his second journey to Washington in mid-June 1942.
It is notable that, when Mountbatten was talking to Roosevelt and
Hopkins, no points pertaining to professional military planning seem to
have been raised.

Certainly, there were no military planners present to

pose appropriate questions.2

The same procedure appears to have been

followed when Churchill put in his appearance in late June 1942.

He

proceeded immediately to Hyde Park, where he met with Roosevelt and
Harry Hopkins.

The British Chiefs of Staff, who had accompanied the

Prime Minister to the United States, were routed to Washington to confer

^Churchill, III, pp. 374-384.
^Wedemeyer, p . 139.
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with the American Chiefs.

As an example of the existing divergence in

opinion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff were deciding against a Northwest
Africa invasion even as Churchill was praising its possibilities at Hyde
Park.

The Combined Staff recommendation was against "any other periph

eral operation that would divert attention from Bolero (the build up
for cross-Channel in 1943).

Any plan, however, would be preferable

to undertaking Gymnast, especially from the standpoint of dispersing base
organization, lines of sea communications, and air s t r e n g t h . H o w e v e r ,
what the Combined Chiefs of Staff had to say never was presented at Hyde
Park.

Churchill's account supports the conclusion that he had long since

ceased to consider the American 1942 action as the contingency or desper
ation measure it always had been.

Rather, in his mir^,--AmeTl~cans con

sidered what originally had been an emergency plan, as now being a firm
commitment.

But he was convinced of the plan's weakness for reasons he

presented as questions:
the enterprise?

"...

Who is the officer prepared to command

What British forces and assistance are required?"

2

While these questions were being asked, there were no professional
soldiers, British or American, present.

Therefore, there was nobody

present qualified to answer properly the Prime Minister's expressions of
doubt.

In reality, there may have been valid answers for the posed

rhetorical questions.

Several writers have recorded well-documented

^Wedemeyer, p . 148,
2pogue, p. 330.
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counter-arguments to the Prime Minister's objections.^

However, at the

time, and under the circumstances, he was 'very effective in bringing
Roosevelt around to his point of view.

American military leaders viewed

the Prime Minister's performance as a deliberate stratagem to shake the
confidence of the American political leaders in their military staff,
since he used only military reasons to support his argument.

No mention

was made of political or economic objectives as he built his case.

In

any event, although he may have embittered some American military men,
Churchill very effectively accomplished his purpose at the time.
Some accounts give Churchill full credit for winning Roosevelt
over to the North African course of action.

Others refer to Stimson's

belief that the President always was attracted to a North African
campaign.2

The latter appears to be more nearly accurate when con

sideration is given to the extended activity in the French African Empire
by Robert Murphy of the State Department.

When the French-German

armistice had been signed in June, 1939, Hitler had agreed that the
French-African empire would not be occupied by German troops.
it would be semi-independent.

Rather,

Murphy has reported that Roosevelt was

intrigued by this situation and " . . .

believed that North Africa was

the most likely place where French tr?ops might be brought back into the
was against Nazi Germany."3

As a result, from September, 1940, until the

^General Wedemeyer is one of these. He ". . . ventures a long be
lated reply", in his Wedemeyer Reports, 145-145. Also see Samuel Eliot
Morison, Strategy and Compromise (Boston; Little, Brown and Co., 1958),
pp. 36-45.
2
". . . i t was the President's great secret baby." (Stimson and
Bundy, p. 425).
^Robert Murpay, Diplomat Among Warriors (New York; Doubleday and
CO., Inc., 1964), pp. 68-69.
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fall of 1942, Murphy was on the spot in either Africa, Vichy France, or
the Iberian Peninsula.

He kept the President fully informed concerning

French-African activities and was a chief architect of the French North
African collaboration throughout the period of the North African campaign.
Thus, "French African policy of the United States Government became the
President's personal policy.

He initiated it, he kept it going, and he

resisted pressures against it.
In addition to such factors as discussed above, immediate events
also had a bearing favorable to Churchill in gaining Roosevelt's, as well
as Marshall's softening toward North Africa. 'At the height of their
argument, Tobruk fell.

The necessity for maintaining their sea lanes and

communications with empire, and the importance of the Middle East to the
success of such an effort was understandably uppermost in the minds of
the British.

Therefore, with the loss of Tobruk to the Germans, talks on

strategy had to give way to the more urgent needs of filling the gaps in
the Middle East force.

Churchill's already well-stated opposition to the

1942 cross-Channel venture was now bolstered, and he ". . . poured out
his matchless prose . . .

in favor of Gymnast as a means of relieving the

crisis in,the M e d i t e r r a n e a n . H o w e v e r , regardless of the strong British
arguments and the sympathetic Presidential and military support of British
forces then fighting in Africa, there was no actual revision at that time
of plans for the major 1943 cross-Channel undertaking.

^Murphy, p. 68.
^Sherwood, p. 592.
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The immediate though tentative decision, which came from these
meetings, was that the build-up of forces in England would continue in
accordance with plans for the 1943 cross-Channel operation, and that a
firm decision regarding the 1942 action would be made following a review
not later than September, 1942.^

However, Churchill had sown the seed of

the North African idea during that June visit, and in spite of American
strategic arguments to the contrary, his contentions carried the day.
The final decision was made in July after Roosevelt sent Marshall, King,
and Hopkins to London ". . . to . . . come to some^^inal^'girëêmënt with
the British."2
The President arranged for this presidential representative contact
with Churchill in July when he saw how serious was the disagreement be
tween the British and American military leaders.

Most indications were

that the British would not agree to a 1942 cross-Channel attack.

Knowing

this, and having programmed equipment and troops for the 1942 possibility,
Marshall and King began to consider seriously diverting the primary
United States military effort to the Pacific.

Marshall later said he was

bluffing in order to prod the British into action.

But King was serious

and consistently advocated action in the Pacific theater in every way
open to him.
Marshall advised the President by memorandum in early July that
the United States Staff was considering a shift in favor of the Pacific
alternative:

^Stimson and Bundy, p. 424.

2Pogue, p, 341,
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If the United States is to engage in any other operation than
forceful, unswerving adherence to Bolero (build-up for crossChannel invasion) plans, we are definitely of the opinion that
we should turn to the Pacific and strike decisively against
Japan; in other words, assume a defensive attitude against
Germany, except for air operations; and use all available
means in the Pacific.1
When pressed by the President for a full statement of the Pacific
alternative, the service chiefs admitted that details were incomplete and
that the proposed alternative would not improve the strategic situation.
However, Stimson justified the desirability of the threat contained in
Marshall's memorandum, as being "absolutely essential^..--^---7~rf‘~we ex
pected to get through the hides of the

British.

The President may have agreed that drastic statements might be
necessary to move the British staff.

However, he was well aware that

leaving Britain in the lurch would not further his nation's cause.
Therefore, he firmly rejected the Pacific idea and indicated that the
direction of primary military effort must remain toward Germany.

Further,

he refused to take part in arbitrary threats during discussions with the
British.
In preparation for the journey to England, Hopkins made notes of
Roosevelt's thoughts concerning the action to which the United States
should agree.

These notes were the basis for the, final orders the party

took with them to England.

The President wanted very much to execute

the plan for a 1942 cross-Channel invasion of France.

"Such an operation

Ipogue, p. 340.
^Stimson Diary, July 15, 1942, as cited by Stimson and Bundy,
p. 425.
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would definitely sustain Russia this year.
which would save Russia this year.^

It might be the turning'point

However, if investigation of

governing factors revealed insufficient support for the plan and the
British definitely refused to agree to it, "I want you to . . . determine
upon another place for United States troops to fight in 1942."

2

That

United States ground forces must fight German forces somewhere in 1942
was uppermost in Roosevelt's mind for political reasons.

He would

certainly gain no respect from Stalin if he permitted nearly a year to
pass with no worthwhile action to relieve German pressure against Russia.
Furthermore, an off year national election was scheduled for November,
and his own people would be highly critical of inaction against the enemy.
His military staff had already demonstrated the need for a firm program
of action against whicn to prepare.

Finally, he was obligated to early

initiation of the British comradeship-in-arms ; an equivalent to the al
ready successful collaboration in plans and supply.
The President recognized the several pressures upon Churchill which
mitigated against a decision for the strike against Germany.

The period

of decision was indeed trying on the Prime Minister's patience., for when
the latter returned home from the June, 1942 meetings, he faced serious
domestic political problems.

Following the military disasters in Libya,

the making of a revolt in the House of Commons developed, and Churchill's
government faced another vote of censure.

Even though he was supported

heavily by the vote, the Prime Minister had to exercise extreme caution

Isherwood, p. 604.
Zgherwbod, p. 604.

85

in committing large bodies of British force to any "sacrifice" operation,
which he feared the 1942 cross-Channel action to be.
political situation demanded a victory.

His tenuous

Further, his enthusiastic

optimism, as a result of the United States entry into the war demanded
that any initial Anglo-American military enterprise be an overwhelming
success.

Hence, when these points were added to the course of military

action already advocated by the British Chiefs of Staff, the Prime
Minister had little choice other than to refuse Marshall's plea for
1942 cross-Channel action.
Prior to the American party's arrival. Field Marshall Dill, who
by this time was the senior representative of the British Chiefs of Staff
on the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee in Washington, advised
Alanbrooke, Chief of the British Imperial Staff, that Marshall felt the
British had provided no real drive behind the European project.

Dill

suggested that the British must in some way show their determination to
defeat the Germans.

Such warnings were of little value, however, for the

British were already certain they faced a divided delegation.

"Hopkins

is for operating in Africa, Marshall wants to operate in Europe, and King
is determined to stick to the Pacific," Alanbrooke wrote even before the
party arrived.^

Furthermore, Roosevelt had already let it be known that

American forces had to be in action somewhere before the Year's end.
Therefore, if the British stood firm against the 1942 cross-Channel attack,
the Americans would accede to British designs for an invasion of North
Africa.

^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p . 341,
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In accordance tîlth the President's request, Marshall made certain
of the views of His,representatives in London before talking either to
the Prime Minister or to the British Staff.

Eisenhower and his associated

were not unanimous in predicting success for the cross-Channel operation,
but they thought an operation to seize the Cotentin Peninsula (of which
the Cherbourg Peninsula is a part) had possibilities.

They felt it might

be held as a bridgehead on the continent until the larger 1943 action
could be mounted.^

Since such an operation would have as its objective a

"permanent" lodgment on the Continent, which Churchill insisted upon,
there was momentary optimism among the Americans that their Ally might
accept that part of the 1942 proposal.

The optimism was short lived,

however, for the British Chiefs of Staff believed "maintaining a lodgment"
would be impossible.

Alanbrooke recalled that "I had to convince them

that there was no hope of such a bridgehead surviving the winter."2

Hence,

the impasse remained.
Marshall made a final plea in order to salvage his main goal ofthe large 1943 landing in France.

For without this as a planning

objective, he would be faced again with all the pressures for diversion
of forces and material he had experienced for the previous year.

The

Prime Minister did not himself agree with Marshall's plan, but he brought
the proposal before a formal meeting of the War Cabinet, and unanimously
the members voted down any cross-Channel operation for 1942.
"...

Realizing

that a North African invasion was the only operation that would

1Sherwood, p. 608.
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 342.
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have the full support of both the President and the Prime Minister,"^
Marshall and King began plans for Gymnast, rechristened Torch.

Hopkins

quickly advised Roosevelt that the North African campaign would be the
American Staff's choice of alternatives and urged the President to set a
date for mounting the attack not later than October 30, 1942.

He said,

"What I fear most is that if we do not now make a firm decision on
Gymnast and fix a reasonably early date, there may be procrastinations
and delay."2

The suspense date may well have had another stimulus, for

the election previously mentioned took place the first week in November.
In any event, Roosevelt complied with Hopkins' suggestion and told
Churchill of his delight "that the decision had been made and that orders
were now full speed a h e a d . T h e r e were further United States Staff
attempts to change the President's mind about the North African campaign.
Moreover, disagreement between British and American staffs over the time
and place of landings in North Africa was cause for vast confusion and
uncertainty during the month of August.

However, the President's original

decision was final, and he made it plain that he would tolerate no un
necessary delay in mounting the campaign.

This is evident by his asking

the Gombined Chiefs of Staff to tell him on August 4 the earliest date
when landing could take place.^

^Wedemeyer, p. 161.
^Sherwood, p. 511.
^Sherwood, p. 612.
^Churchill, IV, p. 451.
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During the few months covered by this chapter, the Anglo-American
leaders moved from the stage of declarations and agreements to the stage
o f action and adjustment - adjustment to each other as well as adjustment
in those earlier agreements.

The Arcadia meetings had concluded with

general consensus on the strategy for dealing with Germany and supporting
Russia.

However, Roosevelt's eagerness to please Stalin by precipitately

implying a Second Front in 1942 might well have alienated Churchill, were
the latter not determined to use all possible American help in achieving
his goal of victory.

As events developed, Churchill used the Russian

trap, which Roosevelt had set for himself, to force 1942 American military
action in the area desired by the British.

If Roosevelt's demand for

action in 1942 was to have substance, the Prime Minister was quick in
pointing to the locale for such action - North Africa.

In the eyes of

the President's military staff, the North African campaign was sadly
deficient as an aid to Stalin; would do little to hasten Germany's defeat;
and promised to delay interminably victory-producing action in the
Pacific.

It was fairly obvious that Allied differences in strategy would

surely arise again:

However, with the decision made, even the American

Staff could agree with their commander-in-chief in his statement to
Churchill following the decision for Torch:

"...

the past week

represented a turning point in the whole war and . . . now we are on
our way shoulder to shoulder.

^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 347.

CHAPTER VI

MIDWAR CONFERENCES : THE SEARCH FOR COMPROMISE

General Marshall remarked in one instance that in war time,
political necessity demands at least one especially important military
move every year.^

Operation Torch was the 1942 move.

The action was

clearly successful, and just as the American Chiefs of Staff had pre
dicted, once combined force was committed to the Mediterranean area,
the British pressed for its continuation there as part of their original
strategy for defeating Germany.

The Americans stoutly resisted further

build up in force for expansion of action into southern Europe and
pressed instead for a massive cross-Channel invasion of France at the
earliest possible date.
was impossible.

To pursue both courses of action simultaneously

The existing military forces simply were not adequate

to support both of these theaters of action.
Strong differences in strategic opinion between British and
American military leaders continued as the source of their major problems
in cooperation throughout 1943.

These differences sometimes attained

such proportions that only through summit conferences could agreement and
final decision be reached in a timely manner.

^Marshall mentioned this as a lesson he learned in 1942, following
the presidential decision to invade North Africa.
(Samuel Eliot Morison,
American Contributions to the Strategy of World War II (London: Oxford
University Press, 1958), p. 23).
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Discussion of how such strategic policy evolved and the factors
involved in achieving the necessary cooperation are the objectives of
this chapter.

Some of the decisions reached at Casablanca are pertinent

to our study and are first in the order of discussion.

It will then be

necessary to move through this midwar period to several succeeding
conferences before firm dates are agreed and plans are approved for the
much discussed cross-Channel invasion or Second Front.
After Casablanca, the Trident conference was held in Washington
during May 1943 and was immediately followed by -Churchill's and General
Marshall's visit to Eisenhower's North African Headquarters.

Within two

months from that visit, Quebec was the host city for the Quadrant delib
erations.

Finally, after some indecision and diversionary planning,

which threatened to negate decisions made at Quadrant, a firm course of
action was decided at Teheran, when Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin
conferred in person for the first time.
Although agreement on military strategy was the main AngloAmerican objective of these midwar conferences, progress toward the
realization of respective national goals was apparent, and political
motivation began to emerge with increased clarity.

The latter was

expected, of course, for the chiefs of the two collaborating nations
were masters in the art of politics, and they had political goals which
were dependent upon the success of military action.
By the time a date was set for Overlord, as the 1944 crossChannel operation was called, plans for achieving respective national
goals became clearer to the President and the Prime Minister.

The taste
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of victory in North Africa and its promise in Italy enabled the Prime
Minister to think more clearly of where rather than how the final
victory could best be achieved.

His sense of history and his bent

toward the traditional European balance of power came into play.

The

President, on the other hand, became more and more inflexibly convinced
that the course of wisdom was away from power politics.

His mind was on

international cooperation, with the Big Three (England, the United States,
and Russia) policing the world immediately after the cessation of
hostilities.

He wished to include China as well, if she could be brought

to sufficient status in power and prestige.
While political strategy was thus becoming more fixed, the military
staffs of both nations were gradually moving from strategic divergence
to agreement.

Nevertheless, sharp differences and bitter argument

between the military staffs of both the United States and Britain con
tinued.

Still, as victory became more certain, the British inclination

to mount small military actions along the European periphery diminished.
Since the Americans had always viewed with alarm this probing or
pecking type of military action, the lessening in British advocacy of
such strategy reduced the strain on the joint military cooperation.
This change was considerably influenced by the ascendency of American
forces.

United States manpower and production grew by leaps and bounds

while the British productive capacity had passed its peak.
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Casablanca;

Expanded Mediterranean Action Sicily

Although Operation Torch was unpopular with American planners,
from a tactical point of view it was certainly a success.^

This very

success raised a question in global strategy which, by December 1942,
demanded attention from the British and American partners.

The question;

Should operations in the Mediterranean now stop to enable the resumption
of a build-up of forces in the British Isles for a 1943 invasion of
/

France, or should operations in the Mediterranean continue with some
ultimate objective of invading southern Europe?

The answer given to

this question would very largely determine the disposition of British and
American forces in 1943.

Recognizing the unsettled condition of Anglo-

American fundamental war strategy and planning, Roosevelt suggested
another meeting on the highest level, with Stalin participating.
Churchill was in solid agreement and, after Stalin advised his inability
to leave Russia "even for a day,"^ Casablanca was decided upon as the
meeting place.
The Prime Minister had no doubt concerning the correct course of
Allied action.

In November 1942 he had cabled the President that the

"paramount task" before the United States and Great Britain was, first,
to conquer North Africa and open the Mediterranean to military traffic,
and, second, to use the bases on the African coast^Jito'^strike at the

^General Wedemeyer has called it ". . . a wasteful side show . . .
but a grand success." (Wedemeyer, 170). As a dress rehearsal for an in
vasion of Europe, the North African campaign was . . . profitable."
(Donald W. Mitchell, "Victory in Tunis," Current History, IV (June 1943),
p. 237).
^Churchill, IV, p. 666.
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underbelly of the Axis . . .

in the shortest t i m e . T h i s

remained

Churchill's opinion in January 1943 and in his mind was the obvious
immediate objective for consideration at Casablanca.
On the eve of the Casablanca conference the President's attitude
on the critical issue of cross-Channel invasion of Prance versus con
tinued Mediterranean operations was one of wait and see.^

He favored

building up United States forces in both the United Kingdom and North
Africa and postponing the choice for a while.

Roosevelt had no particular

aversion to Mediterranean ventures and, although he did not engage in
military arguments with his advisers as did the Prime Minister, he was
not prepared to commit himself, even to his staff, before the conference.
The American Joint Chiefs of Staff approached the meetings with
out a clearly defined position but resolved not to give way to their
British colleagues any more than necessary.3

Under these circumstances

General Marshall could hardly bring about consensus among his people
before the conference, but he felt obliged to wage a strong rear-guard
action in defense of the cross-Channel invasion plan.

He could thus

serve notice to all that concentration of force for a major cross-Channel
operation was still a cardinal objective in American strategic planning.

^Sherwood, p. 674.
^Matloff, p. 21.
^Wedemeyer expresses the American Staff dilemma ". . .we had no
assurance that the President would support our choice of concentration,
and, on the military level, we were without agreement among ourselves
as how to convince the British of the danger of frittering away our
combined resources on indecisive, limited operations." (Wedemeyer,
p. 185).
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Whereas the Apiericans came to Casablanca with a small staff and
with preparations incomplete, the British brought a full staff and care
fully prepared plans and positions.

"For every argument they advanced

they were able to produce .. . . plans and statistics worked out to the
last d e t a i l . F u r t h e r ,

at a meeting of the Brit...n party on the night

prior to the beginning of official discussions, the Prime Minister out
lined the course they should follow during conference deliberations:
They were not to hurry or try to force agreement, but to take
plenty of time; there was to be full discussion and no impatience 'the dripping of water on a stone.'
In the meantime he himself
would pursue the same tactics with the President. He added that
he would like to see agreement reached, not only to clear the
North African shore and capture Sicily in 1943, but to recapture
Burma and launch a preliminary invasion of France. Nothing less,
he felt, would be worthy of two great Powers and their obligation
to Russia.2
As British chairman, Alanbrooke followed the Prime Minister's
advice and encouraged the fullest possible expression of everybody's
opinion as the Combined Chiefs of Staff sought agreement.
presented American arguments.

Marshall

In speaking to the conference, he con

sidered the basic question as being the extent the Allied powers should
adhere to the general concept of cross-Channel actionj^t^ w h i c h all had
given lip service) and the extent to which they could undertake diversions
from it in the interest of helping Russia, improving the shipping sit
uation, and maintaining the pressure against Germany and Japan.

He felt

that a decision for the "main plot" had to be made, for each diversion

^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 439.
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 445.
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from the primary plan siphoned off equipment and manpower and severely
complicated production programs and troop mobilization.

Marshall reviewed

all the arguments the American staff had advanced since the spring of 1942
and further expressed serious doubt that decisions to extend operations in
the Mediterranean while at the same time concentrating forces in the
British Isles, would permit any Pacific operations at all.

His position

was that any Mediterranean undertaking projected for 1943 should be
weighed in terms of its effects on the already critical shipping situation,
the build-up of forces in England, and its role in the overall planning,
to include Pacific action.^
Admiral King's conference comments supported Marshall's argument
with reference to the Pacific.

He cautioned against becoming so concerned

with European preparations that the Japanese might be able to consolidate
their newly won positions.

In his view, merely maintaining pressure

against the Japanese was not enough.
allotted to the Pacific area.

Rather, more resources should be

King's attitude was that so long as the

British persisted in peripheral Mediterranean actions, why not divert
forces, including landing craft, to the Pacific where Americans were
facing an aggressive Japan?

2

The argument which ensued left a lasting

^See Minutes, 55th Meeting Combined Chiefs of Staff (hereafter
referred to as CCS), 14 January 1943; and Minutes, 58th CCS, 16 January
1943; as cited by Maurice Matloff, United States Army in World War II,
The War Department: Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944
(Washington: Department of the Army, 1959), pp. 21-22.
^Wedemeyer offers an analysis of King's rationale and motivation
to look after American interests in the United States strategic sphere the Pacific.
(Wedemeyer, 181 and 187).
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impression on the British staff about Admiral King.

Throughout his diary

of this period, Alanbrooke attributes Anglo-American landing craft diffi
culties to King's abiding interest in the Pacific war.^
In reply for the British Chiefs of Staff, Alanbrooke took the
position to which he held throughout 1943:

that the British and Americans

could not land on the continent in force until Germany definitely weakened.
The British Chief of Staff.presented three telling points.

First, less

than half the required divisions could be made available for a crossChannel operation, by mid-September 1943.

Secondly, if preparations for

that operation were made, no support could be given Russia during the
summer of 1943.

Thirdly, the best way to effect dispersal of German forces

not only from France, but also from the Soviet front, was to threaten
Germany everywhere in the Mediterranean, try to knock Italy out of the
war, and try to bring Turkey in on the Allied side.

He went on to advo

cate an increase in British-American air attacks on Germany, but called
for a continued build-up of forces in England in preparation for the
invasion of the continent.^
The differences between the two staffs thus being__£learly pre
sented, the first four days of the conference dealt with arguing the
points of view and the effects particular actions might have on various
theaters.

Alanbrooke indicates a feeling of despair when, as late as the

^"I'm afraid that nothing we said had much effect in weaning King
away from the Pacific. This is where his heart was, and the bulk of his
Naval Forces. The European war was just a great nuisance that kept him
from waging his Pacific war undisturbed." (Notes on My Life, VIII, 599,
as cited in Bryant, Turn of the Ti d e , p. 446).
^See Minutes, 57th. Meeting CCS, 15 January 1943, as cited in
Matloff, p. 23.
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fourth day, his staff had to present a new paper for discussion of the
long-since-agreed basic strategic principle of defeating Germany first.
He had found that the American Joint Planners now "were wishing to defeat
Japan f i r s t . S o m e w h a t

in desperation, Alanbrooke turned to Field

Marshall Dill, who was the closest of British friends to General Marshall,
for possible support.

Dill assumed an optimistic attitude and suggested

that much progress had already been made and pointed out that some compro
mise on the few remaining differences would be mandatory.

Since Dill had

the confidence of Marshall, he was fairly well acquainted with the extent
of compromise required.

He told Alanbrooke that "you must come to some

agreement with the Americans and . . . you cannot bring the unsolved
problem up to the Prime Minister and the P r e s i d e n t . A t this juncture
in the conversation. Air Marshall Portal arrived with a proposal similar
to Dill's suggestions.

The result was that Dill discussed the tentative

proposal with Marshall in private before the next meeti^g^— and_with minor
alterations, the British proposed compromise was accepted as follows;
Operations in the Pacific and the Far East shall continue with the
forces allocated, with the object of maintaining pressure on
Japan, retaining the initiative and attaining a position of readi
ness for the full-scale offensive against Japan . . . as soon as
Germany is defeated. These operations must be kept within such
limits as will not, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 449.
^This event is described by Alanbrooke in Bryant, Turn of the Tide,
pp. 449-450, where he "gave Dill credit for securing the agreement with
the Americans on this memorable day."
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prejudice the capacity of the United Nations to take any opportunity
that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.1
At about the same time Alanbrooke, through Dill's good offices,
was reaching a stage of satisfactory progress with his American counter
part, Churchill was able to report to the British War Cabinet that "I am
satisfied the President is strongly in favour of the Mediterranean being
given prime place.
"Husky" (Sicily)."2

He also seems increasingly inclined to Operation
It appeared that the "dripping of water on a stone"

was an effective procedure for the British.
Aside from strong arguments advanced by the British and the
inclinations of the President and the Prime Minister, Marshall recognized
certain other critical factors which cast doubt on the possibility of
his 1943 cross-Channel hopes.

Experience in recent^mphibious operations

had caused Eisenhower to revise upward the requirements for landing craft
in support of a cross-Channel effort.

He also felt that more troops

would be required than his plans had called for in 1942 before Operation
Torch.3

Another seriously limiting factor recognized by Marshall and

constantly emphasized by King, was the submarine menace and the delivery
of supplies to Russia.

The totals of Allied shipping losses for 1942

were 1,494 ships and 7,446,204 gross tons.^

An immediate continuation of

^Bryant, 450. Chester Wilmot points out that the phrase "in the
opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff" gave the Americans free rein in
deciding the scope of Pacific operations. Chester Wilmot, The Struggle
for Europe (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1952), p. 121.
^Churchill, IV, p. 676.
^Minutes, Special Meeting Joint Chiefs of Staff and President,
January 16, 1943, as cited by Matloff, p. 24.
^Churchill, IV, p. 879.
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action in the Mediterranean also offered advantages on the air power side,
for with all the north coast of Africa and all of Sicily in Allied hands,
air strikes against more distant German targets would be possible.

Control

of Sicily would offer additional advantages as well, such as the prospect
of releasing 225 vessels for use in the Middle East and the Pacific.
In the end, therefore, Marshall yielded, but in so doing, he "made
it clear that the United States Chiefs of Staff were accepting the
Mediterranean operation only as an expedient action dictated by current
circumstances."^

He still intended that the main effort against Germany

would be across the Channel.

By way of furthering this intention, he and

King together may have established one other point with their British
colleagues.

This was to the effect that the Pacific action would continue

in a dynamic manner, and any war equipment standing idle as it awaited
some possible, though indefinite, use in Europe would be moved to the
Pacific.

In this way, the American Army and Navy Chiefs established a

possible lever for balancing forces among diversionary efforts and those
of primary importance.

Concentration of force for the cross-Channel

effort might thus be retrieved.
From a military point of view, the decision for continued action
in the Mediterranean, with emphasis on Sicilian operations as the
successor to North Africa, was the result of most importance to our
study.

However, from the political point of view and of significance to

Roosevelt's long range goals, the President's announcement that

^Matloff, p. 25.
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unconditional surrender would be required of the Axis nations was the
most important result of the conference.

Advanced by Roosevelt as an

apparent spur-of-the-mdment decision during a press conference near the
end of the Casablanca deliberations, the "unconditional surrender" formula
was interpreted by a number of observers as a unilateral Presidential
decision.

Churchill appeared to be surprised by the announcement but

recovered immediately and gave the policy his full support.

Neverthe

less, there was considerable coimaent from public figures of both Britain
and the United States concerning the wisdom of such a policy, and the
President received unfair criticism for his so-called "impulsive"
announcement.

The Prime Minister has since revealed the existence of

documentation which confirms prior discussion and decision regarding the
policy before the President made his announcement.^
In spite of the issues raised by the unconditional surrender
formula and the long debate as to its value or detriment to the progress
of the war, the principle had important consequences for the coalition.
Assuredly the announcement bolstered Russian spirits, for the Western
Powers thus expressed uncompromising determination to wage a fight to the
finish with Germany.

More important to Roosevelt, however, was that

implicit in this simple formula of resolute purpose was a notice to
friend and foe alike that there would be no negotiated peace, no escape
clauses were to be offered.

As Churchill told the House of Commons in

^Churchill, IV, pp. 684-688. Sherwood also asserts that "this
announcement of Unconditional Surrender was very deeply deliberated . . .
(and the President) had his eyes wide open when he made it." (Sherwood,
pp. 696-697).
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February 1944, "No such arguments will be admitted by us as were used by
Germany after the last war, saying that they surrendered in consequence
of President Wilson's Fourteen P o i n t s . F i n a l l y , the expression of such
a firm purpose served to bind more closely the fortunes and actions of
the two English speaking nations as they moved forward in a great
collaboration begun essentially at the Atlantic Conference.

Such a

philosophy of purpose fitted well the agreements and decisions reached
at Casablanca.

These decisions reflected the type of compromise succeeding

meetings would bring as the two great powers reconciled their strategic
differences into a pattern for victory.

Trident and Its Sequel:

Decision for Italy

Planning for the invasion of Sicily had been completed by early
spring 1943, and prospects for launching an attack there by early summer
were promising.
clear.

A course of action to follow a Sicilian victory was not

Churchill became justifiably anxious therefore for a firm military

plan for the armed forces to follow after the capture of Sicily.

For

their part, the British still had no doubt whatever about what the next
step should be.

At Casablanca, the British Chief of Imperial General

Staff, Alanbrooke, had expounded a well-developed strategy for the conduct
of the war in Europe:

"to begin with the conquest of North Africa so as

to re-open the Mediterranean . . ., t]ien eliminate Italy, bring in Turkey,
threaten southern Europe, and liberate France."

^Churchill, IV, p. 690.
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p . 432.
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Churchill agreed with Alanbrooke, but so long as the American
military staff continued their strong advocacy of cross-Channel action
in place of an Italian invasion, he was certain that American agreement
could be obtained only by another personal conference with the President.^
Accordingly, the President and Prime Minister decided on early May 1943, .
as the date for the third Washington conference, which they named Trident.
At previous conferences with the Americans, the British had
travelled with a large staff.

Such an assembly of experts provided a

means for quick, detailed, and accurate answers to almost any question
which might arise during deliberations.

Indeed, the British preparation

went much further, for their proposals were consistently worked out in
great detail and were well coordinated with British foreign policy.
Churchill's close relationship with his military staff insured the required
balance between policy and the military decisions to enforce it.
In contrast, the Americans had arrived at the earlier conferences
with small staffs and plans expressed only in general terms.

Further,

the American Chiefs of Staff could not be certain of the support the
President might give them as various British points were raised.

To

illustrate the differences existing in preparation for conference
activity between the British and American staffs. General Wedemeyer,
United States Army Plans Division, who was present at the Casablanca
conference, described the American Staff experience with the British
there as follows :

^Churchill, IV, p. 782.
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They swarmed down upon us like locusts, with a plentiful supply
of planners and various other assistants, with prepared plans
to insure that they not only accomplished their purpose but did
so in stride and with fair promise of continuing the role of
directing strategy the whole course ofthe war. I have the
greatest admiration for them, as I indicated above; and if I
were a Britisher, I would feel very proud. However, as an
American, I wish that we might be more glib and better organ
ized to cope with these super-negotiators. From a worm's eye
viewpoint, it was apparent that we were confronted by generations
and generations of experience in committee work, in diplomacy,
and rationalizing points of view. They had us on the defensive
practically all the time.l
The moral was plain following that conference:

that the military

staff of the United States, in preparing for later meetings, should not
only emulate, but also improve on, British thoroughness and firmness in
presenting a united front.

An essential part of this preparation would

be thorough, realistic staff planning on a joint basis which would permit
the Joint Chiefs of Staff to arrive at timely, binding agreements on the
military course to be followed.

Furthermore, these preparations would,

to the degree possible, be coordinated with the White House, and advance
presidential approval would be obtained.

American staff officers had

learned that unless the latter action was taken, military aims, regardless
of how broadly or in what detail they may have been conceived, were subject
to negotiation when the President and Prime Minister worked out compromises
in the light Of respective national policies.
As at past conferences, the British arrived at Trident with a
large staff, which was well prepared and which presented a united front.
This time, following Wedemeyer's suggestions, the American staff was much

^Wedemeyer, p. 192.
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larger, much better organized, and better prepared to argue its case
than at any previous gathering of the kind.
Lord Ismay, who was Churchill's Chief of Staff in the Ministry of
Defense, described the manner in which work at this and succeeding mid
war conferences was conducted:
Each day . . . the British Chiefs of Staff and the American Joint
Chiefs of Staff met independently. At 11 a.m., the two teams
joined together for a Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting, accompanied
by such advisers as the questions under discussion required . . .
often there was a second combined meeting in the afternoon.
Periodically, there were plenary conferences at the White House,
presided over by the President and the Prime Minister. At these,
the Combined Chiefs of Staff reported progress, sought approval,
and were given directions for their future work.1
Both the President and the Prime Minister made opening speeches
at the Trident gathering.

Their comments succinctly exposed the essence

of the Anglo-American differences regarding action in the Mediterranean
area.

The single most pressing question was whether to continue with the

Mediterranean campaign or to concentrate on the cross-Channel operation.
Churchill noted with satisfaction that "we have heed able, by taking
thought together, to produce a succession of brilliant events which have
altered the whole course of the w a r .

He then proceeded to enumerate

the many advantages in plans to invade Italy, his foremost recommendation.
Primary among these advantages would be the loss to Germany of the
Italian fleet and the twenty-six Italian divisions stationed in the
Balkan countries.

Churchill was also optimistic that Allied success in

Italy would bring Turkey into the war against Germany and permit passage

^Ismay, p. 295.
^Churchill, IV, p. 791.
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of supplies to Russia through the Dardanelles.

The Prime Minister also

expressed concern in providing relief to Russia.

He considered "the

best way of taking the weight off the Russian front in 1943 would be
to get, or knock, Italy out of the war, thus forcing the Germans to send
a large number of troops to hold down the Balkans."^

In descending

scale of priority, Churchill mentioned the need to keep large forces in
contact with the enemy during 1943.

He thought such action was necessary,

because it was now evident that a cross-Channel attack could not be
launched before 1944.

Last in priority on his objectives list was aid

to China and study of a long-term plan for the defeat of Japan.
In his turn, the President agreed that a decision for action be
yond Sicily was necessary.

He was also concerned that the more than

twenty divisions of Anglo-American battle trained troops be effectively
employed.

The President felt, however, that the cross-Channel invasion

must take place as early as possible and not later than the spring of
1944.

"He reiterated his frequently expressed determination to concen

trate our military effort first on destruction of Nazi military power
before engaging in any collateral c a m p a i g n s . H e felt that the only
way to force Germany to fight and thus aid Russia was the strike through
France^ as advocated by the American military staff.

The President was

^Churchill, IV, p. 792.
^William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York:
p. 159.
^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 503.

Wittlesey House, 1950),
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also very much concerned with keeping China in the war.

He said that

priority aid to China in 1943 and 1944 must be considered.^
With such guidance from their highest authorities, the Combined
Chiefs of Staff met on the following day (May 13, 1943).
ginning there was an atmosphere of tension.

From the be

Lord Ismay has reported

that "as soon as the controversial question of future operations after
the capture of Sicily came under discussion, it was clear that there was
going to be a battle r o y a l . A d m i r a l Leahy, the Chairman of the American
Joint Chiefs of Staff, presided over the initial meeting and reported
British refusal to consider any major military undertaking during 1943
outside the Mediterranean.

Leahy was much concerned by this British

attitude, for "President Roosevelt . . . had directed me to press for a
O

British-American invasion of Europe at the earliest possible date."
American arguments concerning a cross-Channel attack in 1943
were well known to the British.
same at this conference.

The arguments remained essentially, the

American doubts concerning British reasons for

non-concurrence with the 1943 cross-Channel venture also continued un
changed.

The arguments and doubts of both nations can be summarized.
The American proposal for a 1943 attack along the French Channel

coast, with the possibility of a smaller "emergency" 1942 attack, had
been accepted by the

British in April 1942.

Scarcely a month later the

British reversed themselves and, instead, pressed for the North African

^Churchill, IV, p. 794.
^Ismay, p. 296.
^Leahy, p. 160.
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campaign, later Jcno’t'm as Torchi

Resolution of the deadlock between the

respective national staffs proved impossible, and the President told his
staff to agree on action in some other theater where American troops
could engage the Germans in 1942.

In the face of British stubbornness,

little choice remained for them, and the American Chiefs of Staff finally
agreed to Torch, with the clear understanding that there was still to be
a 1943 cross-Channel attack.

(Since Operation Torch and the resulting

Tunisian campaign took longer to complete than planned, the 1943 crossChannel schedule became impossible.)

In spite of this delay, the British

were now proposing a sequential move to the Italian mainland which, they
claimed, would take Italy out of the war.

Although capitulation of Italy

might well result if the British plan were accepted, the Americans were
not convinced that such a victory would be a significant contribution
toward the defeat of Germany.

Meanwhile, support of an Italian venture

would certainly preclude an adequate force build-up in England, a necessary
prerequisite for a cross-Channel effort in 1944.

Indeed, the Americans

continued to be suspicious of British intentions to land troops in France
at all.

Some American staff members were convinced that Britain would

postpone such a landing as long as possible, and perhaps avoid it
altogether.
The British had arguments to counter the American fears.

Their

leaders considered the strategy they advocated as being justified by the
success of Operations Torch.

In their eyes, American doubt was unwarranted.

The British felt that the only difference which existed between themselves
and the Americans over the cross-Channel attack was one of timing.

They

agreed now that such an attack was the only way for delivery of the final
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blow against Germany.

However, British experience with opposed landings

in former wars had proved costly, and they felt an attack on the coast of
France in 194$ would be premature and, if launched, would result in a
repetition of those costly failures of the past.

During conference pro

ceedings, Alanbrooke explained a number of times in great detail that the
British wished to disperse French-based German troops prior to the
launching of a cross-Channel attack.

Such was the goal of so-called

peripheral forays^ which his staff advocated.
adrastic reduction in these

They

were convincedthat

German forces was necessary

before the dual

tasks of troop landings and establishment of sufficient supply and admini
strative bases could be accomplished.

In early conference arguments, the

British developed as additional prerequisites to the cross-Channel invasion
air superiority and interruption of German lines of communication, which
were vital between the German eastern front and France.

Finally, the

British argued there were deficiencies in numbers of landing craft and
similar shipping capability.

They insisted these were so important to the

success of the cross-Channel operation that the action should be delayed,
pending availability of adequate equipment.
Against such a backdrop of tension and disagreement, the doubt
expressed by Alanbrooke in his diary, that any good could come of the
conference,2 was understandable.

With each side convinced of its respec

tive wisdom, compromise appeared remote.

Past conferences had concluded

with the British winning most of their debated points, particularly in the

^Bryant, Turn of

the Tide, p. 513.

^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 504.
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military arena.

However, at Trident the Americans were not only better

prepared to support a debate, but the staff had also been able to hold
valuable preliminary discussions with the President in which they had
won him over to their side.

Thus the United States delegation had

entered the conference in the favorable posture of being united in favor
of cross-Channel operations as the highest priority for combined action.
With each conference participant well prepared and convinced of
the merits of their respective positions, concerted effort was required
in the search for an effective compromise.

As spokesman for the British

effort, Alanbrooke asserted the elimination of Italy would ease the
formidable tasks attendant upon an Anglo-American force landing in north
west Europe from the British Isles.

British Air Chief Marshall Portal

was of the opinion that the balance of forces on the continent would
change more quickly in Allied favor if Mediterranean operations were
undertaken before launching a cross-Channel attack.

Summarizing this

point of view, Alanbrooke expressed the British Chiefs' firm intention
to execute the cross-Channel operation as soon as sufficiently favorable
conditions would arise in 1944, but that in the meantime Allied action
bearing directly against Germany should consist of intensified bombard
ment .^
General Marshall was again the foremost spokesman and negotiator
for the United States staff on European strategy.

It became apparent to

him as the impasse continued that emphasis on air operations might provide
a means toward compromise.

iMatloff, p. 129.

Inasmuch as the British chiefs were thinking
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in terms of British bases for air attack, limited action in Italy and
resultant provision of bomber bases there from which to attack Germany
could be. justified.

1

Moreover, such limited Italian action should be

possible with the forces already at Eisenhower's disposal in the
Mediterranean theater.
Therefore, Marshall began to advocate the use of air strength
from the Mediterranean.

Responding to this relaxation in the American

position, the British staff became more amenable to the cross-Channel
operation in 1944 provided the Americans were willing to a

scaling down

of its size;

of "back door"

The result of these conversations was a kind

approach to compromise, which provided concessions agreeable to both
sides.

The Americans could agree to limited action in Italy if they had

a firm date against which to plan the 1944 cross-Channel invasion, albeit
with lesser force.

The British, in the absence of better terms, could

agree with a firm date for cross-Channel operations provided the "Italian
prize" could be exploited.
Once these major concessions were made, the debate concerning
optimum action in both theaters could be narrowed down to the availability
of strength and resources.

The British first estimate of requirements

for a 1944 cross-Channel action had called for 8,500 landing ships and
similar craft to lift simultaneously ten divisions.

Both Marshall and

his chief planner. General Wedemeyer, termed this requirement a "logis
tical impossibility."2

After further study, the United States planners

^Matloff, p. 130.
^Matloff, p. 132.
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concluded that, assuming continued Mediterranean action after Sicily,
enough landing craft could be provided in England by the spring of 1944
to lift only five divisions, three in the assault wave and two in the
follow up wave, in a simultaneous operation.
that number might be sufficient.^

However, they felt that

American planning estimates as finally

accepted by the conference for guidance to the cross-Channel planners
were thus half the original British estimate.
British agreement to a definiteoperation with
the Americans agreed to thesmaller

force.

In order to win firm
a definite target date,

As a furtherconcession,

the

Americans also agreed that the 1943 landing craft production rates,
rather than the higher 1944 rates, would suffice as planning factors.
In this way, the time for a cross-Channel operation could become firmly
committed.
In return for this British concession, the Americans yielded to
the British insistence for limited Mediterranean operations.

The United

States staff indicated their willingness to plan with the object of
eliminating Italy from the war.

However, no precise plan for accom

plishing this was adopted by the conference.

Instead, General Eisenhower,

Commander in Chief for North Africa, was instructed to plan such operations
on the basis of having available twenty-seven divisions of troops.

The

final decision for mounting the operation, however, was to be reserved to
the Combined Chiefs of Staff.^

^Matloff,

p. 134.

^Matloff,

p. 134.
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It must be remembered that Churchill had suggested the Trident
meetings to achieve agreement on the invasion of Italy.

The conference

results, therefore, were disappointing to the Prime Minister.

"As this

was the main purpose for which.I had crossed the Atlantic, I could not
let the matter rest.

He appealed to Hopkins for aid in obtaining a

more definite decision concerning Italy from Roosevelt.

Although

sympathetic with the Prime Minister's anxiety, Hopkins was doubtful that
the United States Chiefs would be overruled.

Not to be defeated,

Churchill proposed to visit the North African Headquarters enroute to
England for discussion of Italian possibilities with Eisenhower, whose
staff would have planning responsibility for any action taken.

Roosevelt

agreed that such a visit would be useful in providing Eisenhower and his
staff a more complete understanding of the Trident deliberations.

There

fore, when the Prime Minister expressed a feeling of awkwardness should
decisions be.taken in favor of the British desires, the President asked
Marshall to accompany the party.^
The time spent with Eisenhower and staff extended just over a
week and had far-reaching effect on the final decision in favor of the
Italian invasion.

The visit also provided a unique opportunity for these

high level command personnel to observe the battlefield situation at
close range.
The first meeting was held at Eisenhower's villa on May 29, 1943.
In attendance were Churchill, Alanbrooke, Alexander, Cunningham, Tedder,

^Churchill, IV, p. 810.
^Churchill, IV, p. 811.
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Ismay, Marshall, Bedell Smith, and Eisenhower.

The visitors brought

Eisenhower and his staff up to date by means of a briefing on the Trident
decision.

They also emphasized the fact that among the Allies only the

Russian land forces would be able to produce decisive results in 1943.
Following the briefing, the crucial issue, the mounting of an Italian
campaign, was raised.

Eisenhower's initial reaction was that if Italy

was to be knocked out of the war, it should be done "immediately after
Sicily and with all the means at our disposal . . . (he felt) that this
would simplify his problems.

If Sicily were to succ.eed",-^s'ay~within a

week, he would at once cross the straits and establish a bridgehead."^
Marshall suggested that since no firm decision could be made until the
result of the attack on Sicily were known, it might be wise to set up
two forces:

one to plan for Sardinia and Corsica, and the other for

operation against the mainland of Italy.

Then, when sufficient facts

for decision became available, both forces would move against the
objective then decided upon.^

Eisenhower and Alexander agreed that,

depending upon the ease of operations in Sicily, they would prefer Italy
as the next step.
In view of the general agreement at the first meeting, Churchill
"tried to clinch matters"^ at the next and last meeting on May 31.

He

had marshalled all the facts in a paper called "Background Notes" and
had circulated it for use by all the principals before the meeting.

^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 520.
^Churchill, IV, p. 819.
3Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p. 522.
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is evident that the Prime Minister did his utmost to wring from Eisenhower
and Marshall agreement for action against Italy which could be wired
immediately to the Combined Chiefs of Staff for approval.

He was unable

to win over Marshall who, although not in disagreement with the ideas ex
pressed, would not agree to a clear-cut decision until after the attack
on Sicily had begun.

Following Marshall's lead, Eisenhower saw that he,

would have to await developments and in the light of them advise the
Combined Chiefs of Staff plans and recommendations for follow-on operations.
Alanbrooke recorded in his diary for May 31 "the situation is on the whole
much as we settled it in Washington, which is as it should b e .
Developments testify to the success of the Churchill-sponsored
North African journey.

Such discussions, conducted as they were by men

held in high esteem by battle commanders, served, to remove doubt from
the minds of key people in the field as to preferred decisions.

This

visit is typical of Churchill's willingness to travel anywhere at almost
any time in the interest of furthering the Anglo-American cause.

By

bringing pertinent political factors and his own personal convictions
into play during the decision making process, he was able to hasten
progress toward his goal.

Since he commanded the respect of his fellow

American allies at all levels, few Allied decisions were made and executed
without his strong influence.

Indeed, up until Trident, his voice appeared

to be the most dominant.
That the American strategic cause made gains at Trident is at
tributable to better staff preparation.

Even more important was Marshall's

^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p . 522.
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ability to present the American case to Roosevelt with such firm con
viction that the President agreed.

From a political point of view, the

American President had a considerably freer hand in administering the
.United States war effort than had the British Prime Minister.

Further

more, Roosevelt had a strong tendency toward making the final decision
for his country in matters pertaining to warfare.

Therefore, once his

military advisers gained his complete confidence and convinced him of
their strategic wisdom, it became more difficult for the Prime Minister
to bring the President's ideas into line with his own.

We know from

Admiral Leahy's account of the final Joint Chiefs of Staff meeting with
the President in preparation for Trident that:
It was determined that the principal objective
Government would be to pin down the British to
invasion of Europe at the earliest practicable
full preparations for such an operation by the

of the American
a cross-Channel
date and to make
spring of 1944.1

Hence, the President deliberately decided to support his staff in
obtaining British agreement to early /cross-Channel operation.

An official

Army historian of the period has said there is no clear explanation of
Roosevelt's motives for taking such a stand .at the time.^

But whatever

the pressures upon the President and whatever his motives, at last he and
his staff were of one mind in trying to obtain decisions and plans for the
American military objective - a Second 'Front.
was sufficient as a preliminary step.

The success they enjoyed

The next step took place less than

three months later at the first Quebec Conference, which was named Quadrant.
l-Leahy, .pp. 157-158.
O

Maurice Matloff indicates by footnote that: "Searches of the official
files in Washihgton and of the Roosevelt and Hopkins papers at Hyde Park have
yielded no records of the meetings of 2 May and 8 May of the JCS with the
President at the White House. The only record - -even in published accounts that has turned up is in Admiral Leahy's memoirs.
(Matloff, p. 125).
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Quadrant;

A Plan is Agreed

It is interesting to note that the American strategy for crossChannel action, and insistence upon adherence to it, became progressively
firmer even as British success in obtaining an invasion of Italy developed.
A strong element in this hardening of Roosevelt's support for a crossChannel invasion seems to have been the earnest convictions expressed to
him by Secretary of War Stimson following the Secretary's July 1943 visit
to Europe and North Africa.

His report, complete with conclusions, is

outlined in detail in the Stimson m e m o i r s T h e
arguments on several main points.

Secretary based his

First, the Combined Chiefs of Staff .

planning group responsible for cross-Channel planning had told him that
the plan was sound, but that its time schedule could not withstand any
interference from new or unprogrammed actions.

Therefore, Stimson wanted

to forestall any interference with the plan or its execution.

Secondly,

in discussions with Churchill, the Secretary of War detected a British
fear that a German counterattack after landings of Allied forces in
France might succeed.
to mount the attack.

Stimson felt this fear dampened British willingness
For his part, Stimson thought assurances from the

air commanders that they could block German reinforcements were adequate.^
General Eisenhower had made a convincing third point which the Secretary
presented to Roosevelt.

The General had suggested the possibility of

limiting the war in Italy to capturing air bases there.

The latter were

of great value in prosecution of the air battle against Germany, because

^Stimson and Bundy, pp. 429-438. ■

2

Stimson and Bundy, p. 431.
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they would provide more ready access to targets in southeastern Germany.^
Such argument as the latter point was reminiscent of Marshall's arguments
during Casablanca and Trident talks.
The most effective of the conclusions reached by Stimson and
presented by him to the President just before the Quadrant Conference
is quoted as follows :
I believe, therefore, that the time has come for you to decide
that your government must assume the responsibility of leadership
in this great final movement of the European war which is now
confronting us. We cannot afford to confer again and close with
a lip service tribute to Bolero (the cross-Channel build up in
England) which we have tried and failed to carry out. We cannot
afford to begin the most dangerous operation of the war under
half-hearted leadership which will invite failure or at least
disappointing results. Nearly two years ago the British offered
us this command.
I think that now it should be accepted — if ‘
necessary, insisted on.^
Stimson's point concerning only "lip service tribute" to Bolero
was well taken, for twice had joint instructions been given to prepare
a cross-Channel action only to have the force diverted— to North Africa,
in the first instance, and to Sicily in the second.

When these diversions

occurred, the American men and equipment not required for the alternative
course of action were invariably diverted to the Pacific theater.
While in the early stages of mobilization, the Americans could
replenish the Bolero losses without severe impact on field operations
provided the rate of build up remained slow.

However, as production

began to reach capacity, and as military and industrial demands for
manpower increased, it would become impossible to supply forces and

^Stimson and Bundy, p. 433.
^Stimson and Bundy, p. 437.
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equipment to each of several hlgh-consumption theaters.

Therefore, as

preparations for Quadrant were made, the military departments approached
a supply and personnel crossroads.

If the Pacific action was to con

tinue on the scale already in progress at that time, then a choice had
to be made for the locale of full scale action against Germany— either
Italy or France— not both.
The British had consistently argued for the Mediterranean plan,
and all’Anglo-American actions in that theater had been successful.
Hence, Churchill and staff approached Quadrant in the same conceptual
frame of mind as in the past--application of whatever force was required
for victory against Italy.^
The American "crossroads" situation disturbed Marshall, for
some of his army planners were beginning to fear the Mediterranean
trend had gone so far as to be almost irreversible.

Therefore, they

were beginning to favor a settlement of differences and at least be
unified with the British in one theater or the other.

General Hull,

Chief of the Operations Plans Division Theater Group, expressed the
disturbing trend of thought in a memorandum to his chief during midJuly 1943 :
Although from the very beginning of this war, I have felt that
the logical plan . . . was . . . across Channel by the most
direct route, our commitments to the Mediterranean have led me
to the belief that we should now reverse our decision and pour
our resources into the exploitation of our Mediterranean
operations.%

^Bryant, Turn of the Tide, p.^ 579.
^Matloff, p. 165.
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General Hull and others were discouraged by the sharp contrast
between original plans supporting the Bolero build-up and the actual
force available in England.

Their attitude is unders'taiidable when one

considers that the first estimate was that the United States could have
over a million men and 4,000 airplanes in England by April 1943.

Actually

by that date, the United States had only 109,137 troops and 873 aircraft.
On the other hand, by July 1, 1943, the United States had 540,087 troops
and 4,087 planes in the Mediterranean area.^
Although Marshall and his chief planner. General Wedemeyer, never
faltered in their conviction about the feasibility and necessity for „ .
cross-Channel effort, they were pleased that, during this period of the
doldrums for their planning staff, a cross-Channel plan, which had been
directed during the Trident conference, was completed.

A product of the

combined planning staff in England, the plan was for Overlord, the
eventual cross-Channel operation.

Submitted to the United States staff

in Washington only a week before the conferees gathered at Quebec for
Quadrant, the Overlord Plan provided Marshall a vehicle for use in
attracting and holding the President's support for firm cross-Channel
force and re-affirmation of the Trident agreed time of May 1944.
Thus, the plan for Overlord plus the above mentioned Stimson
arguments combined to harden Roosevelt's resolve to insist upon early
Channel operation during the Quadrant meetings.

One other discussion

qontained the crowning element in Roosevelt's decision to go all out

^Matloff, p. 166.
^Matloff, p. 168.
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for the proposed May 1944 action against the French coast.

That conver

sation took place at the White House on August 10, 1943, when the Joint
Chiefs of Staff joined the President and the Secretary of War to discuss
Quadrant.

The Secretary qualified a statement by the President which

had indicated that Churchill favored operations against the Balkans.
Stimson's qualification was that the Prime Minister while disclaiming
any wish to land troops in the Balkans did feel that gains were possible
there if allied supplies to the Balkans peoples could be increased.
Stimson affirmed, however, that the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony
Eden, wanted the Allies to invade the Balkans.

1

These comments led the

President to express the philosophy underlying his conduct of the war
and his desire for the post war period.

He acknowledged the British

Foreign Office's desire to forestall Soviet influence in the Balkans by
getting there first.

However ;

He did not believe the USSR desired to take over the Balkan
States but rather the USSR wished to establish kinship with
other Slavic people . . . It is unwise (he stated) to plan
military strategy based on a gamble as to political results.^
Thus, it can be seen that Roosevelt's attention was becoming more and
more focussed on the post-war world, free of favored positions, con
trolled by a new community of United Nations.

In view of this

orientation, he could not agree with the pragmatic establishment of
one national influence (the British) ,in a physical position (the
Balkans) that smacked of "deals" or spheres of influence in the

^Matloff, p. 215.
^Matloff, p. 215.
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balance of power tradition.

To forestall any British tendencies in this

direction, Roosevelt may well have decided that day to make the growing
power of his nation the dominant force in mounting Overlord.

Such a'

decision would certainly justify his expressed wish to provide "a larger
force in Great Britain . . .

so that as soon as possible and before the

actual time of landing (on French soil) we should have more soldiers in
Britain dedicated to the purpose than the British."^
Several days after these remarks by the President, Quadrant
convened.

Initial discussions between the members of the Combined Chiefs

of Staff concentrated on resolving the question of whether the main effort
would be made from England or in the Mediterranean.

As was usual at these

conferences. General Marshall again was the principal American spokesman,
pertinent facts being supplied him by a well-organized supporting staff.
A similar alignment was present for the British partner, with Sir Alanbrooke as the chief British spokesman, ably assisted by Air Marshal Sir
Charles Portal.
In accordance with previous American decisions, the American
representatives proposed that Overlord be given overriding priority over
other operations in the European theater.

Somewhat as a surprise to the

Americans, Alanbrooke indicated complete agreement that Overlord should
be the major offensive for 1944, but he went on to stress the absolute
necessity of first achieving the main conditions upon which success of
the plan depended;

^Stimson and Bundy, p. 438.
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(1) . . .Substantial reduction in the strength of German fighter
aircraft in northwest Europe.
(2) . . .Not more than twelve mobile German divisions in northern
France at the time the operation was launched, and . . . not
possible for the Germans to build up more than fifteen divisions
in the succeeding two months.
(3) . . .The problem of beach maintenance of large forces in the
tidal waters must be overcome.1
Alanbrooke insisted that the main British aim of the Italian operations
was to force the Germans to shift much of their force from northwestern
France to Italy, thereby weakening the German defenses in France to
levels satisfactory for mounting the Overlord plan.
Such an agreeable interchange would tend to forecast smooth
progress toward final agreement.

This was not the case, however, for

American doubts concerning the facts supporting the British provisos were
evident.

To begin with. Overlord called for the transfer of seven

divisions from the Mediterranean to support the cross-Channel operation.
Such an allocation had been decided upon at the Trident conference, and
guidelines to Overlord planners had been issued.

Eisenhower had indi

cated to Marshall that he could operate the planned limited Italian
effort without the seven divisions.
The British disagreed and argued that withdrawal of the seven
divisions from Italy would jeopardize the possibility in diverting
German troops from France to Italy.

In their view, a decision to grant

"overriding priority to Overlord" would thus be "too b i n d i n g . I n
consideration of this British objection, Marshall was able to exhibit

^Churchill, V, p. 77
^Matloff, p. 215.
^Matloff, p. 221.
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some flexibility.

Prior to the conference, Roosevelt had asked him if

the seven divisions, which Overlord would withdraw from Italy, could
not be replaced with seven new divisions.

Marshall replied that to do

so would have some adverse impact on the Bolero build up, but the
principal difficulty would be encountered in transporting the new di
visions.

Notwithstanding, a new force could be available^o the

Mediterranean by June 1944.^

Nothing more had been done about this

force of men, however, because of Eisenhower's indication that he could
get along without them.

With such flexibility available to provide a

force of this approximate size, the Americans withdrew from their position
of "overriding priority" for Overlord.

In its place the President agreed

to the more ambiguous ;
As between Operations Overlord and operations in the Mediterranean,
where there is a shortage of resources, available resources will
be distributed and employed with the main object of insuring
success of Overlord.2
Fearing that Mediterranean ventures might thus be permitted to drain off
vital strength from the cross-Channel operation, the Americans argued
for and obtained a saving clause that "all Mediterranean operations
would be carried out (on the basis of) forces allotted at Trident.
Churchill strongly favored Overlord for 1944 provided the con
ditions presented by Alanbrooke were met.

Additionally, the Prime

Minister insisted;

^Matloff, p. 213.
^Ray S. Cline, United States Army in World War II, The War De
partment, Washington Command Post; The Operations Division (Washington;
Department of the Army, 1951), p. 225.
^Cline, p. 225.
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That every effort should be made to add at least twenty-five
per cent to the first assault five divisions versus the
three called for in the plan. This would mean finding more
landing craft. But there were still nine months to go, and
much could be done in that time . . . Above all the initial
lodgment must be strong.1
Always alert to insuring a strong partnership with the United States,
as shown by his earnest cooperation in this argument, Churchill took
another most important step during Quadrant towards settling the command
of the cross-Channel action.

Since the United States forces would be

dominant in the Overlord operation, or would be soon after a continental
bridgehead had been established, the Prime Minister recommended to
Roosevelt that an American commander be designated.

Although Churchill's

logic was unimpeachable, previous plans had envisioned a British commander,
and at least tentatively, Alanbrooke had been promised the assignment.^
In making this offer, Churchill (probably by divination) not only met the
President's desire for an American commander, but he also forcefully
demonstrated his dedication to the vital Anglo-American cooperation most
important to his established goal of victory.
Quadrant was not the last conference in the Anglo-American
cooperation; nor were the arguments finished as to distribution of
forces and locale of application.

However, decisions for the place,

means, and time to meet Russia's continuing demand for a strong Second
Front were stated at Quebec.

As an individual conference of the midwar

period, Quadrant was noted for relatively few unusual accomplishments.

^Churchill, V, p. 85.
^Churchill, V, p. 85.
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Decisions made there were sufficiently firm to provide dependable
guidance to operational and logistical planners of both military
establishments.

Following these decisions, both political and military

chiefs were justified in assigning their top level talent to the
leadership of Overlord.

All levels of authority could respond posi

tively and with confidence to the challenge now scheduled for May 1944.
Quadrant also brought to light a marked change in Churchill's
attitude toward the cross-Channel attack.

A number of reasons might

account for his quick agreement that Overlord must receive maximum
support.

He must have been impressed by Secretary Stimson's arguments

during the letter's visit to England in July.

The Prime Minister knew

the growth rates of production and military manning in the United States.
He knew that this force had to be used in an optimum manner.

He also

recognized the strategic logic of supporting an operation desired by a
partner who would supply more than half the invasion force.

The most

important stimulus to Churchill's support of the May date may well have
been his realization that this might be his last change to bring the
massive American strength against Hitler with such devastation.

Surely

he was aware of the frustration and dissatisfaction the British strategic
arguments (although perhaps completely valid) had caused in American
circles of command.

American threats to pick up the "Pacific alternative"

might cease to be bluff.

He could not permit that to happen, for as much

as he favored the Italian action, he also knew that attack through Italy
alone was not likely to defeat Germany, and decisive victory over Germany
continued to be his primary goal.
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Cairo-Teheran:

A Goal is Reached

Toward the end of the Quadrant conference, Washington learned
that Stalin had agreed to meetings in Moscow of the United States,
British, and Soviet foreign secretaries.

The meetings were to be ex

ploratory in character and were to pave the way for a later conference of
the three chiefs of government.^

During these discussions, which took

place 19-30 October 1943, the Anglo-American Quadrant plans for the in
vasion of Europe were described by the Military Observers of the party.
Major General John R. Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission
to Moscow, and General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, British Chief of Staff for
the Ministry of Defense.

The two generals assured the Russians that at

each of the successive British-American conferences from Casablanca
through Quadrant the necessity of aiding the Soviet Union had been a
cardinal consideration.

They reaffirmed the decision of the Trident and

Quadrant conferences to invade France in the spring of 1944.

Deane went

further and advised Russia that the United States Military Mission would
keep the Soviet staff fully informed of progress in the preparation for
Overlord.

Later Deane told General Marshall that "the^Soviet delegation

appeared to be completely satisfied with the sincerity of British and
American intentions.

^Sherwood, p. 749; Churchill, V, pp. 277-283, contains a dis
cussion of the background of the Moscow Conference; Hull, II, pp. 12471280, discusses in detail the political background of the conference
from the United States point of view.
^Letter, Deane to Marshall, October 29, 1943, as cited by
Matloff, p. 295.
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Faithful adherence to this Anglo-American pledge to Russia
seemed essential to the Americans not only in order to avoid strategic
stalemate in Europe but also to strengthen relations of the United Nations
as foreshadowed by the accomplishments of the Moscow Conference.^
became uneasy, however, as various warning signals arose.

They

Stimson has

recorded "further alarms" from the Prime Minister who, through British
Foreign Minister Eden, informed the Russians that a delay of Overlord
for one or two months might be necessary if the Italian campaign failed
to progress satisfactorily.

2

Also at about this time. General Deane,

Chief of the United States Military Mission to Moscow, warned the Joint
Chiefs of Staff that the Americans might be confronted with a demand for
expanded action in the Mediterranean.

In his opinion, the Russians,

although eager as ever about a Second Front, might push for more immediate
relief from German pressure if such were possible as a result of enlarged
Mediterranean action.^
Thus by early November 1943, the American military staff believed
themselves to be faced with possible modifications to the Quadrant de
cisions as well as reopening the whole problem of European strategy.
Their concern resulted not only from the prospect of further arguments

% u l l , II, pp. 1280-1307, This volume contains detailed first
hand account of the political discussions and agreements at Moscow.
^Stimson and Bundy, p. 439; Churchill, V, pp. 289-293. The
Prime Minister's objective was to insure Stalin understood the Italian
problem which would result from moving seven divisions from Italy to
England for Overlord. This Eden-Stalin discussion may have given Stalin
the idea for the invasion of southern France as an adjunct to Overlord.
Such a tactic was discussed at the time.
^Message, Deane to Marshall, November 11, 1943, as cited by
Matloff, p. 303.
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with the British, but they now had the prospect of difficulties with the
Russians.

Stalin had finally agreed to a date and place for a meeting

of the three heads of governments.

Teheran was the place, and November 28

to December 1, 1943, was the time.

Since another Anglo-American summit

meeting was also needed to clarify the questions concerning problems of
strategy in all theaters, a combined conference was arranged.

The primary

Anglo-American political discussions and the routine Combined Chiefs of
Staff meetings were conducted at Cairo, both before and after the political
summit deliberations at Teheran.

That part of the conference conducted

at Cairo was named Sextant whereas the Teheran deliberations were called
Eureka.
Preparations by the staffs'of both nations followed the- same
pattern as for previous midwar conferences.
the differences they had.

Both sides were aware of

The conference administration and techniques

of procedure had become established and were well known by the conference
principals, who had worked well together for considerable time.

Admit

tedly, there were adjustments due to mode of travel (both parties
travelled to Cairo by battleship), and China was represented by
Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and party, who attended those sessions
where topics of their interest were discussed.

However, the Combined

Chiefs of Staff portion of the Cairo meetings was essentially routine.
The opening talks of European operations, however, were in
conclusive, because each side was holding its full fire and only re
hearsing its arguments for the meetings soon to take place with the
Russians.

This resulted from the situation to which the President
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referred at the plenary meeting in Cairo on the 24th of November that
final decisions would depend on the outcome of discussions with Stalin
at Teheran,

Roosevelt went on to say that he felt the problem was

primarily one of logistics; whether Overlord could be retained "in all
its integrity" and, at the same time, the Mediterranean be kept "ablaze,"
He anticipated that Stalin would demand continued action in the Mediter
ranean as well as Overlord,

Just what future action in the eastern

Mediterranean might be taken was, in the President's view, dependent
upon the entry of Turkey into the war.
Stalin,

This also would be discussed with

Although Roosevelt did not attempt to present American arguments

at that session of the 24th, he did draw attention to the growing pre
ponderance of the United States versus British overseas deployment.
In his turn, the Prime Minister indicated his dissatisfaction
with events of the past two months in the Mediterranean,

He recognized

that the Italian campaign had been slowed by the withdrawal of the seven
divisions transferred to the British Isles in preparation for Overlord.
He also lamented the failure to bolster the efforts of the Balkan guerilla
activity and the loss of the Dodecanese Islands,

It was his hope that

the Russians would agree on the importance of bringing Turkey into the
war.

He emphasized that the British had no thought of advancing beyond

the PisarRimini line, which should be the goal of the Italian campaign.
When these objectives in Italy had been reached, the decision would be
made "whether we should move to the left or to the right."

Finally,

while Churchill emphasized that "Overlord remained at the top of the
bill," he contended that it "should not be such a tyrant as to rule out
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every other activity in the Mediterranean."

He considered a degree of

elasticity necessary in the use of landing craft; the scheduled transfer
of landing craft from the Mediterranean to England should be deferred for
a few weeks.^
It was not until the 26th of November, the last day of the first
part of the Cairo talks, that the Combined Chiefs were able to discuss
seriously the strategy upon which they either could or must agree.

The

delay resulted from the presence of the Chinese representatives, who
from Alanbrooke's point of view "understood nothing about strategy or
higher tactics and were quite unfit to discuss theSe q u e s t i o n s . D u r i n g
this meeting, however, an item of great importance to the future operations
in the Mediterranean was thoroughly aired.

On the 25th, the British

Chiefs of Staff had proposed to take full advantage of all possible
opportunities to threaten the Germans in as many areas as possible and
thereby stretch German forces to the utmost.

It was important to break

the "German iron ring" that included Rhodes, Crete, and Greece.

Rhodes

being the key, it should have priority in capture, but operations
against it would require more equipment from the western Mediterranean.3

^This drawing the line of essential differences between the two
staffs was accomplished during the second plenary session at Cairo and
is reflected in Minutes, Second Plenary Meeting, as they are included in
United States Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States,
Diplomatic Papers 1943, The Conference at Cairo and Teheran (Washington;
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 330-334. Hereafter referred
to as Foreign Relations 1943.
^Arthur Bryant, Triumph in the West (New York;
Company, Inc., 1959), p. 56.

Doubleday and

^Minutes of CCS 409, November 25, 1943, as cited by Matloff,
p. 354.
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The British Chiefs wished to obtain .agreement from the Americans to retain
some of the landing craft scheduled for transfer to Overlord.

The

Americans, with Leahy, Marshall, and King again as primary staff spokes
men, were willing to agree but only as a basis for discussion with the
Soviet Staff at Teheran.^

Moreover, they had insisted on the 25th that

an action planned against Burma (Operation Buccaneer), which had been
promised Chiang Kai-shek, and which had been allocated landing craft, must
not be interfered with as a result of the additional Mediterranean actions.
During the deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the 26th,
Alanbrooke raised the matter again to advise that if the Mediterranean
ventures they wished were to be carried out, and if Operation Buccaneer
was also to be mounted, the date of Overlord would be delayed.

He advo

cated "from a purely strategical aspect" that the Combined Chiefs of Staff
consider "putting off Operation Buccaneer since by so doing the full
weight of our resources'could be brought to bear on Germany."

Neither

Marshall or Leahy could agree to accept postponement of Buccaneer for a
number of reasons, but especially for political reasons involving the
President's promise to the Generalissimo.

Alanbrooke. has noted that

"Marshall and I had the father and mother of a row I

We had to come to

an off the record meeting and then began to make some progress.
The matter was not resolved prior to the meetings at Teheran,
however, and the uncertainty of the availability of landing craft,
^Minutes 131st Meeting CCS, 26 November 1943, as included in
Foreign Relations 1943, p. 363.
^Minutes as footnote above, p. 364.
^Bryant, Triumph in the West, p. 57.
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assigned to Buccaneer, for possible use in other operations created
problems which had to be dealt with at Cairo after the Teheran conference
was over.
Both Roosevelt and Churchill had tried for a long time to arrange
the meeting with Stalin which finally took place on 29 November 1943.

1

For Roosevelt, it meant the opportunity to exercise his^charm oh"Stalin
and firmly establish Russian support, so vital to his goal of post war
international cooperation as a means of peace keeping.
mixed feelings.

Churchill had

Up until this time, and until Overlord proved successful,

the Prime Minister held victory as the major goal for his nation.

He

consistently had refused to admit political post war connotations to his
Balkan military

proposals.^

found warm response.

His suggestions to Roosevelt had usually

Teheran, however, might bring a change, for whereas

in the past the Prime Minister had been at least half owner in the
partnership for victory, once Roosevelt had made contact with Stalin,
the British influence might wane.

On the other hand, Churchill also

knew how to deal with fellow statesmen.

He too was vitally interested

in the Russian ability to support his cause for he realized the war was
not likely to be won without the smashing power of the Red army.

^"On December 14, 1941, Roosevelt wrote Stalin about his wish
that they could meet personally . . . "
This statement is contained in
Foreign Relations 1943, p. 3* Same reference allocates pp. 3-107 to
"Pre-Conference Papers; Arrangements for the Conference." P. 8 same
reference■indicates Churchill became involved in correspondence with
Stalin concerning the Teheran visit in June 1943.
^Churchill told Stalin at Teheran "We ourselves have no ambitions
in the Balkans. ' ATT we want to do is nail down these thirty hostile
divisions." (Churchill, V, p. 367).
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Therefore, these two leaders of mighty nations approached Teheran in
eager anticipation that they could collaborate with the "man of steel"
to the mutual advantage of all three.
During the first Plenary session, Roosevelt reaffirmed to Stalin
that Overlord was definitely set for the summer of 1944 and that during
the preceding eighteen months, all military plans had revolved around
the question of relieving the pressures on the Russian front.

The

President went further and strongly reaffirmed his opposition to any
other venture which might delay the start of an immense cross-Channel
invasion of Europe, reduce its force, or imperil its outcome.

However,

the President wanted allied forces to be used in such a way as to bring
maximum aid to thé Soviet forces on the Eastern front.

He added that

some of the possibilities might involve a delay in Overlord and that
before making any decision as to future extensions of operations in the
Mediterranean, he and the Prime Minister wished to have the views of
Marshal Stalin.

Churchill agreed that the cross-Channel invasion was the

highest priority, but he was also very much concerned with the AngloAmerican forces then present in the Mediterranean a r e a w a s six
months or more before Overlord was to begin and these forces could not
stand idle.' He felt that the first objective should be to capture Rome
and the airfields to the north.

Advancing to the Pisa-Rimini Line, the

position could be held with a minimum of force and the surplus used to •
land in Southern France, move up the Rhone valley or to the northern
Adriatic and northeast to the Danube.^

He also asserted that Turkey had

^Foreign Relations 1943, pp. 488-489-
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to be persuaded to enter the war, and subsequently persuaded to seize the
•

Aegean islands and open the Dardanelles.

1

Stalin tôok a differeiit position.

He doubted that Turkey could

be brought into the war, and although he felt the capture of Rome and
the specified airfields was desirable, it was not a necessity.

He was

insistent in demanding the mounting of Overlord at the earliest possible
time.

He added that a pincers movement was always valuable and that a

large scale operation against southern France, prior to the launch of
Overlord, would serve in a very effective manner.

He^feTtftEat the area

of this supporting attack should be southern France rather than farther
to the east as was suggested by Churchill.^
The President was easily convinced in favor of Stalin’s suggestion,
for his own military staff had been advocating a similar theory of concen
tration since early 1942.

He was therefore insistent that the action

for Overlord be firmly settled and that concentration of the force
through France was the best way.

His son, Elliot, who was present at

the conference, reports that the President told him that:
The way to kill the most Germans, with the least loss of American
soldiers, is to mount one great big invasion and then sTam 'em
with everything we've got. It makes sense to me. It makes sense
to Uncle Joe. It makes sense to all our generals . . .
It makes
sense to the Red Army people. That's that. It's the quickest
way to win the w a r . 3

^The Turkish Problem is discussed in Andre Visson, The Coming
Struggle for Peace (New York: Viking Press, 1944), pp. 188-189.
^Foreign Relations 1943, pp. 555-564.
^Roosevelt, p. 185.
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Churchill presented his arguments in all his eloquence, but Stalin
remained adamant.
Mediterranean.

He was opposed to scattering the Allied forces in the

The clear hard fact was that the Soviet Union had seconded

the American case for Overlord.

Henceforth, the Prime Minister would be

fighting a losing battle for secondary operations in the eastern Mediter
ranean.

Stalin insisted in his arguments that what had to be determined,

arid the points were of major importance, were:

the choice of a commander

for Overlord, the date for Overlord, and the matter of supporting opera- ■
tions to be undertaken in southern France in connection with Overlord.^
The Soviet reinforcement of the American military case, strongly
presented and defended by General Marshall on the staff level, permitted
the Très id ent to play more freely the middle man 's . ^ l e —between- the other
two chiefs of state.

Years later Churchill, still convinced that the

failure at Teheran to addpt his policy was an error, wrote:
I could have gained Stalin, but the President was oppressed by the
prejudices of his military advisers, and drifted to and fro in the
argument, with the result that the whole of these subsidiary but
gleaming opportunities were cast aside unused.%
Back in Cairo on the 3rd of December, 1943, discussion of the
unfinished business concerning the decision for or against Buccaneer was
resumed.

At the plenary session on December 4, Churchill maintained that

the additional attack on southern France would require the landing craft
allocated for Buccaneer.^ To support further his contention that the

^Minutes Second Plenary Meeting, November 29, 1943, as contained
in Foreign Relations 1943, p. 537.
^Churchill, V, p. 346.
^Churchill, V, pp. 411-412.
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amphibious support for China should be withdrawn, on December 5, a newly
revised estimate for the manpower required for Buccaneer was received
from Admiral Mountbatten.

This new estimate was so much greater than

previous estimates that to mount the operation as planned would be
impossible.

Therefore, Marshall concurred with the British staff, and
_

__1_____

Roosevelt reluctantly agreed to the abandonment of^ther'p'lan.
British won a point too.

Hence, the

The partners could now join forces for Overlord.

One of them, the Americans, had yielded on the Burma campaign in support
of China in the interest of assuring early victory in Europe.

The other,

Britain, had yielded on the eastern Mediterranean operation.
Through the deliberations at Cairo and Teheran, the AngloAmerican partnership solidified their strategy.
objective was made.

The decision for a firm

Overlord became the main operation against which

the two nations would bend their mutual efforts— at least in Europe.
In response to Stalin's three requirements for Overlord, the President:
(1) chose General Eisenhower as commander, because he felt "I could not
sleep at night with you (Marshall) out of the c o u n t r y ; (2) set the
date for May; and (3) agreed to Operation Anvil against southern
France.

The new estimate was four times greater than the original.
Mountbatten adequately justified the increase on a basis of immediate
British and American experience in "island-hopping" operations, but
cost in landing craft at the time precluded approval.
(Churchill, V,
pp. 411-441).
^Sherwood, p. 802.
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Thé midwar compromises were now a common goal.

National

interests were merged in the final drive for victory over Nazi Germany.
The period of closest cooperation was about to begin.^

^An
editorial of the day said: "Thus the bell that tolls out
the world of Hitler and Tojo rings in a world of a possibledemocratic
future. It
rings in a world not perfect, but livable, not certain but
now clearly
approaching, for which the masses of common men have fought
and hoped." ("Four Men Reshape the World," The New Republic, A Journal
of Opinion. CIX., (December 13, 1943).)

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

We have attempted to show in this study that national interests,
as interpreted by respective leaders, have primary influence on the
decisions of a cooperative international enterprise.

Final decisions

reflect the efforts of national leaders to attain their primary national
goals as compromise becomes effective.

We have seen that each of four

fairly well-defined episodes or sets of events in the successful AngloAmerican World War II cooperation reveal differences in opinion held by
the main personalities.

It is fair to add that tlie opinions of these

people were based upon more than just the current facts with which they
lived.

The life experiences of Roosevelt and Churchill certainly colored

their separate evaluations of world problems.

Recollections of methods

successfully employed before also greatly influenced the approach to
solutions advocated by both men.

We can't say beyond doubt how influ

ential these recollections were, but they may have been dominant in
Roosevelt's motivation.

Herbert Feis calls this reference to previous

experience "historical memories", and has suggested them as having impact
"on some of the outstanding decisions of American wartime diplomacy."

York:

^Francis L. Loewenheim (ed.). The Historian and Diplomat (New
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1967), p. 91.
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That the President concurred in the Wilson philosophy is clear.

How

ever, his recollection of the Wilson failure influenced him to proceed
with caution both at home and abroad.

Nevertheless, at the opportune

moment, he moved to express to the world the principles which would
support his hoped-for system of international cooperation.

The moment

was the Atlantic Conference, and the pronouncement was the Atlantic
Charter.
Churchill was in agreement with Roosevelt's views, but more for
reasons of what he considered to be Britain's primary goal of victory
than for post-war purposes.

By joining the United States in the issuance

of such a proclamation as the Atlantic Charter, Britain established her
self in close partnership with the nation upon whose resources her goal
depended.

Admittedly, bonus results of good feeling toward Britain would

result from the non-Axis nations as a result of this adherence to high
principles.

However, at the time, the Prime Minister's primary conference

objective was cementing relations with "our good friend"^ and advancing
the cooperation.
The Atlantic Conference having enabled closer acquaintance and
understanding between the two principals of the Anglo-American coop
eration, a real working conference logically followed the violent entry
of the United States into the war.

Such a conference was Arcadia, where

Anglo-American grand strategy had its beginning.

The politico-military

decisions which flowed from that first Washington conference were

^Churchill, III, p. 447.
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certainly a basis for victory plans and, as such, were satisfying to
Churchill as he viewed his objectives.

However, in Roosevelt's mind,

another accomplishment at Arcadia was motivated by more than just à
desire for victory.

The agreement to a United Nations organization at

that time was the President's second step toward his goal of global
peace through international cooperation.

Again Churchill joined in,

but his goal at Arcadia was to affirm United States' commitment to a
strategy of "defeat Germany first."

Although Roosevelt agreed to such

a sequence of action because of the military logic involved, the
political climate in Europe at the time, or soon after, might well have
been more important to him.

We know of his eagerness to support Stalin,

which stemmed in part from a desire to insure post-war Russian coop
eration in peace arrangements and post-war settlements.

Moreover, it is

likely that the President was also vitally interested in having maximum
European nationa support of his technique of insuring lasting world
peace.

For such additional political reasons, Roosevelt could not but

agree that the war*in'Eufope had first priority on United States'
resources.
Our third event had the appearance of crisis amid cooperation.
Strategy had been decided at previous conferences.

Indeed, details of

the combined action required as a first effort were discussed during the
Arcadia meetings.

However, preparation for action seemed slow to the

Americans, so they made two almost simultaneously moves for positive
action, one military, and the other political.

The Marshall Memorandum

was the military move, which, in advocating early cross-Channel invasion.
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represented the American strategic philosophy of a direct approach.
Roosevelt made the political move when he implied to Molotov the likeli
hood of 1942 Anglo-American action for a Second Front.

British con

viction that such action would be courting disaster brought about the
Second Washington Conference and Churchill's successful efforts to
divert American force to a North African campaign.

The resulting

compromise decision satisfied in part all three influencing factors of
our study.

Roosevelt was aiding Stalin as promised, although in a some

what restrained manner; Churchill's victory cause was pursued; and
military action was in accord with British strategy of attrition, while
at the same time acceding to the President's political demand for
"action in 1942."

Success of the North African venture should thus

have fostered even stronger cooperation between the two allies, but
Churchill's influence and Roosevelt's somewhat arbitrary political
decision for the North African campaign generated suspicion and illfeeling in American circles toward British military strategy.
These strategic differences played a i^eading role in the series
of events surrounding our fourth episode, during which time progressive
decisions were made for launching the cross-Channel invasion and a
Second Front.

The basic differences had their source in respective

national capabilities and experiences.

Whereas, the British utilized its

navy to supplement relatively small ground forces and wished, through
several small military actions, to disperse large and powerful German
concentrations of force, the Americans wished to mass relatively large
forces in a concentrated manner, "soften up" the enemy area by air attack,
and mount an invasion.
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The British did not oppose a cross-Channel operation.
they agreed that it was necessary to final victory.

Indeed,

However, the British

differed with the Americans in the matter of when the attack should take
place.

British arguments notwithstanding, the American military leaders

pressed for an early cross-Channel attack for a concentrated, quick, and
decisive winning of the war.

Since both the President and Prime Minister

concerned themselves with bringing the Alliance through the war intact,
with the hope of continuing it for purposes of peace, they concentrated
on reconciling strategic differences.

The result, as it emerged from

the mid-war conferences, was a compromise slanted toward the American
desire and was finally agreed as the Overlord Plan.
Although not discussed at length in the main body of this paper,
two points, emphasized by the President throughout the'mid-war period,
reflect the importance he attached to early and decisive action in a
Second Front.

The first point was his insistence that territorial and

political settlements with the Allies be postponed until after the war,
Indeed, in May 1942, he intervened during Anglo-lussian treaty negoti
ations to oppose a guarantee of territorial concession£_to_the USSR, even
though at the time Churchill was willing to yield to the Soviet desire.
The second point reflecting the influence Roosevelt's post-war goals had
on his mid-war stand on the Second Front was his formula of unconditional
surrender.

Although there has been strong feeling expressed, both pro

and con, by a number of writers in the field, concerning the wisdom of
the formula, it is preferable to accept the historian's reflection that
"a statement of the only terms on which we would make peace did not mean.
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as has been alleged so often, that the President's military and
political aims were unlimited."^
with those who fomented war.

Rather, there was to be no compromise

In effect, the President^wanted to drive

a wedge between enemy governments and their people.

His unconditional

surrender statement was a dramatic slogan to serve notice on enemy and
ally alike that there would be no "escape clauses" offered in exchange
for peace as followed World War I.

Thus, by adherence to postponement

of territorial settlements and insistence upon "no strings attached"
to suits for surrender, plus a decisive victory as promised by strong
cross-Channel invasion, Roosevelt could appear at the peace table
uncommitted.

Then, from his and Churchill's dominant position within

the center of a United Nations organization, they would foster the
purposes, while avoiding the errors, of President Wilson's World War I
experience.

^Loewenheim, pp. 109-110.
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I

LETTER FROM PRIME MINISTER CHURCHILL
TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT^

10 Downing Street, Whitehall,
December 8, 1940.
My Dear Mr. President,
1.

As we reach the end of this year, I feel you will expect me to

lay before you the prospects for 1941.

I do so with candour and con

fidence, because it seems to me that the vast majority of American
citizens have recorded their conviction that the safety of the United
States, as well as the future of our two Democracies and the kind of
civilisation for which they stand, is bound up with the survival and
independence of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

Only thus can

those bastions of sea-power, upon which the control of the Atlantic
and Indian Oceans depend, be preserved in faithful and friendly hands.
The control of the Pacific by the United States N a v y ^ n d of the Atlantic
by the British Navy is indispensable to the security and trade routes
of both our countries, and the surest means of preventing war from
reaching the shores of the United States.
2.

There is another aspect.

It takes between three and four

years to convert the industries of a modern state to war purposes.

^Churchill, II, pp. 475-482.
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Saturation-point is reached when the maximum industrial effort that can
be spared from civil needs has been applied to war production.
certainly reached this point by the end of 1939.

Germany

We in the British

Empire are now only about halfway through the second year.

The United

States, I should suppose, is by no means so far advanced as we.

More-,

over, I understand that immense programmes of naval, military, and air
defence are now on foot in the United States, to complete which certainly
two years are needed.

It is our British duty in the common interest,

as also for our own survival, to hold the front and grapple with the
Nazi power until the preparations of the '

1 States are complete.

Victory may come before two years are out; but we have no right to count
upon it to the extent of relaxing any effort that is humanly possible.
Therefore, I submit with very great respect for your good and friendly
consideration that there is a solid identity of interest between the
British Empire and the United States while these conditions last.

It

is upon this footing that I venture to address you.
3.

The form which this war has taken, and seems likely to hold,

does not enable us to match the immense armies of Germany in any theatre
where their main power can be brought to bear.

We can, however, by the

use of sea-power and air-power, meet the German armies in regions where
only comparatively small forces can be brought into action.

We must do

our best to prevent the German domination of Europe spreading into Africa
and into Southern Asia.

We have also to maintain in constant readiness

in this island armies strong enough to make the problem of an oversea
invasion insoluble.

For these purposes we are forming as fast as possi

ble, as you are already aware, between fifty and sixty divisions.

Even
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if the United States were our ally, instead of our friend and indispensa
ble partner, we should not ask for a large American expeditionary army.
Shipping, not men, is the limiting factor, and the power to transport
munitions and supplies claims priority over the movement by sea of large
numbers of soldiers.
4.

The first half of 1940 was a period of disaster for the Allies

and for Europe.

The last five months have witnessed a strong and perhaps

unexpected recovery by Great Britain fighting alone, but with the in
valuable aid in munitions and in destroyers placed at our disposal by
the great Republic of which you are for the third time the chosen Chief.
5.

The danger of Great Britain being destroyed by a swift, over

whelming blow has for the time being very greatly receded.

In its

place, there is a long, gradually maturing danger, less sudden and less
spectacular, but equally deadly.

This mortal danger is the steady and

increasing diminution of sea tonnage.

We can endure the shattering of

our dwellings and the slaughter of our civil population by indiscriminate
air attacks, and we hope to parry these increasingly as our science
develops, and to repay them upon military objectives in Germany as our
Air Force more nearly approaches the strength of the enemy.
decision for 1941 lies upon the seas.

The

Unless we can establish our

ability to feed this island, to import the munitions of all kinds which
we need, unless we can move our armies to the various theatres where
Hitler and his confederate Mussolini must be met, and maintain them
there, and do all this with the assurance of being able to carry it on
tilllthe spirit of the Continental Dictators is broken, we may fall by
the Way, and the time needed by the United States to complete her
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defensive preparations may not be forthcomirig.

It is, therefore, in

shipping and in the power to transport across the oceans, particularly
the Atlantic Ocean, that in 1941 the crunch of the whole war will be
found.

If, on the other hand, we are able to move the necessary

tonnage to and fro across salt water indefinitely, it may well be that
the application of superior air-power to the German homeland and the
rising anger of the German and other Nazi-gripped populations will bring
the agony of civilisation to a merciful and glorious end.
But do not let us underrate the task.
6.

Our shipping losses, the figures for which in recent months are

appended, have been on a scale almost comparable to that of the worst
year of the last war.

In the five weeks ending November 3, losses

reached a total of 420,300 tons.

Our estimate of annual tonnage which

ought to be imported in order to maintain our effort at full strength
is forty-three million tons.

Were this diminution to continue at this

rate, it would be fatal, unless indeed immensely greater replenishment
than anything at present in sight could be achieved in time.

Although

we are doing all we can to meet this situation by new methods, the
difficulty of limiting losses is obviously much greater than in the
last war.

We lack the assistance of the French Navy, and above all of

the United States Navy, which was of such vital help to us during the
culminating years.

The enemy commands the ports all around the northern

and western coasts of France.

He is increasingly basing his submarines,

flying-boats, and combat planes on these ports and on the islands off the
French coast.

We are denied the use of the ports or territory of Eire

in which to organise our coastal patrols by air and sea.

In fact, we
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have only one effective route of entry to the British Isles, namely,
the northern approaches, against which the enemy is increasingly
concentrating, reaching ever farther out by U-boat action and long
distance aircraft bombing.

In addition, there have for some months been

merchant-ship raiders, both in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.
we have the powerful warship raider to contend with as well.
ships both to hunt down and to escort.

And now
We need

Large as are our resources and

preparations, we do not possess enough.
7.

The next six or seven months will bring relative battleship

strength in home waters to a smaller margin than is satisfactory.
Bismarck and Tirpitz will certainly be in service in January.

We have

already King George V, and hope to have Prince of Wales— in— the-line at
the same time.

These modern ships are, of course, far better armoured,

especially against air attack, than vessels like Rodney and Nelson,
designed twenty years ago.

We have recently had to use Rodney on trans

atlantic escort, and at any time, when numbers are so small, a mine or
a torpedo may alter decisively the strength of the line of battle.

We

get relief in June, when the Duke of York will be ready, and shall be
still better off at the end of 1941, when Anson also will have joined.
But these two first-class modern 35,000-ton fifteen-inch-gun German
battleships force us to maintain a concentration never previously
necessary in this war.
8.

We hope that the two Italian Littorios will be out of action for

a while, and anyway they are not so dangerous as if they were manned by
Germans.

Perhaps they might bel

We are indebted to you for your help

about the Richelieu and Jean Bart, and I daresay that will be all right.
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But, Mr. President, as no one will see more clearly than you, we have
during these months to consider for the first time in this war a fleet
action in which the enemy will have two ships at least as good as our
two best and only two modern ones.

It will be impossible to reduce our

strength in the Mediterranean, because the attitude of Turkey, and in
deed the whole position in the Eastern Basin, depends upon our having a
strong fleet there.
for convoy.
9.

The older, unmodernised battleships will have to go

Thus, even in the battleship class we are in full extension,
There is a second field of danger: The Vichy Government may,

either by joining Hitler's New Order in Europe or through some manoeuvre,
such as forcing us to attack an expedition dispatched by sea against the
Free French Colonies, find an excuse 1er ranging with the Axis Powers
the very considerable undamaged naval forces still under its control.
If the French Navy were to join, the Axis, the control of West Africa
would pass immediately into their hands, with the graveah-consequences
to our communications between the Northern and Southern Atlantic, and
also affecting Dakar and of course thereafter South America.
10.

A third sphere of danger is in the Far East.

Here it seems

clear that Japan is thrusting southward through Indo-China to Saigon
and other naval and air bases, thus bringing them within a comparatively
short distance of Singapore and the Dutch East Indies.

It is reported

that the Japanese are preparing five good divisions for possible use as
an overseas expeditionary force.

We have today no forces in the Far East

capable of dealing with this situation should it develop.
11.

In the face of these dangers we must try to use the year 1941 to

build up such a supply of weapons, particularly of aircraft, both by
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increased output at home in spite of bombardment, and through oceanborne supplies, as will lay the foundations of victory.

In view of the

difficulty and magnitude of this task, as outlined by all the facts I
have set forth, to which many others could be added, I feel entitled,
nay bound, to lay before you the various ways in which the United States
could give supreme and decisive help to what is, in certain aspects,
the common cause.
12.

The prime need is to check or limit the loss of tonnage on the

Atlantic approaches to our island.

This may be achieved both by in

creasing the naval forces which cope with the attacks and by adding to
the number of merchant ships on which we depend.

For the first purpose

there would seem to be the following alternatives;
(1)

The reassertion by the United States of the doctrine of the

freedom of the seas from illegal and barbarous methods of warfare, in
accordance with the decisions reached after the late Great War, and as
freely accepted and defined by Germany in 1935.

From this. United States

ships should be free to trade with countries against which there is not
an effective legal blockade.
(2)

It would, I suggest, follow that protection should be given to

this lawful trading by United States forces, i.e., escorting battleships,
cruisers, destroyers, and air flotillas.

The protection would be

immensely more effective if you were able to obtain bases in Eire for
the duration of the war.

I think it is improbable that such protection

would provoke a declaration of war by Germany upon the United States,
though probably sea incidents of a dangerous character would from time
to time occur.

Herr Hitler has shown himself inclined to avoid the
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Kaiser's mistake.

He does not wish to be drawn into war with the United

States until he has gravely undermined the power of Great Britain, His
maxim is "One at a time."
The policy I have ventured to outline, or something like it, would
constitute a decisive act of constructive non-belligerency by the
United States, and, more than any other measure, would make it certain
that British resistance could be effectively prolonged for the desired
period and victory gained.
(3)

Failing the above, the gift, loan, or supply of a large number

of American vessels of war, above all destroyers, already in the Atlantic
is indispensable to the maintenance of the Atlantic route.

Further,

could not the United States Naval Forces extend their sea-control of
the American side of the Atlantic so as to prevent the molestation by
enemy vessels of the approaches to the new line of naval and air bases
which the United States is establishing in British islands in the
Western Hemisphere?

The strength of the United States Naval Forces is

such that the assistance in the Atlantic that they could afford us, as
described above, would not jeopardise the control of the Pacific.
(4)

We should also then need the good offices of the United States

and the whole influence of its Government, continually exerted, to
procure for Great Britain the necessary facilities upon the southern
and western shores of Eire for our flotillas, and still more important,
for our aircraft, working to the westward into the Atlantic.

If it were

proclaimed an American interest that the resistance of Great Britain
should be prolonged and the Atlantic route kept open for thé important
armaments now being prepared for Great Britain in North America, the
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Irish in the United States might be willing to point out to the Govern
ment of Eire the dangers which its present policy is creating for the
United States itself.
His Majesty's Government would, of course, take the most effective
measures beforehand to protect Ireland if Irish action exposed it to
German attack.

It is hot possible for us to compel the people of

Northern Ireland against their will to leave the United Kingdom and
join Southern Irelandi

But I do not doubt that if the Government of

Eire would show its solidarity with the democracies of the Englishspeaking world at this crisis, a Council for Defense of all Ireland
could be set up out of which the unity of the island would probably in
some form or other emerge after the war.
13.

The object of the foregoing measures is to reduce to manageable

proportions the present destructive losses at sea.

In addition, it is

indispensable that the merchant tonnage available for supplying Great
Britain, and for waging of the war by Great Britain with all vigour,
should be substantially increased beyond the 1,250,000 tons per annum
which is the utmost we can now build.

The convoy system, the detours,

the zigzags, the great distances from which we now have to bring our
imports, and the congestion of our western harbours, have reduced by
about one-third the fruitfulness of our existing tonnage.

To ensure

final victory, not less than three million tons of additional merchant
shipbuilding capacity will be required.
supply this need.

Only the United States can

Looking to the future, it would seem that production

on a scale comparable to that of the Hog Island sche
ought to be faced for 1942.

of the last war

In the meanwhile, we ask that in 1941 the
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United States should make available to us every ton of merchant shipping,
surplus to its own requirements, which it possesses or controls, and to
find some means of putting into our service a large proportion of
merchant shipping now under construction for the National Maritime Board.
14.

Moreover, we look to the industrial energy of the Republic for

a reinforcement of our domestic capacity to manufacture combat aircraft.
Without the reinforcement reaching us in substantial measure, we shall
not achieve the massive preponderance in the air on which we must rely
to loosen and disintegrate the German grip on Europe.

We are at present

engaged on a programme designed to increase our strength to seven
thousand first-line aircraft by the spring cf 1942.

But it is abundantly

clear that this programme will not suffice to give us the weight of
superiority which will force open the doors of victory.

In order to

achieve such superiority, it is plain that we shall need the greatest
production of aircraft which the United States of America is capable of
sending us.

It is our anxious hope that in the teeth of.continuous

bombardment we shall realise the greater part of the production which
we have planned in this country.

But not even with the addition to our

squadrons of all the aircraft which, under present arrangements, we may
derive from planned output in the United States can we hope to achieve
the necessary ascendancy.

May I invite you then, Mr. President, to give

earnest consideration to an immediate order for a further two thousand
combat aircraft a month?

Of these aircraft, I would submit, the highest

possible proportion should be heavy bombers, the weapon on which, above
all others, we depend to shatter the foundations of German military
■power.

I am aware of the formidable task that this would impose upon
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the industrial organisation of the United States.

Yet, in our heavy

need, we call with confidence to the most resourceful and ingenious
technicians in the world.

We ask for an unexampled effort, believing

that it can be made.
15.

You have also received information about the needs of our armies.

In the munitions sphere, in spite of enemy bombing, we are making steady
progress here.

Without your continued assistance in the supply of

machine tools and in further releases from stock of certain articles,
we could not hope to equip as many as fifty divisions in 1941.

I am

grateful for the arrangements, already practically completed, for your
aid in the equipment of the army which we have already planned, and for
the provision of the American type of weapons for an additional ten
divisions in time for the campaign of 1942.

But when the tide of

dictatorship begins to recede, many countries trying to regain their
freedom may be asking for arms, and there is no source_to_whlch they
can look except the factories of the United States.

I must, therefore,

also urge the importance of expanding to the utmost American productive
capacity for small arms, artillery, and tanks
16.

I am arranging to present you with a complete programme of the

munitions of all kinds which we week to obtain from you, the greater
part of which is, of course, already agreed.

An important economy of

time and effort will be produced if the typ.-s selected for the United
States Services should, whenever possible, conform to those which have
proved their merit under the actual conditions of war.

In this way

reserves of guns and ammunition and of airplanes becomes interchangeable.
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and are by that very fact augmented.

This is, however, a sphere so

highly technical that I do not enlarge upon it.
17.

Last of all, I come to the question of Finance.

The more rapid

and abundant the flow of munitions and ships which you are able to send
us, the sooner will our dollar credits bg exhausted.

They are already,

as you know, very heavily drawn upon by the payments we have made to
date.

Indeed, as you know, the orders already placed or under nego

tiation, including the expenditure settled or pending for creating
munitions factories in the United States, many times exceed the total
exchange resources remaining at the disposal of Great Britain.

The

moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for
shipping and other supplies.

While we will do our utmost, and shrink

from no proper sacrifice to make payments across the Exchange, I believe
you will agree that it would be wrong in principle and mutually dis
advantageous in effect if at the height of this struggle Great Britain
were to be divested of all saleable assets, so that after the victory
was won with our blood, civilisation saved, and the time gained for the
United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should
stand stripped to the bone.

Such a course would not be in the moral or

economic interests of either of our countries.

We here should be unable,

after the war, to purchase the large balance of imports from the United
States over and above the volume of our exports which is agreeable to
your tariffs and industrial economy.

Not only should we in Great Britain

suffer cruel privations, but widespread unemployment in the United States
wQuld follow the curtailment of American exporting power.

156

18.

Moreover, I do not believe that the Government and the people of

the United States would find it in accordance with the principles which
guide them to confind the help which they have so generously promised
only to such munitions of war and commodities as could be immediately
paid for.

You may be certain that we shall prove ourselves ready to

suffer and sacrifice to the utmost for the Cause, and that we glory in
being its champions.

The rest we leave with confidence to you and to

your people, being sure that ways and means will be found which future
generations on both sides of the Atlantic will approve and admire.
19.

If, as I believe, you are convinced, Mr. President, that the

defeat of the Nazi and Fascist tyranny is a matter of high consequence
to the people of the United States and to the Western Hemisphere, you
will regard this letter not as an appeal for aid, but as a statement of
the minimum action necessary to achieve our common purpose.

APPENDIX II

LIST OF PERSONS MENTIONED
IN THE STUDY

Alexander, General Sir Harold, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Armies in
Italy.
Arnold, Henry H . , General, U. S. A., Commanding General, Army Air
Forces, and Chief of the Air Staff.
Beaverbrook, Lord William M. A. , British Minister of Production (for
period of our interest).
Brooke, Sir Alan, General, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.
(Referred to throughout this study as Alanbrooke.
This is due
to his having become a Lord in the British Government during
the World War, thereafter being called Lord Alanbrooke.)
Cadogan, Sir Alexander, British Permanent Under>Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs.
Chiang Kai-shek, Generalissimo, President of the National Government
of the Republic of China.
Churchill, Winston S., British Prime Minister and Minister of Defense.
Cunningham, Sir Andrew, Admiral of the Fleet, First Sea Lord and Chief
of the Naval Staff.
(Replaced Admiral Sir Dudley Pound when
latter died in September 1943.)
Deane, John R . , Major General, U. S. A., Chief of the United States
Military Mission to Moscow.
Dill, Sir John, Field Marshall, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission
at Washington.
Eden, Anthony, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
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Eisenhower, Dwight D . , General, U. S. A., Commander in Chief, Allied
Forces, Northwest Africa; designated as Commander of Overlord
on December 5, 1943, with effect of designation to be at a
later date; entered upon the duties of the position ofSupreme
Commander, Allied Expeditionary Forces in January 1944Harriman, W. Averell, Ambassador in the Soviet Union for latter part of
period of this study.
Hitler,

Adolf, Führer and Chancellor of the German Reich.

Hopkins, Harry L . , Special Assistant to the President.
Hull, Cordell, Secretary of State, United States.
Ismay, Sir Hastings Lionel, Lieutenant General, Deputy Secretary
(Military) to the War Cabinet and Chief of Staff to the
Minister of Defense.
Kennan, George F . , Counselor of Legation in Portugal from August 1942;
Counselor of the American Delegation to the European Advisory
Commission from December 1, 1943.
King, Ernest J . , Admiral, U. S. N . , Commander in Chief of the Fleet
and Chief of Naval Operations.
Knox, Frank, U. S. Secretary of Navy.
Leahy, William D . , Admiral, U. S. N . , Chief of Staff to the Commander in
Chief of the United States Army and Navy, Member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Marshall', George C., General U. S. A., Chief of Staff of the Army;
member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Molotov, Vyacheslov M . , People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the
Soviet Union.
Mountbatten, Lord Louis, Admiral, R. N . , Supreme Allied Commander,
Southeast Asia Command.
Portal, Sir Charles, Air Chief Marshall, R. A. F . , Chief of the Air
Staff.
Pound, Sir Dudley, Admiral of the Fleet, First Sea Lord and Chief of
Naval Staff until his death in September 1943.
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Roosevelt, Elliott, Colonel, Ü. S, A., Commanding Officer, 90th Photo
Reconnaissance Wing, Mediterranean Allied Air Forces; son of
President Roosevelt.
Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of the United States, March 4, 1933April 12, 1945.
Stalin, Josif V . , Marshall of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Council
of People's Commissars of the Soviet Union.
Stimson, Henry L . , Secretary of W a r , 1940-1945.
Truman, Harry S., President of the United States, 1945-1953.
Wedemeyer, Albert C., Major General, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff,
Southeast Asia Command.
Earlier, he was the Chief Planner
for the U. S. Army,
^
Welles, Sumner, Under Secretary of State for United States for the
period of this study.
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